In Poland’s presidential election last Sunday, the unprofessional national populist Karol Nawrocki won over the highly skilled former Member of the European Parliament and now Mayor of Warsaw Rafal Trzaskowski. This result had nothing to do with the qualification of the candidates, and everything with crude, ‚us vs. them‘ identity politics of the rural, socially conservative ‚real Poland‘ vs. the urban middle class open to Europe and the world. In a milder form, this antagonism exists in West European countries as well, but the vitriol of the Polish case is not only stunning but also rooted in a very specific political culture. In a 1999 op-ed for Krzysztof Bobinski’s biweekly ‚Unia & Polska‘, I described this ‚war over knives and forks‘ and predicted it will influence Poland’s EU accession and membership for some time to come. The title is derived from a sarcastic remark that Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski made to me at a Warsaw conference in the late 1990s. Sikorski (with whom I get along brilliantly today) at that time was a British-style Eurosceptic clearly feeling sidelined by the Warsaw establishment and therefore flirting with national populism. He accused me of overfocusing on ‚Unia Wolnosci‘ (the precursor of Donald Tusk’s Platforma Obywatelska‘) because ‘they are more comfortable partners for you, they know how to eat with forks and knives‘. That stuck with me, and a few weeks later I wrote the op-ed. I would call it prophetic, but judge for yourselves.
Roland Freudenstein
Director, Warsaw Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation
February 2, 1999
The War Over Knives and Forks, or:
the Conflict Poland Will Take into the EU
As part of the larger debate on Poland and the EU, it has become quite fashionable to ask what will be Poland’s ultimate contribution to the integration process. Many answers are offered: Catholic values as well as a youthful spirit, a „special relationship“ with the United States next to a sense for hard work (as the bumper sticker says: „PL – we try harder“), a reinvigouration of the nation state as well as a particular love of freedom (as Bronislaw Geremek keeps pointing out). My feeling is that there will be a bit of all of these elements in Poland’s contribution. But there will be something else about which there has been very little debate:
In my view, ranking high as an element of Poland’s contribution is a conflict. A conflict so divisive it will influence (and hamper) much of Poland’s behaviour before as well as after accession. I’m talking about the difference between those Poles who constantly have to prove they are not traitors of the Nation (with a capital N), and those who equally constantly have to prove they know what a knife and fork are. Between those who feel the need to demonstrate they still speak Polish, and those who always have to show they already speak a few words of English. Now don’t get me wrong: Almost all current member states of the EU have more or less of an internal split over European policy, even the Germans who for so long seemed to be the good boys in class. But these are arguments about two different ways of defining integration. In Poland’s case, we have to do with a conflict about two different ways of being Polish.
What is the nature of that conflict? – First of all, it is very old. In fact, it came into being long before Poland regained independence in 1919, so except for extreme situations like WW II or martial law, it has been with this country for most of modernity, from the tiffs between urban intelligentsia and organized peasantry to the difference between Unia Wolnosci and most of the rest in Poland’s political spectrum today.
Second, it is, of course, extemely important. It will ultimately shape Poland’s relationship with her partners within the EU. It is about the future of the nation state in a globalized world, about the true meaning of sovereignty and national identity, about what it means to be Polish at the beginning of the 21. century. But it is also about persons and personalities, parties and social milieus.
Third, it is rather intense and waged with all available means. The conflict between Ryszard Czarnecki and Piotr Nowina-Konopka in June 1998 may serve as an example. The dailies „Zycie“ and „Gazeta Wyborcza“ are regularly used as weapons for one or the other side in the conflict.
Fourth, it has some disastrous effects. Precisely in preparing Poland for EU accession, the friction created in the War Over Knives and Forks leads to much waste of energy, time and nerves. For instance, the eternal crisis surrounding the distribution of competences among Poland’s European institutions (UKIE et al.) can only be understood as part of this conflict: „Europe“ is much too important to be left to the domination of one of the sides in the conflict, so they fight. And will continue to do so for some time. The tinge of hysteria in some Polish demands for a target date for EU entry is another product of this conflict. West Europeans will have to take this into account when trying to understand Polish European policy. And Poles will have to do more to minimize the damaging side effects. To be sure, they have already come a long way. Membership itself, for instance, is not much of an issue anymore among relevant political parties, or within the clergy. But don’t deceive yourselves – as soon as we begin to talk about not just membership, but membership under such and such conditions, there will be a relapse into the old times.
Fifth, the conflict’s final outcome is pretty clear – although it will last for a long time to come: The guys who already flock the salons of Brussels will somehow ultimately win – not by annihilating, but by slowly absorbing the other side. Or, if you prefer, the other side will simply improve their English. In any case, somewhere around 2050 nobody will talk about those 20. century antics. But before that, we can look forward to some interesting times.