Kategorie: Democracy

  • Values-Based Realism and Its Enemies: How to Tackle the new Geopolitical ‘Realism’ from Left and Right

    Values-Based Realism and Its Enemies: How to Tackle the new Geopolitical ‘Realism’ from Left and Right

    (Martens Centre Blog, together with Dr. Peter Hefele, uploaded on 24 February 2026)

    This year’s Davos World Economic Forum stood out for many things, not least the Greenland crisis, but it will also be known for two memorable speeches: Those of US President Donald Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. While Trump’s 90 minute rambling, self-congratulatory, passive-aggressive rant may have been the most overcrowded event, Carney’s well-crafted 15-minute speech will enter the history books, not only for its succinctness (as opposed to Trump’s rambling) but for its sketch of a ‘values-based realism’ as a viable alternative to the new transactional pseudo-realism Trump stands for.

    Carney acknowledged the end of the old rules-based international order and proposed a coalition of middle powers that pragmatically cooperates in diversifying its trade while still sticking to essential values as the basis of their international behaviour. But just looking back at the last 5 years, values-based realism has two powerful counter-narratives.

    Great power geopolitics of the Alt-Right

    Geopolitics is back in fashion. For more than a year, we’ve heard from the White House that a new era of global power politics has begun. Trump’s Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller summarised it neatly in early January 2026: ‘We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.’ This transactional, might-makes-right ‘America First’ approach to world affairs is underpinned by official documents such as the National Security Strategy of November 2025.

    In a perfectly clear departure from ‘spreading liberal ideology’ and ‘hectoring … nations into abandoning their traditions and historic forms of government’, the administration dismisses at least eight decades of global democracy support and values-based foreign policy. The partial or total destruction of America’s formidable instruments of democratic solidarity – USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – is entirely in line with this thinking.

    To put it bluntly: In this perspective, what used to be the greatest strength of the West – individual freedom, checks and balances. rules-based multilateralism, and the belief in universal human rights – is now considered its biggest weakness in the global power struggle.

    But there is a new phenomenon arising next to the Trumpian view on great powers eternally jostling for spheres of influence. We observe a rising movement and global alliances on what we would like to call a new realpolitik of Progressives and the Global South.

    After the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many in the West, freshly self-confident with a newfound sense of purpose, were disappointed to see so little support for Ukraine in the ‘Global South’, from Latin America via Africa to much of Asia. That should not have come as a surprise.

    British foreign policy expert Fiona Hill in 2023 spoke of a ‘rebellion’ in the Global South against the collective West. One of the tenets of this mindset is to see the rules-based international order increasingly as a poor disguise for the great power politics of a dominant West – and not as a level      playing field. Another central element is that the Global South very pragmatically forges alliances to defend itself against any Western ‘preaching’, weakening or obliterating ideas like global democracy support. Those are allegedly poorly disguised instruments of Western imperialism.

    What is striking in the context of 2026 geopolitics is how many overlaps there are between the neorealism from the radical right and the progressive Southern philosophies – including their left-progressive acolytes in the West –  of the new global disorder and what to make of it. The messages and consequences are clear: in the end, countries, or rather their often autocratic regimes, have to fight for themselves, or even help each other crush Western-inspired democratic movements. Civil society is not a valid concept and a voice to be heard; democracy support is tainted.

    The challenges of Carneyism

    Mark Carney’s fascinating speech in Davos proposed a new coalition of democratic middle powers, believing in values such as human rights and democracy, but capable of creating partnerships with autocracies.

    The latter come with some unpleasant consequences and bitter pills to swallow. And politicians have to explain this to their voters. Canada’s plans for a free trade agreement with China, for the time being withdrawn, is an example of such dilemmas. The most recent EU-India Free Trade Agreement is another one: it means buying more products made with Russian oil, thus indirectly financing Russia’s war on Ukraine. 

    For Europe’s democracies, there is no alternative to navigate the geopolitical storm without illusions, but still based on principles worth defending, and in cooperation with civil societies and democratic forces across the world. We need to hedge against over-dependency on an unreliable and often hostile US by diversifying, obviously not by replacing one dependency with another. Neither the cynicism of the Alt-Right, nor the relativism and defeatism of many progressives and Global South propagandists, should keep us from promoting our values of a free and open society, contributing to making the world at least a bit safer and freer.

  • Would Péter Magyar Be a Better Hungarian Leader Than Viktor Orbán?

    Would Péter Magyar Be a Better Hungarian Leader Than Viktor Orbán?

    Asking for a friend…

    In all fairness, the short answer is: most likely, yes. Unless you’re Vladimir Putin or Donald Trump, both of whom emphatically agree that Orbán must stay in power. But from the point of view of most other people in Europe, Hungarian and non-Hungarian, the answer should be yes.

    Hungary’s parliamentary election on 12 April will arguably be this year’s most momentous European poll, with consequences far beyond Hungary, and even beyond Europe. After 16 years in power and an elsewhere unparalleled push to turn his country into a de facto autocracy, for the first time since 2010, Viktor Orbán faces the possibility of electoral defeat.

    A lot has been made in recent weeks of all the caveats to a positive answer to the title question. They range from a very unfair advantage for Orbán’s ruling FIDESZ in the electoral system to an uneven playing field when it comes to government control of media, the vote counting etc. Magyar’s TISZA party would have to gain a supermajority of votes in order to get a majority in Parliament. And even if power changes hands, the deep state that Orbán has had four full terms to create, with centrally controlled courts, administration, law enforcement and intelligence services, will at least partly work against any new government.

    Most of all, Péter Magyar would probably not signify a clear, 180 degree turn in everything Orbán stands for, from populism to nationalism, vis-à-vis Brussels, Kyiv or other places in Europe. After all, Magyar was a loyal follower of Orbán until 2024. And for example on Hungarian minority rights in neighbouring countries like Slovakia, he has been challenging the current gouverment ‘from the right’. Magyar wouldn’t be an easy partner for Ukraine and Hungary’s fellow member states, either. His character begs some questions. He and most of his teammates lack governance experience. But the following assumptions about him are justified, in my view:

    1) He would be significantly more cooperative than Orbán on EU security and assisting Ukraine. He would stop making fighting ‘Brussels’ an element of Hungary’s political DNA.

    2) He would end the strategic use of corruption as an element of building and maintaining power, if only to fulfil his campaign promises and prevent an early return to power by FIDESZ.

    3) He would try to re-establish, step by step, the rule of law with strong and independent institutions, if only to make sure the EU funds are flowing again and he can show some immediate economic effect to Hungarians.

    4) While continuing the policy of not sending weapons to Ukraine, he would refuse to be Putin’s mouthpiece in the European Union that Orbán has become.

    5) He would stop the culture wars, freeing up a lot of political energy.

    6) While there may be chaotic conditions for a while, don’t underestimate the burst of enthusiasm and creativity, the return of expats and the general sense of a better future that will take hold of most of the country.

    Now, whether in April Magyar can actually turn a majority of votes into a government, is a different question. The electoral playing field is anything but level. FIDESZ is going full steam ahead with a Musk/Trump/Putin-enabled campaign about alleged foreign interference in favour of Magyar, preparing the ground for biased courts to nullify the election results. The ensuing protests could then even serve as an opportunity to declare a state of emergency.

    But such a scenario would hopefully be a reason for EU partners to get serious about altering Hungary’s status as a member state. Precisely because Trump might want to openly interfere with fundamental EU affairs at this point, this might quickly become another Rubicon moment for Europe, with a strong imperative to prove we can still remain who we are, even in catastrophic circumstances.

    But first and foremost, fingers crossed for a resounding victory of Péter Magyar’s TISZA at the ballot box!

  • Europe, Don’t Be a Scaredy-Cat!

    Europe, Don’t Be a Scaredy-Cat!

    Get onto your feet – now!

    While the tectonic plates below our feet keep shifting, and the global order keeps eroding, Europeans are still punching below their weight. The recent concerted push-back against Trump’s coercive plans for a US-annexation of Greenland illustrate how much Europe can gain from standing up to a bully. Here is my passionate plea for a politics of courage – as the rule and not the exception!

    Europe should not be afraid. Not afraid to assume responsibility for its own security. Not afraid to use its economic power. Not afraid of an open rupture with Washington. And, of course, not afraid of Putinism.

    However, over past years, Europe’s politics was largely driven by fear. Yet fear is a terrible adviser. It paralyzes thinking and triggers the instinct to retreat or hide. Yet withdrawal does not eliminate the source of fear. On the contrary: it allows it to grow.

    Europe’s political leadership, too, has been shaped by fear. Fear of the bully in the White House has led to a mixture of submission and ingratiation — a posture that only reinforces his contempt for Europe. Fear of the violent man in the Kremlin has lead to hesitation, appeasement, and a fixation on avoiding escalation — a strategy that merely emboldens an aggressor pursuing a revisionist, imperial project.


    Democracy and the Politics of Fear

    Admittedly, some characteristics of democratic systems make them particularly susceptible to fear-driven politics. Politicians operate under constant competitive pressure; elections, approval ratings, and legitimacy are fragile. The fear of losing public support — and thus power — often encourages defensive or opportunistic behavior rather than courage. This tendency is reinforced by the logic of blame: political actors are far more likely to be punished for failure than rewarded for success.

    The result is structural risk aversion. Short-term, seemingly safe options are favored over decisions that may appear riskier but promise more sustainable long-term outcomes.

    Fear can also be deliberately instrumentalized. Populist parties, in particular, mobilize anxieties about crime, terrorism, migration, or economic decline in order to generate loyalty and consolidate power. Modern media ecosystems amplify perceived threats and crises, fostering an atmosphere of permanent alarm. Under such conditions, political leaders are pushed to react reflexively rather than act autonomously.

    Yet politics shaped by fear comes at a high price. Structural, long-term solutions are neglected in favor of immediate constraints. Experimentation and reform are avoided; supposedly “tried and tested” approaches are clung to even when they have long ceased to work. Conformity is rewarded, critical debate discouraged, and pluralism narrowed.

    Fear also fuels “us versus them” thinking, undermining cooperation within societies and between states. It fragments the public sphere. Decisions born of fear — preventive wars, mass surveillance, draconian security measures, or appeasement of violent actors — frequently generate the very dangers they were meant to avert.

    Fear is politically contagious. If it is not transformed into purposeful action through leadership, but merely managed, it becomes paralyzing. Decisions are postponed, risks externalized, responsibility diffused. The result is not security, but self-deterrence — a pattern that has been visible repeatedly since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.


    The Costs of Fear-Driven Politics

    History offers abundant evidence of the destructive consequences of fear-based politics.

    The appeasement of Nazi Germany is a stark example. Traumatized by the devastation of World War I, European leaders sanctioned territorial concessions in the hope of avoiding another conflict. Fear of the aggressor, combined with a policy of accommodation, paved the way for the catastrophe of World War II.

    A second example is the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration justified the war with claims about threats from weapons of mass destruction — claims later shown to be manipulated. The invasion destabilized Iraq and the wider region for decades and severely damaged U.S. credibility, including within NATO. Its origin lay in fear of terrorism.

    Today, across Europe, far-right parties exploit fears of immigration and Islam to generate political support. Alarmist rhetoric about the supposed “annihilation” of European civilization — echoed in the new U.S. security strategy — only lends further momentum to these anti-democratic forces.


    From Fear to Responsible Action

    Historically, democracies rarely fail because of excessive courage. They fail because dangers are ignored for too long — or because leaders are unwilling to name them out of fear.

    A politics of courage does not deny fear. It confronts it – in order to act deliberately and decisively in pursuit of a higher objective. As Franklin D. Roosevelt famously suggested, courage is not the absence of fear, but the recognition that something else matters more.

    A politics of courage is value-based. Even under pressure, it remains guided by principles such as justice, dignity, and the rule of law. It rests on the conviction that inaction can be ethically worse than the risks of action. It assumes that political agency matters — that the future is shaped by what we do today. Its horizon extends beyond narrow self-interest and short-term advantage toward the higher common good.

    A politics of courage confronts reality honestly. It identifies dangers without exaggeration or manipulation, names uncertainties, and accepts political or personal costs in order to do what is right rather than what is easy. Above all: risk management is understood simultaneously as opportunity management.

    Instead of symbolic quick fixes, it invests in solutions that address root causes. It embraces a long-term perspective and accepts short-term political or economic costs in order to secure durable outcomes beyond electoral cycles.

    Fear is translated into responsible action by pairing clear communication of threats with credible courses of action for governments, institutions, and citizens alike. Society is treated not as a manipulable mass, but as a community of responsible adults. Acceptance is generated through transparency, fairness, and shared responsibility.

    A politics of courage exercises power with restraint, deploying extraordinary measures only when necessary and always within the bounds of democratic accountability, pluralism, and the rule of law. At the same time, courage is a prerequisite for democratic self-assertion. Without it, democracy is merely administered — not defended.


    Models of Courageous Leadership

    History offers powerful examples of courageous leadership.

    Franklin D. Roosevelt embodied courage as strategic foresight and patient mobilization against prevailing public sentiment. Through his “Four Freedoms” speech and his famous fireside chats, he prepared institutions, the economy, and society for uncomfortable truths, neutralizing fear before it could become paralyzing.

    Winston Churchill exemplified courage as radical honesty in the face of existential threat. In his first speech as prime minister in June 1940, he offered “blood, toil, tears, and sweat,” refusing the false safety of accommodation. By naming danger without euphemism, he transformed fear into collective resilience.

    Since 2022, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has embodied courage as perseverance under existential threat. At personal risk, he has kept Ukraine united, consistently combining honest communication about danger with clear calls to action — transforming national fear into domestic and international resolve.

    What unites these figures is that they were not governed by fear. They transformed fear into political agency. By this standard, Europe’s political leadership fares poorly.


    Trusting Society

    One of the central misunderstandings of modern democracy is the conflation of leadership with mood management. Polling, focus groups, and real-time social-media feedback suggest that politics should merely reflect prevailing opinions. That is not leadership; it is adaptation.

    Courageous leadership begins where public discourse is not only measured but shaped. It provides orientation, frames interpretation, and works through conflict rather than avoiding it. Those who merely react cede the initiative to actors who simplify, polarize, or exploit fear.

    Courageous politicians do not deny fear; they confront reality, also when this is uncomfortable. They name risks and costs, and outline paths forward. Instead of tactical opportunism, they demonstrate conviction, consistency, and responsibility. Courageous leadership trusts society rather than infantilizing it. It believes society can cope with also hard realities.

    But responsibility does not lie with leaders alone. Open societies must value resilience and long-term responsibility over short-term popularity. They must accept that serious leadership will not always be liked — and that appeasement is no substitute for honesty.

    Political education, media, and civil society must preserve spaces where complexity is tolerated and conflict debated constructively. A politics of courage requires citizens who understand that responsibility is never risk-free.


    Europe Between Strength and Self-Doubt

    Objectively, Europe has ample reason to act with confidence. The EU, together with the United Kingdom and Norway, encompasses more than 500 million people — more than the United States and far more than Russia. This population is highly urbanized, well educated, and deeply integrated into global value chains.

    Economically, Europe belongs to the top tier. With a combined GDP of roughly $26 trillion, it trails the United States (with some $ 30 trillion) but significantly exceeds China (ca. $ 19 trillion) and vastly outpaces Russia (ca. $2.5 trillion), whose economic output is comparable to that of Italy.

    European NATO members collectively field around 2.1 million soldiers — more than either the United States or Russia. Europe’s weaknesses lie less in numbers than in capability and coordination — deficits that can be addressed through political will.

    Yet Europe consistently operates below its potential. It emphasizes its limitations, fears escalation, remains trapped in historical guilt debates, favors political comfort, and lacks geostrategic leadership. The real danger is not external defeat, but self-deterrence. Those who fail to articulate and use their own strength invite others to test it.

    Russia’s leverage lies less in material superiority than in its willingness to take risks and exploit uncertainty. Europe’s weakness, by contrast, is largely psychological. Where Europe hesitates, Moscow creates facts — even when the balance of power suggests otherwise.

    Europe therefore faces a strategic choice. It can continue to downplay its strength and practice self-restraint — or it can act with clarity and take responsibility. Courage would not mean confrontation for its own sake, but the willingness to use power as a necessary instrument of democratic self-assertion.

    A European politics of courage would not seek to shape the global order alone — but it would be prepared and willing to defend it.

  • The Cost of Failure

    The Cost of Failure

    A Russian victory in Ukraine would reshape Europe

    In these days of hectic diplomacy around a ‘peace deal’ in Ukraine, it’s easy to lose sight of the long term and the big picture. There is a real possibility of a botched deal that leaves Ukraine weakened, Vladimir Putin triumphant, Europe in disarray and America withdrawn. We ought to give more attention to what it might mean.

    A notable exception to this collective denial is Carlo Masala, the German political science professor whose short book If Russia Wins: A Scenario describes how a catastrophic deal for Ukraine leads Russia to ‘test the West’ with a limited hybrid incursion into Estonia in 2028, taking the Russian-speaking town of Narva much like it took Crimea in 2014.

    The North Atlantic Council decides not to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, leaving the incursion unpunished. As Russian strategists celebrate and NATO’s Secretary General mutters about a “dark day for the alliance”, the question of what exactly could happen next is left unanswered. This op-ed will build on Masala’s scenario, developing a plausible trajectory for 2030.

    NATO after Narva

    The Narva scenario would immediately render NATO meaningless, and it could even cease to exist entirely. The Nordics, Baltic countries and Poland might try to form a more limited alliance but most NATO members would re-nationalise their defence, probably trying individually to exchange security guarantees with Russia and accepting limits on their national sovereignty.

    German chancellors and French presidents would have to call Moscow before doing anything relevant on the world stage. To soften the blow, a purported peace dividend would let them reduce their military spending and strike more or less favourable energy deals with Russia. Nord Stream would be reopened with great fanfare.

    Formally, of course, we would all remain democracies. There would be elections, independent media and open public debates – ‘Russophobes’ could scream until they’re blue in the face. But checks and balances would be undermined, and Russian intelligence services and online trolls would provide discreet assistance to national-populist parties, many of which would already be in power by 2030.

    The EU would hang on by the skin of its teeth, but with a much reduced Single Market and neutered supranational institutions. The inevitable economic stagnation would only serve to reinforce the cynicism on which populists and autocrats thrive.

    With Russian influence on the rise, our daily lives would be marked by corruption and organised crime to an extent we can hardly imagine – echoing what the Kremlin has already achieved at home in amalgamating the public administration, secret police and mafia.

    Last but not least, China would enter the fray in increasing our supply chain dependence and strengthening illiberal forces, in limited competition with Russia, but with the same enemy: liberal democracy.

    How not to get there

    This catastrophe can of course be avoided, but we need to change course. Ensuring our long-term independence means pursuing three interdependent strategies: Helping Ukraine remain free and sovereign, mounting a credible European defence as soon as possible, and getting back to dynamic economic growth.

    Europe must fix its defeatist attitude with relation to Ukraine. The coalition of the willing can, in partnership with like-minded democracies around the world, enable Ukraine to hold out against Russian aggression – still with weapons bought from the US, but with little direct US involvement. European leaders can also help Ukraine develop its own weapons industry, and encourage military reform to ease recruitment difficulties.

    This should naturally be financed by frozen Russian assets, as the European Commission has proposed, and tough sanctions must remain in place.

    In building Europe’s own defence and deterrence, Southern and Western member states will have to follow more closely the example of the Eastern flank. Unpopular cuts in welfare spending may be required, which is why the negative 2030 scenario should get much more attention in political communication. We will need more European leaders delivering ‘blood-sweat-and-tears’ speeches akin to Churchill’s masterful oratory of 1940.

    Nevertheless, much of the pain can be offset by economic growth, which Europe must now redouble its efforts to create. Deregulation and trimming of bureaucracy will create the surplus that makes high military spending more palatable; and injecting this funding into the European economy will set in motion a virtuous circle that will make Europe richer as well as safer.

    The past eighty years have made Europeans accustomed to peace and prosperity, to the extent that we struggle even to imagine a return to conflict. The bad news is that change is upon us, and we may indeed fail to meet the moment. The good news is that we still have the tools to avert catastrophe – if we choose to use them.

    Appeared in: The Sentinel 9 December 2025

    https://substack.com/home/post/p-180624914

  • „Welt in Unordnung -Gerechter Friede im Blick“

    „Welt in Unordnung -Gerechter Friede im Blick“

    Die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland stellt sich mit ihrer neuen Friedensdenkschrift den geopolitischen Realitäten unserer Zeit.

    Im Fadenkreuz der Schurken in Moskau, Peking und ja, auch Washington ist der Weg zu einem gerechten Frieden insbesondere in der Ukraine und in Europa steiniger denn je.

    In einer Welt in Unordnung mit zunehmender Gewalt und Bedrohungen unserer Sicherheit hat die die evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) mit ihrer Friedensdenkschrift vom November 2025 ihre Friedenethik grundlegend aktualisiert, um Antworten und Denkanstöße angesichts neuer Herausforderungen zu geben.  Herausgekommen ist eine beeindruckend mutige Denkschrift, die auch Spannungen, nicht zuletzt in der Evangelischen Kirche selber, aushält.

    Aus einer sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitischen Perspektive enthält die neue Friedensdenkschrift eine ganze Reihe begrüßenswerter Standpunkte:

    Ausgehend vom Leitbild des gerechten Friedens, rückt die EKD klar vom dogmatischen Pazifismus ab, wenn sie feststellt: „Christlicher Pazifismus ist als allgemeine politische Theorie ethisch nicht zu begründen.“  Das ist umso gerechtfertigter, wenn man bedenkt, dass Gewaltmenschen wie Putin einen unbedingten Pazifismus als Schwäche verstehen und damit als Einladung zu mehr Gewalt. Oder in den Worten von Wilhelm Schmid: „Gewaltmenschen fallen nicht um, weil ihnen jemand Friedensappelle ins Ohr flüstert“.

    Insbesondere auf Grundlage des Rechts auf individuelle und kollektive Selbstverteidigung auf Grundlage von Art 51 der UN-Charter, kommt die Denkschrift auch zu dem Schluss, dass „Gewalt oder Gegengewalt als ultima ratio gerechtfertigt sein kann“. Auf dieser Basis wird auch unterstrichen, dass jeder Staat das Recht hat, einen angegriffenen Staat mit dessen Einwilligung mit Waffengewalt zur Seite zu springen. Das legitimiert die Lieferung von Waffen und andere Formen der Unterstützung eines angegriffenen Staates.

    Die Denkschrift kommt dann aber auch zu dem Schluss, dass „aus diesem Recht zur Nothilfe, sich keine ethische Pflicht zur Nothilfe ableiten (lässt)“ und eine Abwägung im Einzelfall erfolgen muss. Angesichts der täglichen russischen Kriegsverbrechen in der Ukraine könnte man sicher argumentieren, dass Nothilfe in diesem Fall nicht nur ein Recht, sondern auch eine ethische Pflicht ist. Diesen extra-Schritt macht die Denkschrift allerdings (leider) nicht.

    Politisch Verantwortliche in Berlin werden sicher mit Genugtuung lesen, dass „in Verteidigung investiert werden (muss), denn sie dient dem Schutz von Menschen, Rechten und öffentlicher Ordnung“. Und auch die Diagnose, „sachlich ist festzustellen, dass eine ausreichende Ausstattung der Bundeswehr für einen Verteidigungsfall derzeit nicht gegeben ist“, ist zutreffend und hilfreich.

    Beim kirchenintern besonders umstrittenen Thema der nuklearen Abschreckung umschreibt die Denkschrift ein ethisch nicht aufzulösendes Dilemma zwischen der grundsätzlich anzustrebenden Welt ohne Atomwaffen und der fortbestehenden Notwendigkeit nuklearer Abschreckung.  Damit liegt die Denkschrift in ihrer Quintessenz erstaunlich nah an der Ausrichtung der NATO. Das Strategische Konzept von 2022 definiert: „Das Ziel der NATO ist eine sicherere Welt für alle; wir streben danach, das Sicherheitsumfeld für eine Welt ohne Kernwaffen zu schaffen.“ Und hält gleichzeitig fest: „Der grundlegende Zweck der nuklearen Fähigkeit der NATO ist die Wahrung des Friedens, die Vorbeugung von Zwangsmaßnahmen und die Abschreckung von Aggression. Solange es Kernwaffen gibt, wird die NATO ein nukleares Bündnis bleiben.“

    Mit der Aufrechterhaltung der nuklearen Abschreckung wählt man mithin das kleinere Übel. Allerdings hat Donald Trump wiederholt die Glaubwürdigkeit des NATO Artikels V über kollektive Verteidigung, dem Herzstück der Allianz, beschädigt. Auch wenn die USA bislang immer betont haben, dass der nukleare Schutzschirm und damit auch die nukleare Teilhabe erhalten bleiben, hat er damit natürlich auch die Glaubwürdigkeit der nuklearen Abschreckung beschädigt. Die Europäer sind also gut beraten, den Vorschlag von Präsident Macron aufzugreifen und auf eine Stärkung ihrer eigenen nuklearen Abschreckung auf der Basis der französischen und britischen Fähigkeiten hinzuarbeiten.

    Bei einer insgesamt sehr zutreffenden Analyse der Bedrohungen von Frieden und Sicherheit und den daraus zu ziehenden Folgerungen, gibt es einige wenige Stellen, an denen die Denkschrift entschiedener hätte sein können.

    So stellt sie fest, dass eine „Politik der Angst nicht vor Terrorismus (schützt), sie macht ihn nur stärker.“  Das ist zwar nicht falsch, aber eben doch zu kurz gedacht:  Eine Politik der Angst schützt auch nicht vor Despoten und Gewaltmenschen.  Die schüren Angst, Lähmung, Zaudern, um all das für sich auszunutzen. 

    Angst ist grundsätzlich ein schlechter Ratgeber. Wenn Menschen Angst haben, erstarren sie oder sie flüchten oder sie unterwerfen sich.  Schon Churchill sagte: „Mut wird zu Recht als die erste der menschlichen Qualitäten angesehen, weil diese Qualität alle anderen garantiert.“  Leider schauen dieser Tage Politiker:innen zu häufig auf die nächsten Wahlergebnisse, oder schüren ganz gezielt Angst, um Unterstützung zu mobilisieren. Wir brauchen daher eine Politik des Mutes – um mit Leidenschaft und Entschlossenheit für eine gerechtere und friedlichere Welt zu kämpfen. Bedauerlicherweise fordert die Denkschrift diese nicht ein.

    Etwas verkürzt gedacht ist auch, dass eine „Entscheidung für Waffenlieferungen und Rüstungsexporte sich daran (wird) messen lassen müssen, dass eine Eskalation der Gewalt vermieden wird.“ Mögliche Risiken einer möglichen Eskalation sind zwar ein Aspekt von Entscheidungen, aber eben auch nur einer.  Zumindest gleichgewichtig sind die Chancen! Eine Politik des Mutes bedeutet auch, Entscheidungen zu treffen und Verantwortung zu übernehmen. Das heißt immer auch, Risiken einzugehen. Wenn wir jedes Risiko vermeiden aus Angst, es könnte zu einer Eskalation führen, stehen wir auf verlorenem Posten. In Deutschland sind wir häufig sehr risikoscheu. Wir müssen Risikomanagement als strategische Aufgabe lernen – denn das ist auch Chancenmanagement.

    Schließlich fordert die Denkschrift, „nicht den Status der Bundeswehr als Parlamentsarmee … auszuhöhlen“.  Demokratische Legitimierung und Transparenz sind wichtig. Aber in der Grauzone des Schattenkrieges können diese Prozesse gerade in Deutschland zu langsam und schwerfällig sein. Es muss eben auch die Handlungsfähigkeit der Exekutive sichergestellt werden.  Wir sollten deswegen Reformansätze diskutieren: Welche Dringlichkeitsmechanismen mit nachträglicher Information des Parlaments können wir ausweiten? Welche klaren Vorab-Delegationen bestimmter Entscheidungen an den Bundeskanzler oder das zuständige Ministerium könnten wir einrichten? Viele europäische Staaten in unserer Nachbarschaft sind da schon weiter.

    Insgesamt zeigt die neue Denkschrift, dass Friedenspolitik nicht naiv sein darf. In einer Welt der Bedrohungen brauchen wir nicht nur wehrhafte Demokratien, wir brauchen auch einen wehrhaften Frieden, der Abschreckung und Verteidigung mit einschließt.

    Angesichts verschwimmender Grenzen zwischen Krieg und Frieden, massiver Desinformationskampagnen und vielfältiger Ansätze zu Destabilisierung brauchen Demokratien vor allem gesellschaftliche Resilienz. Die EKD kann mit ihrer neuen Denkschrift und einem intensiven demokratischen Diskurs einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten, eben diese Resilienz zu stärken.