Kategorie: Central and Eastern Europe

  • Would Péter Magyar Be a Better Hungarian Leader Than Viktor Orbán?

    Would Péter Magyar Be a Better Hungarian Leader Than Viktor Orbán?

    Asking for a friend…

    In all fairness, the short answer is: most likely, yes. Unless you’re Vladimir Putin or Donald Trump, both of whom emphatically agree that Orbán must stay in power. But from the point of view of most other people in Europe, Hungarian and non-Hungarian, the answer should be yes.

    Hungary’s parliamentary election on 12 April will arguably be this year’s most momentous European poll, with consequences far beyond Hungary, and even beyond Europe. After 16 years in power and an elsewhere unparalleled push to turn his country into a de facto autocracy, for the first time since 2010, Viktor Orbán faces the possibility of electoral defeat.

    A lot has been made in recent weeks of all the caveats to a positive answer to the title question. They range from a very unfair advantage for Orbán’s ruling FIDESZ in the electoral system to an uneven playing field when it comes to government control of media, the vote counting etc. Magyar’s TISZA party would have to gain a supermajority of votes in order to get a majority in Parliament. And even if power changes hands, the deep state that Orbán has had four full terms to create, with centrally controlled courts, administration, law enforcement and intelligence services, will at least partly work against any new government.

    Most of all, Péter Magyar would probably not signify a clear, 180 degree turn in everything Orbán stands for, from populism to nationalism, vis-à-vis Brussels, Kyiv or other places in Europe. After all, Magyar was a loyal follower of Orbán until 2024. And for example on Hungarian minority rights in neighbouring countries like Slovakia, he has been challenging the current gouverment ‘from the right’. Magyar wouldn’t be an easy partner for Ukraine and Hungary’s fellow member states, either. His character begs some questions. He and most of his teammates lack governance experience. But the following assumptions about him are justified, in my view:

    1) He would be significantly more cooperative than Orbán on EU security and assisting Ukraine. He would stop making fighting ‘Brussels’ an element of Hungary’s political DNA.

    2) He would end the strategic use of corruption as an element of building and maintaining power, if only to fulfil his campaign promises and prevent an early return to power by FIDESZ.

    3) He would try to re-establish, step by step, the rule of law with strong and independent institutions, if only to make sure the EU funds are flowing again and he can show some immediate economic effect to Hungarians.

    4) While continuing the policy of not sending weapons to Ukraine, he would refuse to be Putin’s mouthpiece in the European Union that Orbán has become.

    5) He would stop the culture wars, freeing up a lot of political energy.

    6) While there may be chaotic conditions for a while, don’t underestimate the burst of enthusiasm and creativity, the return of expats and the general sense of a better future that will take hold of most of the country.

    Now, whether in April Magyar can actually turn a majority of votes into a government, is a different question. The electoral playing field is anything but level. FIDESZ is going full steam ahead with a Musk/Trump/Putin-enabled campaign about alleged foreign interference in favour of Magyar, preparing the ground for biased courts to nullify the election results. The ensuing protests could then even serve as an opportunity to declare a state of emergency.

    But such a scenario would hopefully be a reason for EU partners to get serious about altering Hungary’s status as a member state. Precisely because Trump might want to openly interfere with fundamental EU affairs at this point, this might quickly become another Rubicon moment for Europe, with a strong imperative to prove we can still remain who we are, even in catastrophic circumstances.

    But first and foremost, fingers crossed for a resounding victory of Péter Magyar’s TISZA at the ballot box!

  • Ukraine freezing, Trump raging, Europe reacting

    My latest for TVP World, on Ukraine and Trump/Greenland:

    1) There is, as there has always been, a real danger of Trump ending US support for Ukraine, even if the Europeans are paying for it. Just to blackmail Zelensky into accepting a bad peace deal, or now to coerce Europe on his latest fantasy, annexing Greenland.

    2) This is happening as Russia intensifies its airstrikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. So far, Ukrainians have shown an admirable resilience and ingenuity in repairing and improvising, but now more European deliveries of air defence systems and ammo are urgent.

    3) Macron’s claim that 3/4 of Ukrainian battlefield intelligence is provided by France, not US, is ambitious but intelligence doesn’t replace weapons.

    4) There are ways to tackle the manpower problem of the UA armed forces, by limiting length of service and multiplying pay to get more people to sign up, but also by having younger and more convincing officers and NCOs for training, as most defections happen after basic training – and finally by replacing humans by ground based combat robots, as recently happened very successfully in Donbas.

    5) Trump’s latest tariff threat is clearly crossing a Rubicon for Europeans. The mood in Brussels and other capitals is: „Enough is enough“. There will be a unified answer by the EU, and it won’t be nice. A threat of retaliatory tariffs on US products and services (incl. digital) is definitely on the cards.

    6) Norway and UK are totally on board with this (so much for Brexit). Even many of Europe’s national populists are now attacking Trump, such as Farage and the Denmark Democrats.

    7) Cooperation and coordination of the Europeans with Congress is crucial, and has already begun. There are hopeful signs that Senators and Congresspeople, at long last, man up to prevent Trump from destroying NATO and throwing Ukraine under the bus.

  • Ukraine’s Road to EU Membership

    TVP World, the Polish Public TV English language channel, has a new format: „Wider View From Brussels“. Here’s my take, of 2 days ago, on Ukraine’s road to EU membership, the geopolitical, political and economic implications, comparisons with the 2004 big bang enlargement, and the eminent question of how to overcome the fatal Hungarian vetoes – together with Rosa Balfour from Carnegie Europe, moderated by TVP World’s Marcin Zaborowski.

  • The Cost of Failure

    The Cost of Failure

    A Russian victory in Ukraine would reshape Europe

    In these days of hectic diplomacy around a ‘peace deal’ in Ukraine, it’s easy to lose sight of the long term and the big picture. There is a real possibility of a botched deal that leaves Ukraine weakened, Vladimir Putin triumphant, Europe in disarray and America withdrawn. We ought to give more attention to what it might mean.

    A notable exception to this collective denial is Carlo Masala, the German political science professor whose short book If Russia Wins: A Scenario describes how a catastrophic deal for Ukraine leads Russia to ‘test the West’ with a limited hybrid incursion into Estonia in 2028, taking the Russian-speaking town of Narva much like it took Crimea in 2014.

    The North Atlantic Council decides not to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, leaving the incursion unpunished. As Russian strategists celebrate and NATO’s Secretary General mutters about a “dark day for the alliance”, the question of what exactly could happen next is left unanswered. This op-ed will build on Masala’s scenario, developing a plausible trajectory for 2030.

    NATO after Narva

    The Narva scenario would immediately render NATO meaningless, and it could even cease to exist entirely. The Nordics, Baltic countries and Poland might try to form a more limited alliance but most NATO members would re-nationalise their defence, probably trying individually to exchange security guarantees with Russia and accepting limits on their national sovereignty.

    German chancellors and French presidents would have to call Moscow before doing anything relevant on the world stage. To soften the blow, a purported peace dividend would let them reduce their military spending and strike more or less favourable energy deals with Russia. Nord Stream would be reopened with great fanfare.

    Formally, of course, we would all remain democracies. There would be elections, independent media and open public debates – ‘Russophobes’ could scream until they’re blue in the face. But checks and balances would be undermined, and Russian intelligence services and online trolls would provide discreet assistance to national-populist parties, many of which would already be in power by 2030.

    The EU would hang on by the skin of its teeth, but with a much reduced Single Market and neutered supranational institutions. The inevitable economic stagnation would only serve to reinforce the cynicism on which populists and autocrats thrive.

    With Russian influence on the rise, our daily lives would be marked by corruption and organised crime to an extent we can hardly imagine – echoing what the Kremlin has already achieved at home in amalgamating the public administration, secret police and mafia.

    Last but not least, China would enter the fray in increasing our supply chain dependence and strengthening illiberal forces, in limited competition with Russia, but with the same enemy: liberal democracy.

    How not to get there

    This catastrophe can of course be avoided, but we need to change course. Ensuring our long-term independence means pursuing three interdependent strategies: Helping Ukraine remain free and sovereign, mounting a credible European defence as soon as possible, and getting back to dynamic economic growth.

    Europe must fix its defeatist attitude with relation to Ukraine. The coalition of the willing can, in partnership with like-minded democracies around the world, enable Ukraine to hold out against Russian aggression – still with weapons bought from the US, but with little direct US involvement. European leaders can also help Ukraine develop its own weapons industry, and encourage military reform to ease recruitment difficulties.

    This should naturally be financed by frozen Russian assets, as the European Commission has proposed, and tough sanctions must remain in place.

    In building Europe’s own defence and deterrence, Southern and Western member states will have to follow more closely the example of the Eastern flank. Unpopular cuts in welfare spending may be required, which is why the negative 2030 scenario should get much more attention in political communication. We will need more European leaders delivering ‘blood-sweat-and-tears’ speeches akin to Churchill’s masterful oratory of 1940.

    Nevertheless, much of the pain can be offset by economic growth, which Europe must now redouble its efforts to create. Deregulation and trimming of bureaucracy will create the surplus that makes high military spending more palatable; and injecting this funding into the European economy will set in motion a virtuous circle that will make Europe richer as well as safer.

    The past eighty years have made Europeans accustomed to peace and prosperity, to the extent that we struggle even to imagine a return to conflict. The bad news is that change is upon us, and we may indeed fail to meet the moment. The good news is that we still have the tools to avert catastrophe – if we choose to use them.

    Appeared in: The Sentinel 9 December 2025

    https://substack.com/home/post/p-180624914

  • Poland’s War Over Knives and Forks

    Poland’s War Over Knives and Forks

    In Poland’s presidential election last Sunday, the unprofessional national populist Karol Nawrocki won over the highly skilled former Member of the European Parliament and now Mayor of Warsaw Rafal Trzaskowski. This result had nothing to do with the qualification of the candidates, and everything with crude, ‚us vs. them‘ identity politics of the rural, socially conservative ‚real Poland‘ vs. the urban middle class open to Europe and the world. In a milder form, this antagonism exists in West European countries as well, but the vitriol of the Polish case is not only stunning but also rooted in a very specific political culture. In a 1999 op-ed for Krzysztof Bobinski’s biweekly ‚Unia & Polska‘, I described this ‚war over knives and forks‘ and predicted it will influence Poland’s EU accession and membership for some time to come. The title is derived from a sarcastic remark that Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski made to me at a Warsaw conference in the late 1990s. Sikorski (with whom I get along brilliantly today) at that time was a British-style Eurosceptic clearly feeling sidelined by the Warsaw establishment and therefore flirting with national populism. He accused me of overfocusing on ‚Unia Wolnosci‘ (the precursor of Donald Tusk’s Platforma Obywatelska‘) because ‘they are more comfortable partners for you, they know how to eat with forks and knives‘. That stuck with me, and a few weeks later I wrote the op-ed. I would call it prophetic, but judge for yourselves.

    Roland Freudenstein

    Director, Warsaw Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation

    February 2, 1999

    The War Over Knives and Forks, or:

    the Conflict Poland Will Take into the EU

    As part of the larger debate on Poland and the EU, it has become quite fashionable to ask what will be Poland’s ultimate contribution to the integration process. Many answers are offered: Catholic values as well as a youthful spirit, a „special relationship“ with the United States next to a sense for hard work (as the bumper sticker says: „PL – we try harder“), a reinvigouration of the nation state as well as a particular love of freedom (as Bronislaw Geremek keeps pointing out). My feeling is that there will be a bit of all of these elements in Poland’s contribution. But there will be something else about which there has been very little debate:

    In my view, ranking high as an element of Poland’s contribution is a conflict. A conflict so divisive it will influence (and hamper) much of Poland’s behaviour before as well as after accession. I’m talking about the difference between those Poles who constantly have to prove they are not traitors of the Nation (with a capital N), and those who equally constantly have to prove they know what a knife and fork are. Between those who feel the need to demonstrate they still speak Polish, and those who always have to show they already speak a few words of English. Now don’t get me wrong: Almost all current member states of the EU have more or less of an internal split over European policy, even the Germans who for so long seemed to be the good boys in class. But these are arguments about two different ways of defining integration. In Poland’s case, we have to do with a conflict about two different ways of being Polish.

    What is the nature of that conflict? – First of all, it is very old. In fact, it came into being long before Poland regained independence in 1919, so except for extreme situations like WW II or martial law, it has been with this country for most of modernity, from the tiffs between urban intelligentsia and organized peasantry to the difference between Unia Wolnosci and most of the rest in Poland’s political spectrum today.

    Second, it is, of course, extemely important. It will ultimately shape Poland’s relationship with her partners within the EU. It is about the future of the nation state in a globalized world, about the true meaning of sovereignty and national identity, about what it means to be Polish at the beginning of the 21. century. But it is also about persons and personalities, parties and social milieus.

    Third, it is rather intense and waged with all available means. The conflict between Ryszard Czarnecki and Piotr Nowina-Konopka in June 1998 may serve as an example. The dailies „Zycie“ and „Gazeta Wyborcza“ are regularly used as weapons for one or the other side in the conflict.

    Fourth, it has some disastrous effects. Precisely in preparing Poland for EU accession, the friction created in the War Over Knives and Forks leads to much waste of energy, time and nerves. For instance, the eternal crisis surrounding the distribution of competences among Poland’s European institutions (UKIE et al.) can only be understood as part of this conflict: „Europe“ is much too important to be left to the domination of one of the sides in the conflict, so they fight. And will continue to do so for some time. The tinge of hysteria in some Polish demands for a target date for EU entry is another product of this conflict. West Europeans will have to take this into account when trying to understand Polish European policy. And Poles will have to do more to minimize the damaging side effects. To be sure, they have already come a long way. Membership itself, for instance, is not much of an issue anymore among relevant political parties, or within the clergy. But don’t deceive yourselves – as soon as we begin to talk about not just membership, but membership under such and such conditions, there will be a relapse into the old times.

    Fifth, the conflict’s final outcome is pretty clear – although it will last for a long time to come: The guys who already flock the salons of Brussels will somehow ultimately win – not by annihilating, but by slowly absorbing the other side. Or, if you prefer, the other side will simply improve their English. In any case, somewhere around 2050 nobody will talk about those 20. century antics. But before that, we can look forward to some interesting times.