Over the course of its 75 years’ history, NATO has weathered many storms. At least two earlier crises were existential – and in each case the US played a key role:
During the Suez crisis in 1956, the US under President Eisenhower strongly opposed the use of force by Britain and France to regain control of the Suez Canal, which had been nationalized by Egypt. Britain and France, as the former colonial powers, saw the Suez Canal as crucial to their economic and strategic interests. They believed that the nationalization threatened their influence in the region and decided to take military action, despite U.S. disapproval. At the time, the US forced them to withdraw. More fundamentally, this rift laid bare the lack of political consultations among Allies. In response, NATO developed the famous „Report of Three Wise Men“ which reinforced NATO’s political and non-military role, strengthened political consultations, and contributed to broadening the strategic framework of the Alliance.
2003 saw another deep rift in the Alliance, this time linked to Iraq. Many NATO nations including France, Germany, Belgium argued that there was no convincing evidence for the presumed existence of Sadam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction. At the time, this served as the main argument to justify the incursion. The US, supported by the UK and Poland nonetheless went ahead with the invasion and toppled Iraq’s dictator. While NATO as an organisation was not directly involved, divisions among Allies were so deep and bitter that a break-up of the Alliance was entirely possible. When it transpired in the following that no weapons of mass destruction could be found, this led to a long-lasting damage of US credibility in NATO.
This time, the crisis caused by Donald Trump and his clan is again existential, and arguably more fundamental, for NATO on several fronts:
- With his disdain for democracy, D Trump is infringing on NATO’s shared values and principles as enshrined in the Alliance’s 1949 founding treaty, the Washington Treaty. In the preamble Allies commit to “safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisations of their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and human rights.”
- His neo-imperialistic coercion targeted, inter alia, against two fellow NATO Allies, i.e. Canada and Denmark’s self-ruling territory Greenland, over whom he wants to achieve control, is in violation of both the UN Charter and the NATO Treaty.
- By raising doubts if the US would contribute to defending other Allies in case of an armed attack, he is putting into question the bedrock of NATO, the collective defence clause of Article V, Washington Treaty.
- Trump’s entire strategic orientation, like his cosying up with Russia’s despot Vladimir Putin, or insulting Ukraine’s democratically elected President as a “dictator”, is in blatant contradiction with consecutive NATO Summit decisions. It is symptomatic for a political U-turn away from overarching strategic policies in NATO agreed among all Allies including the US, be these the 2019 Military Strategy, the 2020 Concept for the Defence and Deterrence of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) or the 2022 Strategic Concept.
In view of all this, does NATO have a plan how to deal with the multiple onslaughts? How would NATO cope with a potential US withdrawal from the Alliance?
Perhaps there is something well hidden in NATO Secretary General Rutte’s mind, but so far there is little visible or tangible resembling a plan or policy options. The focus seems to rely on talking to key US interlocutors and activating Rutte’s talent as a “Trump whisperer” – which was eventually also one of the main reasons why he got the job as Secretary General. Big parts of NATO seem paralysed. This concerns not only work on defining a new Russia policy (a tasker from the 2024 Summit), but also other work strands. How can the North Atlantic Council still discuss sensitive matters ranging from cyber security via support to Ukraine or steps to strengthen Allied resilience in view of Russia’s intensifying shadow war against all of them, when nations cannot exclude that their positions may well be shared with Moscow? A coherent plan worth that name, or options how to deal with the assault, are lacking.
A first immediate step for NATO must be to realise that remaining in the defensive vis-à-vis Trump, like an anxious little rabbit imploring the snake not to hurt it, is probably a recipe to be swallowed. Instead, willing Allies should take the initiative, as a coalition of the willing, and ask the US to clarify whether or not they still abide by a whole range of key strategic documents constituting NATO’s acquis and political agenda. These include the NATO Treaty, the 2022 Strategic Concept, the 2019 Military Strategy to name but the most foundational ones. All these were, of course, also agreed by the US. Depending on the answer received, Allies should either demand the US to honour commitments made, or suspend US membership.
The logical public focus of NATO’s Secretary General will be to keep the Alliance together and therefore the US in NATO. However, there is no guarantee whatsoever that this is achievable. Marc Rutte would therefore be well advised to pursue in parallel other options and scenarios. This requires strategic-level cooperation with the EU and the fostering of new forms of cooperation via coalitions of the willing.
Considering the US disregard for Europeans in NATO and the EU, the logical focus of these efforts must be Europe, with the overarching goal to become a serious geostrategic player. The days of Europe’s childhood are over. The decades of geopolitical outsourcing are over. It is high time to grow up and behave like an adult.
Most of the following reflections and recommendations are based on the so far more likely scenario of an immediate to mid-term end of US support to Ukraine, and the substantive rebalancing of the transatlantic relationship towards a more reduced US role and more European strategic responsibility. This would require the creation of a “coalition of the willing” as an ad hoc solution, the Europeanisation of NATO in conjunction with strengthening the EU as a more capable actor in the realm of security and defence.
- Prepare a robust and substantial support package for Ukraine. Defeating Russia in Ukraine is the most effective and efficient investment in European security. European defence begins in Ukraine. To match Russia’s resources on the battle field, just 0.2% of the GDP of European NATO member would be needed, according to new research from the Tony Blair Institute. That is a feasible amount, especially when considering that in the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, European NATO members would have to move to some 5% of GDP on defence.
For delivering on a potential future peace keeping or reassurance mission, leaders from both EU and NATO need to agree on a new enabling framework – as the unanimity principle of both institutions would otherwise paralyse them. The most productive would be a „coalition of the willing“ to take things forward. The political lead could come from a Quintet consisting of France, UK, Poland, Italy, and Germany. Preparations on this seem to advance, considering the flurry of meetings between these countries over past weeks. The operational lead could come via the UK-lead Joint Expeditionary Forces (JEF) which would have to be enlarged to also include at least also France, Poland, Germany, Italy and ideally more nations such as Canada. - Boost combat capable troops and work towards joint defence planning in Europe: On paper, European armies have a total of 1.9 million military personnel, with 1.33 million in the EU alone. But effectiveness is hampered by a myriad of issues. These range from lack of equipment including most strategic enablers, via lack of training and to lack of unified command. In essence, European armies are so far not set up to fight without US support. A recent analysis from Bruegel concludes that an increase in European capacities equivalent to the fighting capacity of 300 000 US troops would be needed for Europe to defend itself against Russia as the most direct and imminent threat. NATO European Allies should agree within NATO’s defence planning process to a military level of ambition for European strategic responsibility.
- In view of these huge deficits, commit to raise defence spending to a new baseline of 3.5% of GDP – which was pretty much the norm during the decades of the Cold War in European countries. Political leaders need to be upfront with their populations explaining that peace and security are investments in our prosperity. In parallel, also work towards common funding at EU levels. The EU has mobilized a massive multi-tier support package of ca. € 3.2 trillion in total fiscal response in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. Today’s security challenges are far greater. There is no justification other than political inertia to not embrace an ambitious and robust approach now.
- Turbo-charge European defence production which so far is too small, too fragmented, and too slow. In this context, work towards closing key gaps in artillery shell production, air and missile defence and deep-strike systems. Also consider NATO’s upcoming report on capability gaps – which is expected to call for 49 new brigades, 1500 tanks and 1000 artillery pieces – as a guide for the EU’s industrial spending priorities.
- Reinforce the Europe’s Eastern flank as quickly as possible, by redeploying forces and prepositioning equipment. This will reinforce Europe’s deterrence and defence posture vis-a-via Russia as the biggest threat to peace and security. The continuing hurdles with military mobility, e.g. lack of adequate infrastructure like roads or railways, lack of standardized procedures akin to a (non-existing) „Military Schengen“, and the abundance of red tape imply that any large move of forces is slow and cumbersome. Getting ahead of the curve before any potential conflict erupts, is therefore a logical move.
- Foster synergies with other likeminded partners across the globe: With Donald Trump’s neo-imperialism and unwillingness to behave like a trustworthy Ally, it is important to forge ties with those countries that share the fundamental values and interest of both NATO and EU in upholding a rules-based international. These include capable partners in the Indo-Pacific like Japan, Australia, or South Korea, but should be extended to other partners in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
Prepare for the unthinkable: A conventional US withdrawal from NATO and the “nuclear option”
While to date, Donald Trump has not (yet) repeated his threat to withdraw the US from NATO, considering his unpredictability such a scenario cannot be ruled out. Europeans, be they via NATO and/or the EU need to stick together as “forces for good”, adhering to fair play and global norms, fostering democratic principles, and multilateralism in a civilised world. NATO and the EU should bring their strategic partnership to a new level of practical efficiency. A useful step would be to set up a new albeit informal “Leadership Steering Group” as an organic link, driving the strategic partnership and generating ‘synergy from the top’.
Altogether, Europeans should pursue a three-pronged survival strategy to regain the initiative and become a serious geopolitical actor.
As an immediate and urgent need, largely driven by the imperative to support Ukraine, work on establishing a “coalition of the willing” must be expedited as an ad-hoc solution. This approach allows Europeans to deliver, since spoilers like Hungary or Slovakia cannot block decision making and implementation.
On a second track, they must reinforce the Europeanisation of NATO in conjunction with boosting the EU as a more capable actor in the realm of defence and security.
Europeans have a vital self-interest to deliver expeditiously on more European strategic responsibility, also to keep the US engaged at least mid-term, e.g. with its forces and the nuclear umbrella in Europe. This also buys them some time to build the capabilities they need to better look after their defence and security.
On track three Europeans also need to envision a potential worst-case scenario of “NATO minus US”. This would require to establish a new European Defence Alliance (or Organisation), or a Western Defence Alliance, as a new body and based on a coalition of the willing. Such a new institution could merge the rump NATO with the defence and security capabilities developed under the EU umbrella. Setting up such a new institution could also be a useful move to reinforce European capability to act. If based on a coalition of the willing, it could include Canada, and it would avoid the notorious blockages from Russia’s Trojan Horses like Orban and Fico. At the same time, a new institution could include Ukraine which arguably has the most capable and combat experienced armed forces in Europe, hardened by defending the country against a major power, i.e. Russia. This would be a formidable asset. Thinking on all this must start now. The ad hoc “coalition of the willing” forged to deliver European support to Ukraine could be a useful testbed or precursor.
The good news is that NATO survived earlier crises. Thus, there is hope that also this time it will have the drive and determination to reinvent itself – or be reborn as something new. The jury is out there whether NATO Secretary General Rutte will play any meaningful role in these endeavours. So far, it doesn’t bode too well.
© Gerlinde Niehus, March 2025