Kategorie: Topics

  • Diplomacy and War Zelensky-Trump-Putin phone diplomacy, NATO and Poland-Ukraine: My interview yesterday on TVP World

    Zelensky-Trump and Putin-Trump calls:

    • Zelensky can build on recent military successes against Russia (drones, deep strikes). Trump may not like Zelensky, but he respects winners.
    • Zelensky can show that he is still interested in peace negotiations, as opposed to Putin who hasn’t budged since 2022

    NATO summit in Ankara:

    • damage limitation is the Europeans’ goal but Trump has been turning up the hate against NATO recently.
    • On defence spending, Greenland, Iran, in 2025/6 Europeans have done the reasonable things and resisted the crazy ideas.
    • The problem is that every Trump tweet bashing the allies gives Putin new hope of splitting the West and thereby eventually winning against Ukraine.

    Ukrainian drone strikes:

    • They are extremely effective in turning up the heat on Putin. He is now in his worst situation since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, thanks to Ukrainian military successes, but also Western sanctions and the subsequent souring of the mood of many Russians.
    • Whether that will force him to compromise on peace with Ukraine, remains to be seen. But it’s still Ukraine’s best bet.

    Military situation in Donbas:

    • Claims and counter-claims about who controls Kostyantynivka: What we know for sure is that the city centre will still be embattled for some time while Ukraine inflicts terrible losses on Russia (like in Pokrovsk).
    • Kostyantynivka is no tipping point, even for the Donbas itself. Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are firmly in Ukrainian hands, and strongly fortified.

    US intel warnings about Russian attack against Poland:

    • Putin may indeed be weighing options of a hybrid attack on a NATO member. It sounds counter-intuitive because Russia has problems already in Ukraine but it would most certainly not be a full-scale ground attack but something hybrid (missiles, drones, sabotage, maybe limited incursion under false flag).
    • The goal would not be to conquer territory, but to distract attention (and arms deliveries) from Ukraine and, above all, split the Europeans: there would be countries in favour of an armed response and others who would want to de-escalate.
    • Donald Tusk is right to amplify those US government warnings: Better safe than sorry!

    The Polish-Ukrainian spat over history:

    • This is by now a full-blown crisis between important allies, and the only profiteer is Putin!
    • Mistakes were made on both sides, but the most important lesson is: Poles and Ukrainians will hardly agree on a common vision of a painful history. They should jointly prioritise to cooperate on topics that are of strategic importance: that Ukraine wins the war and that it soon joins the EU.
    • In that sense, history should be put in its place.
  • Die Ukraine ist ein Vorbild für Europa

    Die Ukraine ist ein Vorbild für Europa

    In vielen Ländern, die die Ukraine bei ihrer Verteidigung gegen Russland unterstützen, gilt das Land als Bittstellerin. Diese Sichtweise ist einseitig und voreingenommen. In entscheidenden Bereichen ist die Ukraine ein Vorbild für Europa und darüber hinaus. Fünf strategische Lehren.

    Russland führt einen totalen Krieg gegen die Ukraine. Es greift nicht nur militärische, sondern vorwiegend zivile Ziele an. Es versucht, Staatlichkeit und Nation zu zerstören, ihre Bevölkerung und die zivile Infrastruktur. Russland setzt psychologische Kriegsführung, die Manipulation der Religion und alle ihm zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel ein, um die Ukraine als unabhängige und souveräne Nation auszulöschen. 
     

    1. Ein Ansatz der totalen Verteidigung 

    Im Falle eines russischen Angriffs müssen wir bereit sein, dem ukrainischen Vorbild zu folgen und unsererseits einen Ansatz der totalen Verteidigung umzusetzen. Wir müssen verstehen, dass Russland in einem solchen Fall, der leider durchaus möglich ist, über die militärischen Maßnahmen hinaus sein gesamtes Instrumentarium der hybriden Kriegsführung einsetzen würde. Russland würde nicht nur darauf abzielen, auf dem Schlachtfeld zu siegen, sondern auch darauf, unsere Gesellschaften zum Zusammenbruch zu bringen und den Staat zum Scheitern zu bringen.

    Bislang wenden nur wenige europäische Nationen einen Ansatz der Gesamtverteidigung an: 

    • Finnland zeichnet sich mit seinem Modell der „umfassenden Sicherheit“ durch die am weitesten entwickelte Form der Totalverteidigung in Europa aus. Dieses Modell umfasst die Bereitschaft der gesamten Gesellschaft und der ganzen Regierung mit einer Kriegsbereitschaft von bis zu 280.000 Soldaten und einer Gesamtreserve von 870.000 Personen.
    • Schweden hat eine lange Tradition der Totalverteidigung, die Zivilschutz, militärische Verteidigung und psychologische Verteidigung umfasst. Nach einer Phase der Unterbrechung nach dem Kalten Krieg hat Schweden seinen Totalverteidigungsansatz reaktiviert, einschließlich einer „Totalverteidigungspflicht“ für alle Bürger im Alter von 16 bis 70 Jahren, was bedeutet, dass jeder im Kriegsfall aufgefordert werden kann, einen Beitrag zu den Verteidigungsbemühungen zu leisten.
    • Auch Norwegen verfolgt ein Konzept der Gesamtverteidigung, wobei der Schwerpunkt auf der Einbeziehung der gesamten Gesellschaft liegt, insbesondere angesichts seiner geografischen und demografischen Herausforderungen.

    Im Gegensatz dazu hinkt Deutschland hinterher. Zwar hat es begonnen, einen Ansatz der „Gesamtverteidigung“ oder umfassenden Verteidigung zu verfolgen, doch bleibt dieser unvollständig und wird uneinheitlich umgesetzt. Während die politischen Entscheidungsträger auf militärischer Ebene – angetrieben durch den Strategiewechsel der „Zeitenwende“ nach 2022 – erhebliche Fortschritte erzielt haben, bestehen auf ziviler und gesellschaftlicher Ebene, bei der institutionellen Kohärenz und der nachhaltigen Umsetzung weiterhin große Lücken. Nur zur Veranschaulichung: Deutschland verfügt über keinen einzigen funktionsfähigen Bunker; nur 32 Prozent der Deutschen wären bereit, zur Verteidigung ihres Landes zu den Waffen zu greifen – 57 Prozent lehnen dies ab.

    Die EU hat im März 2025 eine Strategie für eine Europäische Union der Abwehrbereitschaft auf den Weg gebrachtDies ist ein guter Schritt in die richtige Richtung – allerdings fehlt der Strategie ein klarer Fahrplan. Hinzu kommt, dass die meisten Aspekte von den Mitgliedstaaten und deren oft begrenzter Bereitschaft abhängen, sie voranzutreiben.
     

    2. Die Ukraine als strategischer Vorteil für Europa

    Als im Februar 2022 die groß angelegte Invasion Russlands begann, war die Ukraine im Kampf ums Überleben stark auf westliche Militärhilfe angewiesen. Seit diesen Anfängen hat sich die ukrainische Armee dramatisch vergrößert und sich zur größten und erfahrensten Streitmacht Europas entwickelt. Infolge dieses Wandels wird ein Land, das zuvor von vielen als militärisch unbedeutend abgetan wurde, heute weithin als unverzichtbar für die künftige Verteidigung Europas angesehen. Tatsächlich verfügen die ukrainischen Streitkräfte über praktische Erfahrungen und hart erarbeitete Erkenntnisse, die keine NATO-Übung vermitteln kann.

    Für Europa bedeutet dies, dass wir die Ukraine in die europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsstrukturen und -strategien integrieren müssen. Dabei gilt insbesondere:

    • Die Beschleunigung der EU-Integration der Ukraine ist unerlässlich. Da die EU erwägt, den Prozess mit einem neuen Ansatz der „umgekehrten Erweiterung“ grundlegend zu überarbeiten, verbessern sich die Aussichten. Bei einer „umgekehrten Erweiterung“ würde die Ukraine (wie andere Beitrittskandidaten wie Moldawien oder Albanien) zur EU eingeladen, dann aber zunächst über einen bestimmten Zeitraum hinweg schrittweise in Bezug auf Rechte und Pflichten integriert werden. 
    • Da eine NATO-Mitgliedschaft der Ukraine auf absehbare Zeit blockiert ist, müssen die Europäer die Ukraine in eine künftige Europäische Verteidigungsunion (oder ähnliches) sowie in die sich bereits abzeichnende Koalition der Willigen integrieren, die die europäische Verteidigung und Sicherheit vorantreibt. Eine erste sinnvolle (und eigentlich längst überfällige) Initiative wäre die gemeinsame Umsetzung der Skyshield-Initiative mit der Ukraine als eine von Europa geführte integrierte Luftschutzzone über unumstrittenen Gebieten der Ukraine. 
    • Die Erfahrungen der Ukraine sollen in europäische Prozesse einfließen und institutionell eingebunden werden. Dazu gehört beispielsweise, ukrainische Experten auf allen Ebenen in relevante Ausbildungsprogramme einzubinden, ukrainische Ausbilder an europäischen Militärakademien zu stationieren oder gemeinsame Zellen zur Doktrin-Entwicklung zu schaffen, insbesondere mit Schwerpunkt auf Drohnen und elektronischer Kriegsführung.

    Dazu ein typisches Beispiel: Angesichts des Krieges gegen den Iran, in dem sowohl die USA als auch die arabischen Golfstaaten mit begrenzten Raketenvorräten konfrontiert sind, bemühen sie sich nun aktiv um die Abfangdrohnen und das Luftverteidigungs-Know-how der Ukraine, insbesondere um iranischen Shahed-Drohnen entgegenzuwirken. Als Reaktion darauf bietet die Ukraine ihre im Einsatz erprobten Abfangdrohnen (wie die „Sting First Person View“-Drohne), Schulungen und Fachwissen vor Ort an, um den USA und ihren arabischen Verbündeten bei der Abwehr iranischer Drohnenschwärme zu helfen. Als Gegenleistung streben die Ukrainer den Erhalt von High-End-Waffen an, wie zum Beispiel dringend benötigte Patriot-Luftabwehrraketen, die sie im eigenen Land (noch) nicht herstellen können. Darüber hinaus ist die Ukraine auch an Joint Ventures und Technologieaustausch interessiert, nicht nur an Direktverkäufen, um Investitionen anzuziehen und neue Lieferketten für ihre eigenen Kriegsanstrengungen aufzubauen. 

    Wenn die Europäer (und auch andere) von den Erfahrungen der Ukraine profitieren, wenn sie sich auf ukrainisches Know-how stützen, um ihre eigenen Streitkräfte zu stärken, dann ist Gegenseitigkeit keine Option, sondern eine Notwendigkeit. Insbesondere Europa muss der Ukraine die Mittel zur Verfügung stellen, um zu gewinnen – nicht um zu überleben, nicht um die Stellung zu halten, sondern um zu gewinnen. Wenn die europäischen Regierungen anerkennen, dass das Schlachtfeld der Ukraine zu einem Testfeld für die Zukunft der europäischen Verteidigung geworden ist, dann ist die Unterstützung der Ukraine keine Wohltätigkeit – sie ist eine strategische Investition und ein fairer Deal. Je schneller die Ukraine die Offensivfähigkeit Russlands besiegt, desto unwahrscheinlicher ist es, dass Europa später mit einer direkten Konfrontation konfrontiert wird.
     

    3. Innovative Verteidigung 

    Verteidigungstechnologien entwickeln sich ständig weiter: Ganz gleich, welche neuen Waffen auf dem Schlachtfeld auftauchen, keine von ihnen bleibt lange entscheidend. Innerhalb weniger Monate entwickeln die Gegner Gegenmaßnahmen – neue Taktiken, neue Technologien. Kriege werden nicht von denen gewonnen, die über die größten Arsenale oder die meisten Soldaten verfügen, sondern von denen, die dieses Wettrennen gewinnen. 

    Der Erfolg der Ukraine bei ihrer Verteidigung gegen Russland beruht nicht nur auf Widerstandsfähigkeit oder Patriotismus, sondern auch auf der Fähigkeit, sich anzupassen, zu dezentralisieren und neue Technologien schneller als der Gegner einzusetzen. 

    Nirgendwo wird dies deutlicher als in der Herangehensweise des Landes an die Drohnenkriegsführung, wo rasante Entwicklung und Einsatz es der Ukraine ermöglicht haben, tief hinter den feindlichen Linien zuzuschlagen und konventionelle militärische Kalkulationen zu durchbrechen. Initiativen wie BRAVE1, die Echtzeit-Feedback zwischen Fronttruppen und Entwicklern ermöglichen, sorgen dafür, dass neue Technologien schnell auf dem Schlachtfeld getestet und verfeinert werden. Die ukrainische Regierung hat zudem Maßnahmen zur Unterstützung von Start-ups im Verteidigungsbereich ergriffen, was seit Beginn der groß angelegten Invasion zur Gründung von über 200 neuen Rüstungsunternehmen geführt hat.

    Die Fähigkeit, Lösungen schnell zu testen, zu optimieren und umzusetzen, verschafft der Ukraine einen Vorteil gegenüber dem stärker zentralisierten, bürokratischen Verteidigungsindustriekomplex Russlands. Zwar ist es Russland gelungen, die Rüstungsproduktion auszuweiten und bestehende Technologien anzupassen oder zu verbessern, doch fehlt es dem Land an einer unternehmerischen Kultur sowie an der Agilität und dezentralen Kreativität, die die Ukraine an den Tag legt. 

    Die Europäer hingegen stehen vor vielfältigen Herausforderungen: Dazu zählen insbesondere die vorherrschende Fragmentierung der Innovationsbemühungen, anhaltende Unterinvestitionen in die kooperative Verteidigungsforschung, eine begrenzte Fokussierung auf neue Technologien sowie Spannungen zwischen unterschiedlichen Ansätzen in Bezug auf Governance und Koordination.

    Um Innovationen zu fördern, haben die Europäer mehrere Initiativen ins Leben gerufen, darunter den Europäischen Verteidigungsfonds, das EU-Programm für Verteidigungsinnovation und den Hub für Verteidigungsinnovation, um Innovationen voranzutreiben und die europäische technologische und industrielle Verteidigungsbasis zu stärken. Parallel dazu treibt die NATO den NATO-Innovationsfonds und den NATO-Verteidigungsinnovationsbeschleuniger voran, um den technologischen Vorsprung des Bündnisses auszubauen.

    Generell müssen die Europäer hier fünf wichtige Lehren ziehen:

    • Geschwindigkeit und Agilität: Europa muss schnellere Beschaffungs- und Entwicklungszyklen einführen und sich von starren, trägen Prozessen lösen. Die Fähigkeit der Ukraine, neue Technologien innerhalb von Wochen – statt Jahren – zu entwickeln und einzusetzen, unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit agiler Verteidigungsinnovationen.
    • Gesellschaftsweites Engagement: Europa kann von dem ukrainischen Ansatz lernen, Zivilisten, Start-ups und das Militär in ein einheitliches Innovationsökosystem zu integrieren. Die Förderung der Beteiligung des Privatsektors und der Abbau bürokratischer Hindernisse könnten den technologischen Fortschritt im Verteidigungsbereich beschleunigen.
    • Strategische Integration mit der Ukraine: Europa sollte darauf hinarbeiten, ukrainische Innovationen in seine eigenen industriellen und finanziellen Kapazitäten zu integrieren. Diese gegenseitige Integration könnte die Verteidigungsautonomie Europas stärken, die Abhängigkeit von den USA verringern und die Abschreckung gegen künftige russische Aggressionen verbessern.
    • Fokus auf skalierbare, kostengünstige Lösungen: Der Erfolg der Ukraine mit kostengünstigen Drohnen und digitalen Lösungen zeigt den Wert erschwinglicher, skalierbarer Technologien. Europa sollte Investitionen in Bereichen priorisieren, in denen die Ukraine bewährtes Fachwissen vorweisen kann, wie beispielsweise in der elektronischen Kriegsführung und bei unbemannten Systemen.
    • Langfristige Investitionen in Innovationsökosysteme: Europa muss in den Aufbau widerstandsfähiger, anpassungsfähiger Innovationsökosysteme investieren, ähnlich dem ukrainischen BRAVE1-Modell, um sicherzustellen, dass es in Echtzeit auf sich entwickelnde Bedrohungen reagieren kann. 
       

    4. Führungsstärke und Mut zeigen

    Seit 2022 zeigen Präsident Selenskyj und sein Team beeindruckende Führungsstärke und Mut – angesichts der brutalen russischen Aggression, der täglichen Kriegsverbrechen, des Todes und des Leids. Auch wenn er Fehler gemacht hat, verkörpert Präsident Selenskyj insbesondere Beharrlichkeit angesichts einer existenziellen Bedrohung. Unter persönlichem Risiko hat er die Ukraine geeint gehalten und dabei stets ehrliche Kommunikation über die Gefahr mit klaren Aufrufen zum Handeln verbunden – und so nationale Angst in nationale und internationale Entschlossenheit sowie politische Handlungsfähigkeit verwandelt.

    Gemessen an diesem Maßstab schneiden die Europäer schlecht ab. Europas politische Führung ist weitgehend von Angst geprägt. Die Angst vor dem Tyrannen im Weißen Haus hat zu einer Mischung aus Unterwerfung und Anbiederung geführt – eine Haltung, die seine Verachtung für Europa nur noch verstärkt. Die Angst vor dem starken Mann im Kreml hat zu Zögern, Beschwichtigung und einer Fixierung auf die Vermeidung einer Eskalation geführt – eine Strategie, die den Aggressor, der ein revisionistisches, imperialistisches Projekt verfolgt, nur noch ermutigt. 

    Grund dafür ist ein strategisches Führungsvakuum, das durch den Rückzug der USA aus Europa und der NATO entstanden ist. Über Jahrzehnte hinweg haben sich die Europäer daran gewöhnt, zu folgen statt zu führen. Nun müssen die Europäer (und Kanadier) ihre selbstverschuldete Unreife überwinden, an ihre Stärke glauben und sich auf eine neue Führungsformel einigen. 

    Dies erfordert Tatkraft, Entschlossenheit und Mut. Die europäischen Nationen und die Kanadier sind für diese Rolle nicht geschult, nicht auf eigene Faust, geschweige denn im Zusammenspiel mit anderen. Hinzu kommt, dass einige der größeren Akteure ihre Vorbehalte mitbringen. Frankreich und das Vereinigte Königreich kämen als die beiden verbliebenen Atommächte Europas für diese Rolle infrage. Doch der Brexit macht eine solche Führungsrolle Londons für manche im EU-Lager fragwürdig. Und Frankreich, wo Präsident Emmanuel Macron innenpolitisch geschwächt ist und die Aussicht besteht, dass die extreme Rechte die Präsidentschaftswahlen 2027 gewinnen könnte, wird nicht als ausreichend verlässlich angesehen. Deutschland, als größte Volkswirtschaft Europas und unter Bundeskanzler Friedrich Merz, scheint bereit zu sein, eine Führungsrolle zu übernehmen, würde dies aber grundsätzlich immer als gemeinsame Anstrengung betrachten.

    Angesichts dieses uneinheitlichen Bildes wäre die beste Lösung die Bildung einer Führungsgruppe, um die Stärken zu bündeln und die Schwächen auszugleichen. Es gibt mehrere Optionen: Die Europäer könnten einen Europäischen Sicherheitsrat einrichten, wie kürzlich von EU-Kommissar Andrius Kubilius vorgeschlagen. In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass alles mit allem zusammenhängt, könnten sie auch ehrgeiziger sein und eine Europäische Führungsgruppe gründen, um die bisher fehlende Führungsstärke zu entwickeln. Beide Ansätze würden es ermöglichen, die Ukraine in ihre Arbeit einzubeziehen.
     

    5. Einheit schaffen! 

    Die Ukraine ist natürlich kein monolithischer Block. Als demokratische Nation und Staat hat sie ihren Anteil an manchmal heftigem Wettbewerb, Spannungen und Rivalitäten. 

    Ungeachtet dessen bleiben angesichts des russischen Angriffs die nationale Einheit und Identität eine tragende Säule des Widerstands. Tatsächlich hat die russische Invasion einen „Rally-around-the-flag“-Effekt ausgelöst, der die Festigung der ukrainischen Identität beschleunigt und interne Spaltungen verringert hat. Trotz der Verwüstungen durch den Krieg zeigen die Ukrainer eine bemerkenswerte Widerstandsfähigkeit, geprägt von einem hohen Maß an sozialem Zusammenhalt, Solidarität und Vertrauen in die Institutionen.

    Als Europäer scheinen wir mehr Wert auf das zu legen, was uns trennt, als auf das, was uns verbindet. Das ist dumm und der Weg zum strategischen Scheitern. Jede unserer Nationen ist einfach viel zu klein und zu peripher, um im Machtkampf der starken Männer in Washington, Moskau oder Peking allein eine Chance zu haben. Nur wenn wir zusammenhalten, haben wir eine Chance, Einfluss zu nehmen. Wir müssen unsere europäische Identität schmieden und mit „Europa zuerst“ beginnen, dann kommt meine Nation – und nicht umgekehrt. 

    Die Einheit der EU steht weiterhin unter Druck. Wir können die Risse täglich beobachten und beklagen. Gleichzeitig wissen wir, dass die meisten Schwächen Europas, sei es in den Bereichen Verteidigung, Wirtschaft, Innovation oder Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, auf mangelnde Integration zurückzuführen sind. Wir haben die Wahl: uns mit dem Machtverlust Europas aufgrund von Spaltung und Fragmentierung abzufinden oder mit Leidenschaft und Entschlossenheit auf die „Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ hinzuarbeiten. 

  • Europe’s Drone Moment: Turning Civilian Strength into Strategic Defence Advantage

    Europe’s Drone Moment: Turning Civilian Strength into Strategic Defence Advantage

    By Christine Raab, Germany-based drone and defence expert, founder of COPURA GmbH

    Russia’s war against Ukraine, the constant probing of Europe’s airspace and borders, and the vulnerability of our critical infrastructure have made one thing crystal clear: drones are now a central feature of modern security. From the Black Sea to the Baltic and the Gulf region, cheap unmanned systems have challenged traditional military technology and exposed how easily our open societies can be disrupte. For a Europe that has long under‑invested in hard power, drones are both a warning light and an opportunity.

    The warning is obvious: Drones have driven a profound empowerment of small groups and even individuals, similar to what smartphones did some 15 years ago. They shake up our concepts of security and are accessible to state and non‑state actors alike. They have been used to spy and hit facilities that were previously considered relatively safe, while border services and police forces report increasing use of drones for smuggling, illegal crossings and surveillance of security forces themselves. The security infringements are serious and manyfold. Europe needs to act and act fast.

    Yet Europe is not starting from zero: In the last decade, the EU has developed the most sophisticated civilian drone framework in the world. Its airspace rules, certification concepts, operational categories and uncompromising approach to safety are shaping how drones are designed, built and flown – in Europe and beyond. A capable ecosystem of SMEs, start‑ups and industrial players has emerged around these rules. This civilian base is a hidden strategic asset that political decision‑makers should now bring into their security toolbox.

    “Civilian” and “defence” increasingly blend together and if we build bridges with our security thinking, a dual‑use strategy would use taxpayer money once to serve two purposes: crowding in private investment and jobs at home, while at the same time strengthening deterrence and resilience against real threats. It would provide security on our borders and across EU territory, and at the same time serve as a major innovation agenda for the European economy.

    Bridge 1 – capability. Many technologies and procedures tested and solidified in civil airspace – detect‑and‑avoid systems, traffic management, secure communications or operator training – are directly relevant to border surveillance, critical‑infrastructure protection and battlefield logistics. By aligning requirements and standards where possible, defence and interior ministries can shorten procurement cycles, avoid bespoke “gold‑plated” solutions and benefit from economies of scale created by the civilian market. Training reserve soldiers on drones in their regular exercises is another cost‑efficient way to increase overall resilience. This is fiscal efficiency in practice.

    Bridge 2 –  governance. A cross‑border airspace incursion, a hostile drone over a nuclear plant, or an attack on an LNG terminal at sea raises operational and legal questions for local police, air‑navigation service providers, national air forces, EU agencies and NATO – all at once. Today, responsibilities and rules of engagement remain fragmented, with grey zones between “civil” and “military” chains of command. Good governance also needs coherent, integrated data for proper situational awareness, another element Europe still lacks. We need clearer roles, better information‑sharing and joint exercises between EU, NATO and member states, using existing civil‑drone expertise as part of the solution.

    Bridge 3 – industry. We cannot afford to miss the innovation wave of drones and counter‑drones. The good news is that a vibrant civilian sector already exists inside the Single Market. With the right incentives, these firms can scale into dual‑use champions, offering European alternatives to imported systems and embedding our own standards on safety, cybersecurity and data protection. EU defence tools, from joint procurement to the European Defence Fund, should be used to pull these players into larger programmes, not to reinvent the wheel in closed military silos.

    More drones will likely raise concerns among citizens. Questions about surveillance, data use, and deployment at borders or over cities are not “technical”. If mishandled, they risk fuelling resistance to exactly the capabilities Europe needs. Our democratic systems have a high‑stakes opportunity here to show that liberty and security are not a zero‑sum game. A rules‑based approach – with clear legal mandates, proportionality safeguards and effective parliamentary oversight – can ensure that high‑tech security remains anchored in European values, supported by open public discussion to build societal acceptance.

    So here is a set of political actions necessary to get the unmanned capabilities a democratic and resilient Europe needs:

    • Prioritise a small number of concrete drone and counter‑drone capabilities that directly protect citizens and critical infrastructure.
    • Use existing civilian rules, agencies and test ranges as accelerators for defence and security projects, not as obstacles.
    • Develop and maintain high‑volume drone production capacities in Europe, accepting that maintaining them may cost taxpayers money.
    • Fund pragmatic pilot projects with industry, cities and border regions to prove concepts quickly and visibly, helping to shorten procurement cycles.
    • Create the legal and technical conditions for an integrated situational‑awareness picture for decision‑preparation, because when the moment comes, decisions must be quick and aligned.
    • Embed privacy‑by‑design and transparency requirements early, so that public trust grows with capability, rather than distrust.

    Europe’s drone moment is already here and a lot of initiatives in these priority areas have started. The bigger challenge will be to maintain focus despite political distractions and to develop capabilities as coherently as possible across Europe. In security, any wall is only as strong as its weakest brick. If Europe manages to implement such a security‑ and innovation‑focused agenda in developing its unmanned capabilities, it can credibly improve its geopolitical security position within a foreseeable time.

  • Trump, NATO and a Possible Russian Attack

    (my interview for TVP World on 26 April, 2026)

    • White House Correspondents Dinner attack:
      • Europeans’ gut reaction is: This is America’s toxic gun culture and political polarisation.
      • But initially, there was even a conciliatory tone between Republicans and Democrats: both sides were represented at the dinner, and Trump called this an attack on the Constitution (about which he otherwise cares less).
      • But this kind of unity is not going to last. Trump’s ship is sinking, politically, and divisiveness will quickly return.
    • Trump’s and Tusk’s remarks on NATO allies:
      • Trump calling Europeans bad allies is like Voldemort claiming Harry Potter violated the Geneva Convention at the Battle of Hogwarts.
      • Critics of PM Tusk’s questioning US loyalty in NATO should finally admit that it’s Trump who has been systematically undermining Article 5 for over a year now.
      • Trump’s claim that NATO allies are unhelpful over Iran systematically overlooks the fact that NATO is a defensive alliance, not one for a war of choice without even consulting allies.
      • The one time allies were there to help the US was after it had been attacked on 9/11. And Europeans casualties there were overproportional in relation to their size.
    • US-Polish relations:
      • There still is a special relationship beyond NATO. Poland’s record on defence spending and readiness to fight is exemplary. Trump has nothing to complain about here.
      • Recent US behaviour reminds a lot of Poles of Soviet bullying. And President Nawrocki’s attempt to create a special axis to Washington, bypassing the government, is not helpful.
    • Is a Russian attack on NATO imminent?
      • PM Tusk said something that many European political leaders and military commanders have said, just maybe a little less dramatically than he.
      • An attack may indeed be closer than many in Europe think. Russia still has some reserve forces and air assets, and it already is waging a hybrid war against Western democracies ranging from cyber attacks to sabotage etc.
    • Is NATO ready?
      • Probably not tomorrow. Also depends on the kind of attack. Now, the US are indispensable for a defence.
      • In the long run, Europeans have to be able to deter Russia on their own; in the short run, they have to take what they can get from the US. This may make them actually more dependent, which is why Europeans need to navigate between short and long term.
    • EU summit in Cyprus:
      • The 90 bn loan for Ukraine passed! That’s a welcome boost for Ukraine.
      • On financing the EU’s huge expenditures for defence, energy security and soon maybe even to counter a new global recession, there is the habitual difference between the frugal North and the profligate South. But a compromise will be found!
  • Values-Based Realism and Its Enemies: How to Tackle the new Geopolitical ‘Realism’ from Left and Right

    Values-Based Realism and Its Enemies: How to Tackle the new Geopolitical ‘Realism’ from Left and Right

    (Martens Centre Blog, together with Dr. Peter Hefele, uploaded on 24 February 2026)

    This year’s Davos World Economic Forum stood out for many things, not least the Greenland crisis, but it will also be known for two memorable speeches: Those of US President Donald Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. While Trump’s 90 minute rambling, self-congratulatory, passive-aggressive rant may have been the most overcrowded event, Carney’s well-crafted 15-minute speech will enter the history books, not only for its succinctness (as opposed to Trump’s rambling) but for its sketch of a ‘values-based realism’ as a viable alternative to the new transactional pseudo-realism Trump stands for.

    Carney acknowledged the end of the old rules-based international order and proposed a coalition of middle powers that pragmatically cooperates in diversifying its trade while still sticking to essential values as the basis of their international behaviour. But just looking back at the last 5 years, values-based realism has two powerful counter-narratives.

    Great power geopolitics of the Alt-Right

    Geopolitics is back in fashion. For more than a year, we’ve heard from the White House that a new era of global power politics has begun. Trump’s Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller summarised it neatly in early January 2026: ‘We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.’ This transactional, might-makes-right ‘America First’ approach to world affairs is underpinned by official documents such as the National Security Strategy of November 2025.

    In a perfectly clear departure from ‘spreading liberal ideology’ and ‘hectoring … nations into abandoning their traditions and historic forms of government’, the administration dismisses at least eight decades of global democracy support and values-based foreign policy. The partial or total destruction of America’s formidable instruments of democratic solidarity – USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – is entirely in line with this thinking.

    To put it bluntly: In this perspective, what used to be the greatest strength of the West – individual freedom, checks and balances. rules-based multilateralism, and the belief in universal human rights – is now considered its biggest weakness in the global power struggle.

    But there is a new phenomenon arising next to the Trumpian view on great powers eternally jostling for spheres of influence. We observe a rising movement and global alliances on what we would like to call a new realpolitik of Progressives and the Global South.

    After the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many in the West, freshly self-confident with a newfound sense of purpose, were disappointed to see so little support for Ukraine in the ‘Global South’, from Latin America via Africa to much of Asia. That should not have come as a surprise.

    British foreign policy expert Fiona Hill in 2023 spoke of a ‘rebellion’ in the Global South against the collective West. One of the tenets of this mindset is to see the rules-based international order increasingly as a poor disguise for the great power politics of a dominant West – and not as a level      playing field. Another central element is that the Global South very pragmatically forges alliances to defend itself against any Western ‘preaching’, weakening or obliterating ideas like global democracy support. Those are allegedly poorly disguised instruments of Western imperialism.

    What is striking in the context of 2026 geopolitics is how many overlaps there are between the neorealism from the radical right and the progressive Southern philosophies – including their left-progressive acolytes in the West –  of the new global disorder and what to make of it. The messages and consequences are clear: in the end, countries, or rather their often autocratic regimes, have to fight for themselves, or even help each other crush Western-inspired democratic movements. Civil society is not a valid concept and a voice to be heard; democracy support is tainted.

    The challenges of Carneyism

    Mark Carney’s fascinating speech in Davos proposed a new coalition of democratic middle powers, believing in values such as human rights and democracy, but capable of creating partnerships with autocracies.

    The latter come with some unpleasant consequences and bitter pills to swallow. And politicians have to explain this to their voters. Canada’s plans for a free trade agreement with China, for the time being withdrawn, is an example of such dilemmas. The most recent EU-India Free Trade Agreement is another one: it means buying more products made with Russian oil, thus indirectly financing Russia’s war on Ukraine. 

    For Europe’s democracies, there is no alternative to navigate the geopolitical storm without illusions, but still based on principles worth defending, and in cooperation with civil societies and democratic forces across the world. We need to hedge against over-dependency on an unreliable and often hostile US by diversifying, obviously not by replacing one dependency with another. Neither the cynicism of the Alt-Right, nor the relativism and defeatism of many progressives and Global South propagandists, should keep us from promoting our values of a free and open society, contributing to making the world at least a bit safer and freer.

  • Would Péter Magyar Be a Better Hungarian Leader Than Viktor Orbán?

    Would Péter Magyar Be a Better Hungarian Leader Than Viktor Orbán?

    Asking for a friend…

    In all fairness, the short answer is: most likely, yes. Unless you’re Vladimir Putin or Donald Trump, both of whom emphatically agree that Orbán must stay in power. But from the point of view of most other people in Europe, Hungarian and non-Hungarian, the answer should be yes.

    Hungary’s parliamentary election on 12 April will arguably be this year’s most momentous European poll, with consequences far beyond Hungary, and even beyond Europe. After 16 years in power and an elsewhere unparalleled push to turn his country into a de facto autocracy, for the first time since 2010, Viktor Orbán faces the possibility of electoral defeat.

    A lot has been made in recent weeks of all the caveats to a positive answer to the title question. They range from a very unfair advantage for Orbán’s ruling FIDESZ in the electoral system to an uneven playing field when it comes to government control of media, the vote counting etc. Magyar’s TISZA party would have to gain a supermajority of votes in order to get a majority in Parliament. And even if power changes hands, the deep state that Orbán has had four full terms to create, with centrally controlled courts, administration, law enforcement and intelligence services, will at least partly work against any new government.

    Most of all, Péter Magyar would probably not signify a clear, 180 degree turn in everything Orbán stands for, from populism to nationalism, vis-à-vis Brussels, Kyiv or other places in Europe. After all, Magyar was a loyal follower of Orbán until 2024. And for example on Hungarian minority rights in neighbouring countries like Slovakia, he has been challenging the current gouverment ‘from the right’. Magyar wouldn’t be an easy partner for Ukraine and Hungary’s fellow member states, either. His character begs some questions. He and most of his teammates lack governance experience. But the following assumptions about him are justified, in my view:

    1) He would be significantly more cooperative than Orbán on EU security and assisting Ukraine. He would stop making fighting ‘Brussels’ an element of Hungary’s political DNA.

    2) He would end the strategic use of corruption as an element of building and maintaining power, if only to fulfil his campaign promises and prevent an early return to power by FIDESZ.

    3) He would try to re-establish, step by step, the rule of law with strong and independent institutions, if only to make sure the EU funds are flowing again and he can show some immediate economic effect to Hungarians.

    4) While continuing the policy of not sending weapons to Ukraine, he would refuse to be Putin’s mouthpiece in the European Union that Orbán has become.

    5) He would stop the culture wars, freeing up a lot of political energy.

    6) While there may be chaotic conditions for a while, don’t underestimate the burst of enthusiasm and creativity, the return of expats and the general sense of a better future that will take hold of most of the country.

    Now, whether in April Magyar can actually turn a majority of votes into a government, is a different question. The electoral playing field is anything but level. FIDESZ is going full steam ahead with a Musk/Trump/Putin-enabled campaign about alleged foreign interference in favour of Magyar, preparing the ground for biased courts to nullify the election results. The ensuing protests could then even serve as an opportunity to declare a state of emergency.

    But such a scenario would hopefully be a reason for EU partners to get serious about altering Hungary’s status as a member state. Precisely because Trump might want to openly interfere with fundamental EU affairs at this point, this might quickly become another Rubicon moment for Europe, with a strong imperative to prove we can still remain who we are, even in catastrophic circumstances.

    But first and foremost, fingers crossed for a resounding victory of Péter Magyar’s TISZA at the ballot box!

  • Europe, Don’t Be a Scaredy-Cat!

    Europe, Don’t Be a Scaredy-Cat!

    Get onto your feet – now!

    While the tectonic plates below our feet keep shifting, and the global order keeps eroding, Europeans are still punching below their weight. The recent concerted push-back against Trump’s coercive plans for a US-annexation of Greenland illustrate how much Europe can gain from standing up to a bully. Here is my passionate plea for a politics of courage – as the rule and not the exception!

    Europe should not be afraid. Not afraid to assume responsibility for its own security. Not afraid to use its economic power. Not afraid of an open rupture with Washington. And, of course, not afraid of Putinism.

    However, over past years, Europe’s politics was largely driven by fear. Yet fear is a terrible adviser. It paralyzes thinking and triggers the instinct to retreat or hide. Yet withdrawal does not eliminate the source of fear. On the contrary: it allows it to grow.

    Europe’s political leadership, too, has been shaped by fear. Fear of the bully in the White House has led to a mixture of submission and ingratiation — a posture that only reinforces his contempt for Europe. Fear of the violent man in the Kremlin has lead to hesitation, appeasement, and a fixation on avoiding escalation — a strategy that merely emboldens an aggressor pursuing a revisionist, imperial project.


    Democracy and the Politics of Fear

    Admittedly, some characteristics of democratic systems make them particularly susceptible to fear-driven politics. Politicians operate under constant competitive pressure; elections, approval ratings, and legitimacy are fragile. The fear of losing public support — and thus power — often encourages defensive or opportunistic behavior rather than courage. This tendency is reinforced by the logic of blame: political actors are far more likely to be punished for failure than rewarded for success.

    The result is structural risk aversion. Short-term, seemingly safe options are favored over decisions that may appear riskier but promise more sustainable long-term outcomes.

    Fear can also be deliberately instrumentalized. Populist parties, in particular, mobilize anxieties about crime, terrorism, migration, or economic decline in order to generate loyalty and consolidate power. Modern media ecosystems amplify perceived threats and crises, fostering an atmosphere of permanent alarm. Under such conditions, political leaders are pushed to react reflexively rather than act autonomously.

    Yet politics shaped by fear comes at a high price. Structural, long-term solutions are neglected in favor of immediate constraints. Experimentation and reform are avoided; supposedly “tried and tested” approaches are clung to even when they have long ceased to work. Conformity is rewarded, critical debate discouraged, and pluralism narrowed.

    Fear also fuels “us versus them” thinking, undermining cooperation within societies and between states. It fragments the public sphere. Decisions born of fear — preventive wars, mass surveillance, draconian security measures, or appeasement of violent actors — frequently generate the very dangers they were meant to avert.

    Fear is politically contagious. If it is not transformed into purposeful action through leadership, but merely managed, it becomes paralyzing. Decisions are postponed, risks externalized, responsibility diffused. The result is not security, but self-deterrence — a pattern that has been visible repeatedly since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.


    The Costs of Fear-Driven Politics

    History offers abundant evidence of the destructive consequences of fear-based politics.

    The appeasement of Nazi Germany is a stark example. Traumatized by the devastation of World War I, European leaders sanctioned territorial concessions in the hope of avoiding another conflict. Fear of the aggressor, combined with a policy of accommodation, paved the way for the catastrophe of World War II.

    A second example is the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration justified the war with claims about threats from weapons of mass destruction — claims later shown to be manipulated. The invasion destabilized Iraq and the wider region for decades and severely damaged U.S. credibility, including within NATO. Its origin lay in fear of terrorism.

    Today, across Europe, far-right parties exploit fears of immigration and Islam to generate political support. Alarmist rhetoric about the supposed “annihilation” of European civilization — echoed in the new U.S. security strategy — only lends further momentum to these anti-democratic forces.


    From Fear to Responsible Action

    Historically, democracies rarely fail because of excessive courage. They fail because dangers are ignored for too long — or because leaders are unwilling to name them out of fear.

    A politics of courage does not deny fear. It confronts it – in order to act deliberately and decisively in pursuit of a higher objective. As Franklin D. Roosevelt famously suggested, courage is not the absence of fear, but the recognition that something else matters more.

    A politics of courage is value-based. Even under pressure, it remains guided by principles such as justice, dignity, and the rule of law. It rests on the conviction that inaction can be ethically worse than the risks of action. It assumes that political agency matters — that the future is shaped by what we do today. Its horizon extends beyond narrow self-interest and short-term advantage toward the higher common good.

    A politics of courage confronts reality honestly. It identifies dangers without exaggeration or manipulation, names uncertainties, and accepts political or personal costs in order to do what is right rather than what is easy. Above all: risk management is understood simultaneously as opportunity management.

    Instead of symbolic quick fixes, it invests in solutions that address root causes. It embraces a long-term perspective and accepts short-term political or economic costs in order to secure durable outcomes beyond electoral cycles.

    Fear is translated into responsible action by pairing clear communication of threats with credible courses of action for governments, institutions, and citizens alike. Society is treated not as a manipulable mass, but as a community of responsible adults. Acceptance is generated through transparency, fairness, and shared responsibility.

    A politics of courage exercises power with restraint, deploying extraordinary measures only when necessary and always within the bounds of democratic accountability, pluralism, and the rule of law. At the same time, courage is a prerequisite for democratic self-assertion. Without it, democracy is merely administered — not defended.


    Models of Courageous Leadership

    History offers powerful examples of courageous leadership.

    Franklin D. Roosevelt embodied courage as strategic foresight and patient mobilization against prevailing public sentiment. Through his “Four Freedoms” speech and his famous fireside chats, he prepared institutions, the economy, and society for uncomfortable truths, neutralizing fear before it could become paralyzing.

    Winston Churchill exemplified courage as radical honesty in the face of existential threat. In his first speech as prime minister in June 1940, he offered “blood, toil, tears, and sweat,” refusing the false safety of accommodation. By naming danger without euphemism, he transformed fear into collective resilience.

    Since 2022, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has embodied courage as perseverance under existential threat. At personal risk, he has kept Ukraine united, consistently combining honest communication about danger with clear calls to action — transforming national fear into domestic and international resolve.

    What unites these figures is that they were not governed by fear. They transformed fear into political agency. By this standard, Europe’s political leadership fares poorly.


    Trusting Society

    One of the central misunderstandings of modern democracy is the conflation of leadership with mood management. Polling, focus groups, and real-time social-media feedback suggest that politics should merely reflect prevailing opinions. That is not leadership; it is adaptation.

    Courageous leadership begins where public discourse is not only measured but shaped. It provides orientation, frames interpretation, and works through conflict rather than avoiding it. Those who merely react cede the initiative to actors who simplify, polarize, or exploit fear.

    Courageous politicians do not deny fear; they confront reality, also when this is uncomfortable. They name risks and costs, and outline paths forward. Instead of tactical opportunism, they demonstrate conviction, consistency, and responsibility. Courageous leadership trusts society rather than infantilizing it. It believes society can cope with also hard realities.

    But responsibility does not lie with leaders alone. Open societies must value resilience and long-term responsibility over short-term popularity. They must accept that serious leadership will not always be liked — and that appeasement is no substitute for honesty.

    Political education, media, and civil society must preserve spaces where complexity is tolerated and conflict debated constructively. A politics of courage requires citizens who understand that responsibility is never risk-free.


    Europe Between Strength and Self-Doubt

    Objectively, Europe has ample reason to act with confidence. The EU, together with the United Kingdom and Norway, encompasses more than 500 million people — more than the United States and far more than Russia. This population is highly urbanized, well educated, and deeply integrated into global value chains.

    Economically, Europe belongs to the top tier. With a combined GDP of roughly $26 trillion, it trails the United States (with some $ 30 trillion) but significantly exceeds China (ca. $ 19 trillion) and vastly outpaces Russia (ca. $2.5 trillion), whose economic output is comparable to that of Italy.

    European NATO members collectively field around 2.1 million soldiers — more than either the United States or Russia. Europe’s weaknesses lie less in numbers than in capability and coordination — deficits that can be addressed through political will.

    Yet Europe consistently operates below its potential. It emphasizes its limitations, fears escalation, remains trapped in historical guilt debates, favors political comfort, and lacks geostrategic leadership. The real danger is not external defeat, but self-deterrence. Those who fail to articulate and use their own strength invite others to test it.

    Russia’s leverage lies less in material superiority than in its willingness to take risks and exploit uncertainty. Europe’s weakness, by contrast, is largely psychological. Where Europe hesitates, Moscow creates facts — even when the balance of power suggests otherwise.

    Europe therefore faces a strategic choice. It can continue to downplay its strength and practice self-restraint — or it can act with clarity and take responsibility. Courage would not mean confrontation for its own sake, but the willingness to use power as a necessary instrument of democratic self-assertion.

    A European politics of courage would not seek to shape the global order alone — but it would be prepared and willing to defend it.

  • Thinking beyond old silos!

    Thinking beyond old silos!

    Europeans and Canada need to be bolder and braver in charting out options for their future security.

    Feeling like Cassandra can be unsettling. In early 2025 I wrote the below as part of a broader policy paper on the future of NATO. With Trump now threatening to annex Greenland, thereby putting NATO’s future in further jeopardy, my analysis remains evergreen…

    A potential US withdrawal from NATO would not make the NATO Treaty per se obsolete. At least de iure, it would remain in place. Remaining members may argue that the Alliance is the best and already existing structure for the collective security of all its members. It has a tried and tested machinery, an established international secretariat (both civilian and military), and includes apart from Canada also Norway, the UK and Türkiye as significant non-EU security powers.

    Notwithstanding, remaining members cannot pretend that they could do business as usual. For starters, they would be obliged to update NATO’s founding treaty from 1949. Articles 5 and 6 focusing on NATO’s collective defence provisions explicitly refer to include Europe and North America. With the US gone, this would no longer be valid. What is more, NATO’s institutional identity forged over more than 75 years has always centred around the transatlantic link between Europe and US/America. A potential US withdrawal would in essence be the end of NATO as we know it, and would require a fundamental reconceptualization of its strategic outlook and posture.

    The resulting political dynamics could well lead to transforming or transitioning NATO into a new European Defence Alliance or Organisation, or broader, a Western Defence Alliance, as a new body and ideally based on a coalition of the willing. Setting up such a new institution could also be a useful move to reinforce European capability to act.

    However, there could be an even better way forward: If we want to create the institutional basis for Europeans (and Canada) to become a serious geostrategic actor, we need to stop thinking in old institutional NATO and EU silos which, often based on mutual ignorance, lead to an increasing fragmentation, a growing maze of clouded responsibilities, and often unnecessary duplication.

    Therefore, an even more holistic approach with significant strategic advantages would be to undertake this reform jointly from the EU and NATO angle and, in fact, with the overarching goal to create a joint new body, akin to a Western Defence Union. As a basis, both sides would “create a real joint security strategy between the EU and NATO which clearly integrates NATO and EU threat assessments, capability targets, regional and thematic responsibilities” (Volt; 2025). In essence, such a new joint body with its roots in NATO and the EU would be a further development and merger of all EU efforts currently undertaken as part of a future European Defence Union, which currently focuses on support to Ukraine, ramping up European defence industry and production, and investment in defence, with all defence and security efforts undertaken then hitherto in the NATO framework.

    As both the EU and NATO are frequently gridlocked by the unanimity or consensus principle, such a new institution based on a coalition of the willing would avoid the notorious blockages from Russia’s Trojan Horses like Orban and Fico. It would include Canada, and in fact should also include Ukraine as the country which is defending European security on its soil. Ideally, a new institution would also opt for a qualified majority voting formula as the standard decision-making process. This would further enhance the institution’s capacity to decide and deliver at speed of relevance.

    Such a new framework could also include a mutual defence clause which is more demanding on members than NATO’s Article 5 whereby members only commit to “taking forthwith, individually or in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of force, to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

    Political discussions among capitals about reforms of frameworks and structures must be pursued with urgency.

  • Ukraine freezing, Trump raging, Europe reacting

    My latest for TVP World, on Ukraine and Trump/Greenland:

    1) There is, as there has always been, a real danger of Trump ending US support for Ukraine, even if the Europeans are paying for it. Just to blackmail Zelensky into accepting a bad peace deal, or now to coerce Europe on his latest fantasy, annexing Greenland.

    2) This is happening as Russia intensifies its airstrikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. So far, Ukrainians have shown an admirable resilience and ingenuity in repairing and improvising, but now more European deliveries of air defence systems and ammo are urgent.

    3) Macron’s claim that 3/4 of Ukrainian battlefield intelligence is provided by France, not US, is ambitious but intelligence doesn’t replace weapons.

    4) There are ways to tackle the manpower problem of the UA armed forces, by limiting length of service and multiplying pay to get more people to sign up, but also by having younger and more convincing officers and NCOs for training, as most defections happen after basic training – and finally by replacing humans by ground based combat robots, as recently happened very successfully in Donbas.

    5) Trump’s latest tariff threat is clearly crossing a Rubicon for Europeans. The mood in Brussels and other capitals is: „Enough is enough“. There will be a unified answer by the EU, and it won’t be nice. A threat of retaliatory tariffs on US products and services (incl. digital) is definitely on the cards.

    6) Norway and UK are totally on board with this (so much for Brexit). Even many of Europe’s national populists are now attacking Trump, such as Farage and the Denmark Democrats.

    7) Cooperation and coordination of the Europeans with Congress is crucial, and has already begun. There are hopeful signs that Senators and Congresspeople, at long last, man up to prevent Trump from destroying NATO and throwing Ukraine under the bus.

  • Ukraine’s Road to EU Membership

    TVP World, the Polish Public TV English language channel, has a new format: „Wider View From Brussels“. Here’s my take, of 2 days ago, on Ukraine’s road to EU membership, the geopolitical, political and economic implications, comparisons with the 2004 big bang enlargement, and the eminent question of how to overcome the fatal Hungarian vetoes – together with Rosa Balfour from Carnegie Europe, moderated by TVP World’s Marcin Zaborowski.