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  • Book review – Piotr Siemion: Bella Ciao

    My summer reading in 2023.

    “They are seven, moving through mapless, measureless land. They are surrounded by a no man’s world, a bloodstained bedsheet of earth, a shroud at dawn. No kingdom of kindness, just the tired, trampled football field that our millennium has become.” (my translation of the opening lines, with apologies to the author)

    Piotr Siemion, lawyer, top manager and novelist with a rich personal experience in Western Europe and North America, has put 200 years of Polish sacrifice, guilt, domestic strife and strategic dilemma into a (logically dystopian) novel that neatly hovers between tragic past, alternate present and gloomy future. Europe (which is mentioned a lot by the protagonists) is in some kind of postwar situation but it’s never completely clear whether the fictional reality of the novel is closer to 1944, 1945, 1989 or 2022. There is even a reference to 1709 and a Swedish intervention (tough humanitarian this time). Refugees have left, people expelled elsewhere have arrived, and in between are Polish militias, leftovers of regular forces, Russian mercenaries and kids in the forest that survive through cannibalism.

    There is a bit more clarity as to the place: somewhere in Pomerania, in a town whose architecture speaks German and which has one German name (Lanzig) and about ten different Polish ones (from Leńsko via Łancko to Łańcyk). Two of the protagonists also have several names like the heroes of Polish uprisings from 1830 to 1944. All the collective traumas and vitriolic debates, the homicidal, fratricidal and suicidal proclivities of Poland in the course of history are negotiated in almost mathematical permutations in the dialogues, with a confident feeling for sociolects and languages. And ‘Bella Ciao’, the perky musical antidote to oppression and misery is rendered in Swedish as well as Kashub (google that!). The separation of the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’ (where the worst of ‘them’ can be your own compatriots), the desperate oscillation between revolt and submission, the ‘Should I stay or should I go’ of generations of Poles tempted to just get up and leave for safer, richer and greener shores – it’s all there. Some of the dialogues between the two different Polish forces in ‘Bella Ciao’ sound like a copy pasted debate between the current government and opposition after a few drinks.

    There is no shortage of cliffhanger scenes, and there is a surprise ending with a tiny ray of hope, as well as some nuanced characters without total villains or angels, but the strongest element of the novel is Piotr Siemion’s uncanny sense of continental vibes in the air. Slovenia’s heavy industrial band ‘Laibach’ may be politically difficult to bear and musically a bit tedious in recent decades, but in the early 1980s they managed to ‘predict’ the lethal identity politics at the root of the Balkan wars with an esthetic precision that no PoliSci pundit could muster at the time. Siemion wrote ‘Bella Ciao’ between 2015 and 2021 – so after Crimea and before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And by the time it was published, war crimes, torture and expulsions in Europe’s East had become the staple food of TV news and social media.

    So, my non-Polish friends, ‘Bella, Ciao’ is well worth waiting for the English translation – and Piotr Siemion, apologies for any misinterpretations and mistakes. But I had to write this review before gong back to work!

  • Book review – Sönke Neitzel: Deutsche Krieger

    Book review – Sönke Neitzel: Deutsche Krieger

    ‘German Warriors’: My primary summer reading in 2023. Mind blowing, I dare say. So Germany’s leading young military historian, Sönke Neitzel, asks what the Kaiser’s soldiers in 1914, the Wehrmacht ones in WW2, the Bundeswehr’s ‘virtual’ soldiers in the Cold War, and the post-unification first (few) real warriors since 1945 (Afghanistan) had in common. Not to forget a few other German armies in between, such as the 1920s Reichswehr and the East German NVA.

    His ambition is breathtaking in its temporal and intellectual scope. He looks at how political leadership, the standing of soldiers in society and politics, and force structure and inner resilience are intricately linked, in no less than 7 German militaries over 120 years. He zooms in and out, from broad sweeps of the geopolitical and ideological ‘big picture’ to day-by-day accounts of individual battles of WW2 or the Bundeswehr Afghanistan mission. Sometimes you feel like he read an entire book in order to put down a half sentence.

    His primary questions are: What was the common element (subsidiarity/Auftragstaktik, the preference of mobility over firepower, leading from the front, a higher emphasis on offence rather than defence etc.) and: how can German soldiers still be warriors while aiming to be the contrary of Hitler’s Wehrmacht, or even other past German forces, in every sense?

    It is this last question which makes Neitzel’s book so explosive: he is absolutely right (but very much opposed to the PC Berlin zeitgeist) that in order to maintain liberal democracy in the 21st century, neither the emphasis on deterrence of the Cold War Bundeswehr nor the ‘development assistant’ mode of post-2001 will suffice. Soldiers kill and die on the job, and therefore develop a very special tribal culture, which is what makes them unique among professionals. Whether that means that Bundeswehr garrisons should return to celebrating WW2 Fallschirmjäger strikes in Crete or panzer attacks in the East, is a different question. My answer is no; Neitzel is a bit less clear on that. But he is right in saying that Afghanistan, and the sacrifices made by German soldiers there, would offer some ground to create new tribal traditions.

    So for military geeks like me, this book is no less than a treasure trove, more captivating than a Netflix series and food for thought and debate for years to come. Thank you, Sönke Neitzel, for the best book I’ve read in a long time!

  • We Are All Gaullists Now. Are We?

    We Are All Gaullists Now. Are We?

    To the Grand Old Man of wartime and postwar France, Donald Trump’s treatment of America’s European allies would not have come as a surprise. Quite the contrary, he suspected the Americans all along of being perfectly capable of backstabbing their allies (in his view) like in the Suez Crisis of 1956. That is one of the reasons why he insisted on taking France out of NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966 and prioritised developing France’s independent nuclear deterrent.

    In the days of Trump and MAGA, he seems to be proven right, to the point of Dutch Foreign Minister Caspar Veldkamp claiming ‘We’re all Gaullists now’, or Germany’s likely future Chancellor Friedrich Merz demanding European ‘independence from the US’ in security, like an Atlanticist mugged by reality.

    No wonder that Charles de Gaulle is now back in the headlines across much of Europe, way beyond the hexagone of France itself. But before we unquestioningly jump on this bandwagon, let’s examine the entire de Gaulle, assess his present successor Emmanuel Macron and his record on European security, and spend a few thoughts on the future of our relationship with the US. And then chart a course that will hopefully be consensual among the majority of Europeans.

    De Gaulle’s mixed legacy

    While acknowledging the indispensable contribution of les Anglo-Saxons (meaning chiefly Britain and the US) to France’s freedom in the First as well as the Second World War, de Gaulle nevertheless harboured a deep, culture-based bias against them. Incidentally, that was why he went to considerable lengths to keep Britain out of the European Economic Community, the EU’s precursor, in the 1960s. Today, the UK is indispensable to any European security structure, for its size, as well as for its military, diplomatic and intelligence capabilities, especially its own nuclear deterrent. Nobody has brought post-Brexit Britain and the EU closer together than Donald Trump.

    De Gaulle was also very much opposed to all supranational aspects of European integration, advocating a ‘Europe of the fatherlands’ (very much Orbán-style in today’s terms) – and boycotting European ministerial meetings in his ‘empty chair’ policy of 1965 which threw the young community into an existential crisis. The EU wouldn’t be where it is if this purely intergovernmental approach had won the day. De Gaulle also helped to kill the European Defence Community which would have given European integration an early security component, in 1954.

    Finally, his 1959 dream of a ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’ deliberately excluded North America (including Canada) from the continent while approving a strong bond with Russia (as he insisted on calling the USSR). That’s not even equidistance anymore; in today’s terms, this would be appeasement of Putin.

    Praise to Macron where praise is due

    To make things absolutely clear: Macron was right about Europe’s strategic autonomy as a goal. Probably, the concept would have had stronger appeal if he had named it ‘responsibility’. But this is water under the bridge. As much as the Central Europeans were historically right about Russia, he had the right instincts about the probability of the US decoupling from European security in a way Atlanticists (including myself) could not imagine.

    But Macron came late to the party of clearly and decisively opposing Russian aggression under Putin. Only in his Bratislava speech of 2023 did he fully embrace Central European views of Russia, having dangerously appeased Putin – alongside Germany under Schröder and Merkel – for much too long: for almost a decade after the initial aggression of 2014. This attitude went a long way to explain Central Europeans’ and, generally, Atlanticists’ distrust of French leadership on European security.

    Moreover, even after 2023, France has not in every sense followed up its words with concrete action. Today, France’s defence spending has just reached 2 % of GDP while already being in massive debt. And French military assistance to Ukraine, at 3,5 billion Euros, remains behind countries like Sweden, Netherlands and Denmark and above all, Germany with over 12 billion.

    Most importantly, France’s partners in Europe are still worried about the prospect of a Marine Le Pen victory (or some other nationalist’s) in the 2027 presidential election. Would other Europeans then be entitled, or actually forced, to seek strategic autonomy from France? – To say that such a victory is not going to happen, or not going to have any consequences for Europe’s common defence, would be to repeat the mistakes of those who ruled out Trump in 2015, or the disastrous effects of Trump 2.0 in 2024. This is another reason why France as the sole leader on Europe’s security is unlikely, and a backstop against one of the security drivers of future Europe turning nationalist, will have to be part of the formula.

    Is Trump history’s last word on America?

    The answer is, of course, no. First of all, whatever Trump and the Republican Party are claiming, November 6, 2024, was no landslide victory. Trump got less than 50 % of the valid votes (49,8 %), his advance on Kamala Harris was a mere 1,5 percentage points – and 48,3 % voted for her. With the US economy tanking, there are good reasons to assume that the midterm elections in November 2026 will see a Democratic majority in the House, ending unrestrained Republican government. There have been too many moments since the end of the Cold War when the current administration seemed to imply a total and lasting break with the past – for example, George W. Bush’s neocons 2000-2008, and right after that the ‘Obama coalition’ of youngsters, women and Black and Latino voters that were supposed to guarantee Democrat majorities forever. At some point, US electorates will realign again, maybe rather sooner than later.

    Whether Trump and MAGA manage to turn the US into an autocracy, is very questionable. Not just are checks and balances still alive and hard to abolish, but there are powerful federal states, media, civil society and above all, citizens who will at least have an important say in the future of the United States, no matter who is in the White House.

    Most of all, ‘America First’, bullying allies and pandering to autocrats is simply opposed to the founding narrative of the United States. The ‘city upon a hill’ as which America is designed, cannot easily and above all sustainably turned into a jingoistic bully. America the Beautiful is stronger than America the Horrible. Of course, Europe must now defend its freedom against MAGA and Musk, and it should never return to the dependency of recent decades. But it should always prepare for a change of tack in Washington and leave as much as possible of transatlantic ties in place, especially on the sub-national level.

    What we owe to ourselves and our children now:

    · It is high time to put to rest the acrimony of past debates about Russia as well as the US, and step by step work on Europe’s strategic autonomy in defence and security.

    · Obviously, we need to ramp up defence spending, arms production and assisting Ukraine: on this, ‘Gaullists’ and Atlanticists were already in agreement for some time. For sophisticated weapons systems, there should be a clear ‘Buy European’ preference.

    · This will in many cases have to happen in coalitions of the willing, because of Hungarian vetoes, and outside of EU structures in order to include countries like the UK. An EU Army is therefore hard to imagine, as well as an EU nuclear deterrence. Which is why Britain and France will be in the drivers’ seat of rearming Europe and securing a possible ceasefire in Ukraine for quite some time.

    · We need to preserve of NATO as much as possible for as long as possible, because Europe’s autonomy will take time to build; if necessary, we need to stick to ‘NATO Redux’ (with the US remaining de facto passive) but including the UK, Canada and Norway. Even a ‘Ramstein Redux’ Group makes sense, in order to continue security cooperation with Japan, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan etc.

    · Don’t fall for China: China under Xi Jinping has developed into a fundamentally hostile power that, though different from Russia under Putin, nevertheless defines our democracy as an existential threat. Some degree of economic decoupling from China, especially reducing dependency on its markets and lowering the risk of technological penetration, will be necessary – for our own sake, not to please Trump.

    · Global democracy support remains a worthwhile undertaking. Our growth in hard power should not come at the cost of soft power (which is not that expensive anyway). Part of the mantle of America’s past solidarity with democrats across the globe must now be picked up by Europe.

    In other words, we need to embrace strategic autonomy while seeing that it will only emerge step by step. We will need America’s support in a transactional manner where we can get it but should never rely on it for our freedom. It will be a long and arduous road, with lots of socioeconomic distribution battles. But we need to start walking on it now.

  • Will NATO’s new existential crisis be its last?

    Will NATO’s new existential crisis be its last?

    Over the course of its 75 years’ history, NATO has weathered many storms. At least two earlier crises were existential – and in each case the US played a key role:

    During the Suez crisis in 1956, the US under President Eisenhower strongly opposed the use of force by Britain and France to regain control of the Suez Canal, which had been nationalized by Egypt. Britain and France, as the former colonial powers, saw the Suez Canal as crucial to their economic and strategic interests. They believed that the nationalization threatened their influence in the region and decided to take military action, despite U.S. disapproval. At the time, the US forced them to withdraw. More fundamentally, this rift laid bare the lack of political consultations among Allies. In response, NATO developed the famous „Report of Three Wise Men“ which reinforced NATO’s political and non-military role, strengthened political consultations, and contributed to broadening the strategic framework of the Alliance.

    2003 saw another deep rift in the Alliance, this time linked to Iraq. Many NATO nations including France, Germany, Belgium argued that there was no convincing evidence for the presumed existence of Sadam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. At the time, this served as the main argument to justify the incursion. The US, supported by the UK and Poland nonetheless went ahead with the invasion and toppled Iraq’s dictator. While NATO as an organisation was not directly involved, divisions among Allies were so deep and bitter that a break-up of the Alliance was entirely possible. When it transpired in the following that no weapons of mass destruction could be found, this led to a long-lasting damage of US credibility in NATO.
    This time, the crisis caused by Donald Trump and his clan is again existential, and arguably more fundamental, for NATO on several fronts:

    • With his disdain for democracy, D Trump is infringing on NATO’s shared values and principles as enshrined in the Alliance’s 1949 founding treaty, the Washington Treaty. In the preamble Allies commit to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisations of their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and human rights.”
    • His neo-imperialistic coercion targeted, inter alia, against two fellow NATO Allies, i.e. Canada and Denmark’s self-ruling territory Greenland, over whom he wants to achieve control, is in violation of both the UN Charter and the NATO Treaty.
    • By raising doubts if the US would contribute to defending other Allies in case of an armed attack, he is putting into question the bedrock of NATO, the collective defence clause of Article V, Washington Treaty.
    • Trump’s entire strategic orientation, like his cosying up with Russia’s despot Vladimir Putin, or insulting Ukraine’s democratically elected President as a “dictator”, is in blatant contradiction with consecutive NATO Summit decisions. It is symptomatic for a political U-turn away from overarching strategic policies in NATO agreed among all Allies including the US, be these the 2019 Military Strategy, the 2020 Concept for the Defence and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) or the 2022 Strategic Concept.

    In view of all this, does NATO have a plan how to deal with the multiple onslaughts? How would NATO cope with a potential US withdrawal from the Alliance?

    Perhaps there is something well hidden in NATO Secretary General Rutte’s mind, but so far there is little visible or tangible resembling a plan or policy options. The focus seems to rely on talking to key US interlocutors and activating Rutte’s talent as a “Trump whisperer” – which was eventually also one of the main reasons why he got the job as Secretary General. Big parts of NATO seem paralysed. This concerns not only work on defining a new Russia policy (a tasker from the 2024 Summit), but also other work strands. How can the North Atlantic Council still discuss sensitive matters ranging from cyber security via support to Ukraine or steps to strengthen Allied resilience in view of Russia’s intensifying shadow war against all of them, when nations cannot exclude that their positions may well be shared with Moscow? A coherent plan worth that name, or options how to deal with the assault, are lacking.  

    A first immediate step for NATO must be to realise that remaining in the defensive vis-à-vis Trump, like an anxious little rabbit imploring the snake not to hurt it, is probably a recipe to be swallowed. Instead, willing Allies should take the initiative, as a coalition of the willing, and ask the US to clarify whether or not they still abide by a whole range of key strategic documents constituting NATO’s acquis and political agenda. These include the NATO Treaty, the 2022 Strategic Concept, the 2019 Military Strategy to name but the most foundational ones. All these were, of course, also agreed by the US. Depending on the answer received, Allies should either demand the US to honour commitments made, or suspend US membership.

    The logical public focus of NATO’s Secretary General will be to keep the Alliance together and therefore the US in NATO. However, there is no guarantee whatsoever that this is achievable. Marc Rutte would therefore be well advised to pursue in parallel other options and scenarios. This requires strategic-level cooperation with the EU and the fostering of new forms of cooperation via coalitions of the willing.
    Considering the US disregard for Europeans in NATO and the EU, the logical focus of these efforts must be Europe, with the overarching goal to become a serious geostrategic player. The days of Europe’s childhood are over. The decades of geopolitical outsourcing are over. It is high time to grow up and behave like an adult.

    Most of the following reflections and recommendations are based on the so far more likely scenario of an immediate to mid-term end of US support to Ukraine, and the substantive rebalancing of the transatlantic relationship towards a more reduced US role and more European strategic responsibility. This would require the creation of a “coalition of the willing” as an ad hoc solution, the Europeanisation of NATO in conjunction with strengthening the EU as a more capable actor in the realm of security and defence. 

    • Prepare a robust and substantial support package for Ukraine. Defeating Russia in Ukraine is the most effective and efficient investment in European security. European defence begins in Ukraine. To match Russia’s resources on the battle field, just 0.2% of the GDP of European NATO member would be needed, according to new research from the Tony Blair Institute. That is a feasible amount, especially when considering that in the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, European NATO members would have to move to some 5% of GDP on defence.

      For delivering on a potential future peace keeping or reassurance mission, leaders from both EU and NATO need to agree on a new enabling framework – as the unanimity principle of both institutions would otherwise paralyse them.  The most productive would be a „coalition of the willing“ to take things forward. The political lead could come from a Quintet consisting of France, UK, Poland, Italy, and Germany. Preparations on this seem to advance, considering the flurry of meetings between these countries over past weeks. The operational lead could come via the UK-lead Joint Expeditionary Forces (JEF) which would have to be enlarged to also include at least also France, Poland, Germany, Italy and ideally more nations such as Canada.
    • Boost combat capable troops and work towards joint defence planning in Europe: On paper, European armies have a total of 1.9 million military personnel, with 1.33 million in the EU alone. But effectiveness is hampered by a myriad of issues. These range from lack of equipment including most strategic enablers, via lack of training and to lack of unified command. In essence, European armies are so far not set up to fight without US support. A recent analysis from Bruegel concludes that an increase in European capacities equivalent to the fighting capacity of 300 000 US troops would be needed for Europe to defend itself against Russia as the most direct and imminent threat. NATO European Allies should agree within NATO’s defence planning process to a military level of ambition for European strategic responsibility.
    • In view of these huge deficits, commit to raise defence spending to a new baseline of 3.5% of GDP – which was pretty much the norm during the decades of the Cold War in European countries. Political leaders need to be upfront with their populations explaining that peace and security are investments in our prosperity. In parallel, also work towards common funding at EU levels. The EU has mobilized a massive multi-tier support package of ca. € 3.2 trillion in total fiscal response in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. Today’s security challenges are far greater. There is no justification other than political inertia to not embrace an ambitious and robust approach now.
    • Turbo-charge European defence production which so far is too small, too fragmented, and too slow. In this context, work towards closing key gaps in artillery shell production, air and missile defence and deep-strike systems. Also consider NATO’s upcoming report on capability gaps – which is expected to call for 49 new brigades, 1500 tanks and 1000 artillery pieces – as a guide for the EU’s industrial spending priorities.
    • Reinforce the Europe’s Eastern flank as quickly as possible, by redeploying forces and prepositioning equipment. This will reinforce Europe’s deterrence and defence posture vis-a-via Russia as the biggest threat to peace and security. The continuing hurdles with military mobility, e.g. lack of adequate infrastructure like roads or railways, lack of standardized procedures akin to a (non-existing) „Military Schengen“, and the abundance of red tape imply that any large move of forces is slow and cumbersome. Getting ahead of the curve before any potential conflict erupts, is therefore a logical move.
    • Foster synergies with other likeminded partners across the globe: With Donald Trump’s neo-imperialism and unwillingness to behave like a trustworthy Ally, it is important to forge ties with those countries that share the fundamental values and interest of both NATO and EU in upholding a rules-based international. These include capable partners in the Indo-Pacific like Japan, Australia, or South Korea, but should be extended to other partners in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.

    Prepare for the unthinkable: A conventional US withdrawal from NATO and the “nuclear option”

    While to date, Donald Trump has not (yet) repeated his threat to withdraw the US from NATO, considering his unpredictability such a scenario cannot be ruled out. Europeans, be they via NATO and/or the EU need to stick together as “forces for good”, adhering to fair play and global norms, fostering democratic principles, and multilateralism in a civilised world. NATO and the EU should bring their strategic partnership to a new level of practical efficiency. A useful step would be to set up a new albeit informal “Leadership Steering Group” as an organic link, driving the strategic partnership and generating ‘synergy from the top’.

    Altogether, Europeans should pursue a three-pronged survival strategy to regain the initiative and become a serious geopolitical actor. 

    As an immediate and urgent need, largely driven by the imperative to support Ukraine, work on establishing a “coalition of the willing” must be expedited as an ad-hoc solution. This approach allows Europeans to deliver, since spoilers like Hungary or Slovakia cannot block decision making and implementation. 

    On a second track, they must reinforce the Europeanisation of NATO in conjunction with boosting the EU as a more capable actor in the realm of defence and security.
    Europeans have a vital self-interest to deliver expeditiously on more European strategic responsibility, also to keep the US engaged at least mid-term, e.g. with its forces and the nuclear umbrella in Europe. This also buys them some time to build the capabilities they need to better look after their defence and security.  

    On track three Europeans also need to envision a potential worst-case scenario of “NATO minus US”. This would require to establish a new European Defence Alliance (or Organisation), or a Western Defence Alliance, as a new body and based on a coalition of the willing. Such a new institution could merge the rump NATO with the defence and security capabilities developed under the EU umbrella. Setting up such a new institution could also be a useful move to reinforce European capability to act. If based on a coalition of the willing, it could include Canada, and it would avoid the notorious blockages from Russia’s Trojan Horses like Orban and Fico. At the same time, a new institution could include Ukraine which arguably has the most capable and combat experienced armed forces in Europe, hardened by defending the country against a major power, i.e. Russia. This would be a formidable asset. Thinking on all this must start now. The ad hoc “coalition of the willing” forged to deliver European support to Ukraine could be a useful testbed or precursor.

    The good news is that NATO survived earlier crises. Thus, there is hope that also this time it will have the drive and determination to reinvent itself – or be reborn as something new. The jury is out there whether NATO Secretary General Rutte will play any meaningful role in these endeavours. So far, it doesn’t bode too well.

    © Gerlinde Niehus, March 2025

  • Odd Taxi – a brilliant Japanese anime series on YouTube

    Odd Taxi – a brilliant Japanese anime series on YouTube

    Oddo takushii ( = odd taxi), the simultaneously weirdest and best Japanese anime series I’ve seen in a long time. Somewhere between jazz and rap, alternately strange, brutal and miraculous, forever lost in the nocturnal cityscapes of Shibuya, Harajuku, highbrow hotels and junk food places, the docklands and other more or less well known Tokyo haunts, the taxi (as arch-Japanese a place as trains or hot baths) and its driver, a seemingly phlegmatic walrus (all characters are anthropomorphic animals) are at the centre of this rollercoaster ride through organised crime, middle class banality, prostitution, apps & memes, millennial messages and the occasional drawn and fired handgun.

    But like so many Japanese movies, deep down this is all about values, justice and dignity. And indeed it’s amazing how in such a conformity-obsessed society, the visual arts universe is so populated by individualists, misfits, odd characters and unlikely heroes. Maybe there is actually a correlation there…. Well done, TV Tokyo (and DJ Punpee for the brilliant opening tune)!

  • Capitani – an RTL Netflix serial

    Capitani – an RTL Netflix serial

    If it is indeed true that our European brains were ‚wired‘ in the medieval village community, then that goes a long way to explaining the mesmerising effect of this Netflix serial. At least on me – I’m totally hooked.

    see trailer

    Essentially, it’s Twin Peaks in provincial Luxembourg. Minus evil spirits, but everything else is there: the detective hero from the city (in tiny Luxembourg, just half an hour’s drive away) who has to work his way around the wall of silence of the locals, but harbours a dark secret himself. The local alpha males willing to break any rule or principle for power. The naive/innocent local assistant cop, a kind of young Parzival. The sex & drugs & town hall corruption, the girls in puberty who go everywhere (as opposed to heaven) – and even the Log Lady makes an appearance in the shape of the village idiot who babbles truth to power. It also has impressive camerawork on lush nature and dark forests.

    And the best is that the whole thing is spoken in Lëtzebuergisch – essentially a strong dialect of German (the linguistic term is Moselfränkisch) which lapses into French when approaching military, police, judicial and administrative topics. Although Lëtzebuergisch is phonetically and in its sound shifts from standard German often pretty close to my native Rheinisch dialect, I need the English subtitles. The German TV adaptation, I understand, dubs all texts into standard German and therefore takes out half the charm. According to Wiki, in Luxembourg itself the serial has broken all imaginable records in terms of ratings: 29 % of the adult population of the Grand Duchy (with a total of 620.000) have watched it on TV, and many more on the internet.

    Each of the 12 sequels is only max. 30 minutes long. A second season is in strong demand. So this is my recommendation for switching off from COVID if you live in Belgium or your Netflix offers ‚Capitani‘. Äddi (=bye)