Freedom Agora

NATO After Greenland

What will be the most important consequences – direct and indirect, short and longer term – of the crisis that NATO went through in January 2026, caused by the US administration’s threats about an annexation of Greenland? – Here are some responses. Our readers are welcome to weigh in! We welcome contributions of 200 – 300 words, sent to one of the mail addresses under Contact.

1. Dr. Jamie Shea, Senior Fellow Friends of Europe and Brussels Freedom Hub Advisory Board Member:

The Greenland crisis may not be over yet for the Alliance. With Trump, nothing is ever certain and he may well ramp up the pressure again, once he is no longer diverted by Iran, the stabilisation of Gaza and pursuing regime change in Cuba. Or whatever foreign policy adventure he fixates on next. So NATO has bought time (always a valuable commodity in international relations) and needs to use that time to put itself in a less vulnerable position next time round. 

The first imperative is to come up with a NATO military plan for the defence of Greenland and the wider Arctic region. Allied Command Operations is now working on an Arctic Sentry plan which will no doubt be a key deliverable for the Alliance’s next summit in Ankara in July. It can involve more frequent and larger scale reinforcement exercises in Greenland along the lines of the recent Danish-led  Arctic Endeavour in which 8 mainly Nordic allies participated. More maritime task forces can patrol the eastern shoreline of Greenland, aircraft deployed on a rotational basis as in Iceland and some radar and tracking stations and sensors established on the island with a small NATO command team in Nuuk to maintain coordination with SACEUR ( to overcome the fact that the Pentagon recently re-assigned the defence of Greenland from EUCOM to the US Northern Command). 

The goal here is to pre-empt US unilateral moves against Greenland by not only demonstrating a NATO and European willingness and capacity to defend the territory but also by tying the US into NATO plans and activities, for instance US participation in the NATO exercises. These moves will also undermine Trump’s arguments that only the US can defend Greenland and has to own it precisely for this purpose. Arguably NATO should have started this work much earlier as Trump has been banging the drum over Greenland since his first term and waiting for the crisis to break before acting is rarely good policy. 

Yet there are dangers for NATO here too. Greenland is not the Alliance’s strategic priority. That remains Ukraine and supporting Kyiv to push the Russians back until a sustainable peace reflecting NATO’s security interests can be achieved. An independent Ukraine with a strong army is massively more important to NATO than a fortress Greenland where Russian and Chinese military activity does not currently justify a large buildup of NATO forces. It is precisely those allies that are doing the most to support Ukraine in terms of finance and weapons transfers (including purchases in the US) that are now being called upon to support Trump’s Greenland sideshow. Yet these allies cannot afford to divert precious land, sea and airforces plus logistics and radars or air defence to Greenland when these capabilities will be more urgently needed for the Reassurance Force in Ukraine currently being planned by the Coalition of the Willing. if Greenland cannot be avoided, all (or the majority of) allies have to be involved on a true burden sharing basis or the north-south divide in NATO (nearly as significant as the transatlantic divide) will widen further. The EU can also be involved in mobilising financial support for European military operations in Greenland to take the pressure off the Nordics and have southern Europe contribute more. 

The other danger is that once the European allies mobilise their forces in the direction of Greenland, Trump will reverse course and leave the job to the allies. After all, and despite all the hullabaloo about threats to Greenland, the US has not increased its military presence on the island beyond the 150 space specialists at the US station at Pittufik. These personnel don’t exactly have a combat capability. This at a time when the US is sending valuable aircraft carriers, destroyers, electronic warfare vessels to Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, Puerto Rico and now the Persian Gulf which NATO could use for its upcoming Greenland and Arctic strategy. Not to mention the Baltic and the Eastern Mediterranean. 

Finally a lesson of Greenland is that Republican Congress members don’t always follow Trump on everything and still support the Alliance and US troops in Europe and funding for the Baltic allies, NATO and Ukraine (albeit modestly in this latter case). So whatever the merits or real benefits of “Trump whispering”, a NATO diplomatic strategy based purely on the White House or the US President himself is not wise or in NATO’s long term interest. The NATO leadership needs to diversify its efforts and reach out to the US foreign policy and strategic community more broadly and more effectively. 

2. Dr. Gerlinde Niehus, Brussels Freedom Hub Co-Founder:

Donald Trump’s most recent coercion of a fellow NATO Ally, this time threatening the annexation of Greenland, eventually also with military force, was another near-death experience for the Alliance caused by the same President.

To everyone’s relief, the immediate danger was averted at Davos in January 2026. This was less due to the soft-talking of Trump whisperers like NATO Secretary General Rutte, but mainly because Europeans showed Trump & Co that they do carry a big stick! The perspective to apply a heavy tariffs package of Euro 93 billion and to eventually activate the Anti-Coercion Instrument went down badly with markets reacting with heightened volatility.

The truth be told, NATO has for long largely ignored the Artic. Implicitly, the Alliance acknowledged the “exceptionalism” of the region. This was mainly because NATO’s Artic members, including the US, wanted it that way.

This stance is no longer tenable, regardless of Trump’s coercion. Russia is continuing to ramp up its military presence in the Arctic, which is home to the Northern Fleet, nuclear submarines, missile facilities, airfields, radar stations, and troops. In essence, Russia has created a virtual net over all of its Artic operations. And also cooperation with China is on the rise.

To strengthen security and defence in the High North including Greenland, NATO could pursue the following work strands:

• Establish a dedicated Artic Command, eventually as part of the currently responsible Allied Joint Force Command in Norfolk, US.
• Set-up Artic Sentry modelled around the earlier Eastern Sentry military activity. If launched as multi-domain activity, rather than a full-fledged operation, approval processes are easier and more expeditious.
• Reinforce dedicated training to enlarge the number of skilled forces able to operate under severe weather conditions.
• Increase the range of exercises which are key as NATO’s military presence in the region is not robust enough to deter potential aggressors.
• Beef-up the array of arctic-capable assets which currently remain too limited: For example, Denmark operates outdated frigates that do not meet current readiness standards for Arctic operations, while the UK has reduced its submarine fleet significantly.
• Bolster situational and domain awareness to closely monitor evolving risks.

And on a broader scale: Once and for all, remember that bowing down to a bully only invites this bully to punch you over and over again!

3. Roland Freudenstein, Brussels Freedom Hub Co-Founder:

• After Greenland is before Greenland: the crisis is not over. Trump – or even his successor – may revive the conflict in the future, in the ‘hemispheric spirit’ of recent US strategy documents. That is why the Europeans in NATO will have to now take the lead in stronger efforts for Arctic security, including an improved presence in Greenland. Beyond Greenland, a US hostile to Europe’s democratic mainstream is now one part of transatlantic reality.
• NATO Redux moves from possibility to probability: an alliance with a strongly reduced US presence and involvement is by definition an alliance in which the Europeans and Canada shoulder more responsibility. This is not just a result of the Greenland crisis. However, the experience of Trump’s bullying in January 2026 provides additional ‘fuel’ for stronger action. Europeans will have to create a coalition of the willing, taking the lead in planning for their security with less America.
• The short vs. the long term: One of the most important missions of that group will be to be realistic enough to see that in the upcoming couple of years, we’ll need US weapons and involvement in European security (even in a reduced form) while beyond 2030, the goal must be a Europe which is capable of deterring threats and safeguarding its democracies increasingly on its own. This will require careful balancing, but it’s a better roadmap than an illusory ‘autonomous Europe’ tomorrow, or a prolonged dependence on a neo-imperial US.
• We should leave the door open for a more cooperative US: Trump and MAGA are not history’s last word on America, nor on Euro-American relations. A transatlantic renaissance is possible, but it will have to be based on a more equal, and therefore more mature, relationship.