Jürgen Habermas, like my mother, turns 96 this year. This is, in itself, a remarkable achievement, especially as both, in their own ways, have remained intellectually agile. Admittedly this is where the parallels end.
The philosopher and political-social theorist Jürgen Habermas is an institution in Germany and beyond. His works spanning by now several decades have regularly impacted public discourse and political thinking.
- Already in the early 60ies he outlined that democracy is not just about free and fair elections. Equally crucial for democracy, he outlined, is a vibrant public sphere, providing a space for critical debate and public opinion formation.
- In the 80ies Habermas provoked one of the most important debates in postwar Germany, when he accused four historians of trying to “normalize” the German past and criticized any attempts to relativize the Holocaust. Instead, he argued in favor of “constitutional patriotism” with Germans learning to take a critical stance vis-à-vis their history while embracing universal principles enshrined in a liberal democratic constitution.
- His passion for European integration and a stronger Europe has become another leitmotiv in his thinking and writing. He supported the adoption of a European constitution (which failed) and regularly advocated for more democratic participation and the active engagement of citizens in shaping Europe’s future.
It is this enduring engagement for Europe which has now led him to publish a comprehensive essay “For Europe” in Süddeutsche Zeitung.
Many aspects of his analysis and critique are to the point and heads-on, but he seems far from having internalised the “Zeitenwende” in his own framework.
With Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the systemic change in the US that has set in motion, the “West under the leadership of the United States has disintegrated, even if, formally speaking, the fate of NATO remains an open question for the time being.”
Against this background he is again advocating for a strong and united Europe: “From a European perspective, this epochal break has far-reaching consequences – both for the further course and possible end of the war in Ukraine, and for the need, willingness, and ability of the European Union to find a redemptive response to the new situation. Otherwise, Europe will also be drawn into the maelstrom of the declining superpower.”
Astonishingly for someone with a lifelong pacifist posture, he justifies European rearmament: “The member states of the European Union must strengthen and pool their military forces, because otherwise they will no longer count politically in a geopolitically turbulent and disintegrating world. Only as a Union capable of independent political action can the European countries effectively bring their common global economic weight to bear in support of their normative convictions and interests.”
And he criticizes, rightly, consecutive German governments since Angela Merkel for “ignorance and inactivity” in the realm of European integration, “and this in the face of the long-standing efforts of our neighbour France!”
But when it comes to other aspects, Russia, Ukraine, and Europe’s way forward, his analysis seems biased or limited.
Whereas Habermas outlines the authoritarian transformation of the US with some depth, Russia is largely defined as an “irrational imperial power long in decline.” While Russia may be in decline from an economic and human resources perspective, its imperialism under Putin has, sadly, not been in decline, but rather on the rise. As such, there is no reference that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine since 2014, as earlier wars against Georgia, are an integral part of a coherent, and not an irrational, imperialistic ideology, combined with a strengthening of dictatorship internally.
When it comes to Russia, he diagnoses a “climate of heated anti-Russian sentiment” which is “fuelling old prejudices” and refers to “a possible or talked-up current Russian threat to NATO countries” and “highly speculative assumptions about a current threat to the EU from Russia.” This is largely ignoring facts and reality. Not any hot-headed individual has identified Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” This was agreed by all then 30 NATO Allies in adopting the still valid Strategic Concept 2022. Since then, it has been reconfirmed and sharpened by Allies on many occasions. And the threats of Russia’s shadow war against European countries are not “speculative” but very real. They range from interference in election processes, cyber-attacks, via sabotage against critical infrastructure, coercion in particular against Ukraine supporters, up to targeted murder. The EU is pursuing the European Defence Readiness 2030 or the EU Preparedness Strategy not out of “speculative”, but in light of very tangible threats.
This bias is compounded with other misjudgements. He accuses the US government of having “made no attempt to initiate negotiations to avert the threatened Russian attack flanked by troop deployments” in 2022. In fact, negotiations with Russia continued also in NATO until last minute. The last meeting of the NATO-Russia Council with Russia represented by Deputy Defence Minister Fomin and Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko took place on 12 January 2022! In that meeting, as in earlier ones, the Russian side had outlined their maximalist revisionist programme, including the assured neutrality of Ukraine, and the withdrawal of NATO troops from Allies that did not belong to the Alliance prior to 1997, i.e. the entirety of NATO’s eastern flank from the Baltic States, via Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary to Romania and Bulgaria. This would in essence have granted Russia a sphere of influence not only over Ukraine but also NATO. At the time, then NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg noted that “NATO Allies are ready to meet again with Russia to discuss a number of topics in greater detail and to put concrete proposals on the table.” “There are opportunities for constructive engagement which should not be missed, in the interest of security in Europe,” he added.
Habermas’ pro-Russia bias is combined with a latent anti-Ukraine bias. According to him, Europeans “completely surrendered the initiative to the Ukrainian government by pledging unconditional support for the Ukrainian war effort without any objective or orientation of their own.” In reality, support provided to Ukraine has in essence been too limited, too late, and subject to too many caveats – driven by a mixture of lack of leadership and courage, and narrow national interests. This in essence, while it has enabled Ukraine to uphold the defence of the country, has not provided it with what is needed to win the fight on its own terms.
Equally concerning is how Habermas constructs a presumed divergence of fundamental interests between Ukraine, NATO nations and the EU respectively:
“For the immediate concern of this long-term rearmament program cannot be the fate of Ukraine, which is currently particularly risky and rightly worrisome; nor is it a possible or talked up current Russian threat to Nato countries. Rather, the overall goal of this rearmament is the existential self-assertion of a European Union that can no longer count on the protection of the United States in an increasingly unpredictable geopolitical situation.”
With that Habermas seems to construe different European categories: There is Ukraine whose fate is “particularly risky and rightly worrisome,” but European rearmaments efforts should not be seen as considering Ukraine as an “immediate concern.” Thereby, Habermas seems unwilling to understand that the defence of Ukraine cannot be separated from European values and interests; that these very values are defended by Ukraine on its soil and with its blood, against a ruthless aggressor. As stated by all 32 Allies at NATO’s Washington Summit: “A strong, independent, and democratic Ukraine is vital for the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. Ukraine’s fight for its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders directly contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.” Sadly, Ukraine’s partners have only been providing half-hearted support in putting this vision into reality.
And then there are in Habermas’ thinking NATO countries facing a “possible or talked up current Russian threat”, in distinction to the “existential self-assertation” of the European Union – as if most EU members would not also be in NATO.
Altogether, Habermas’ framework seems unable to accommodate the seismic shifts that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and Donald Trump’s instigated dissolution of the “West” have triggered. While the response undoubtedly needs to be European, his focus on the European Union is too narrow to meet current and future challenges.
Habermas wants the creation of a “joint EU military deterrent force”: “Can the EU be perceived as an independent military power factor at the global level as long as each of its member states retains ultimate sovereignty over decisions regarding the structure and deployment of its armed forces? It will only gain geopolitical independence if it is able to act collectively, including in the use of military force.”
Even if this EU reform were ever achieved, which is more than doubtful, it would not provide the deterrence, defence and security Europeans need now, and in the years ahead. As a case in point, the EU itself confirms in the new White Paper on European Defence Readiness 2030 that “Member States will always retain responsibility for their own troops, from doctrine to deployment, and for the definition needs of their armed forces”. But providing collective defence and security does not necessarily require the creation of a supranational body a la Habermas. NATO has done this successfully over the past 76 years as an intergovernmental institution. Should NATO fail to meet the challenges of its current Trump-induced existential crisis, there can be other formats to mobilize Europe’s ”existential self-assertation”. These can consist in establishing a coalition of the willing which could also involve EU outsiders UK, Norway, Canada, and in fact also Ukraine, or by forging a new European or Western Defence Alliance which could bring together the “rump NATO” and the EU’s portion of defence and security.
Effective deterrence and defence needs, beyond resources and formats, in particular the will and determination of people to defend their country, their values and their interests. For that the “military mentality” much demonized by Habermas is essential – to be in extremis willing to fight for our freedom and our democracies.
Habermas’ adherence to his life-long pacifism and anti-militarism, as honourable as they have been over past decades, seem to have made him a prisoner of his own thought structure. The “Zeitenwende” begins in people’s minds. Unfortunately, Habermas doesn’t really seem to have realised it yet.
