Over the years, I have been involved in close to 20 NATO summits. Many of them had a substantive political agenda, like the 2022 Madrid Summit with NATO adopting a new Strategic Concept. Some were dramatic, like the 2008 Bucharest Summit when especially Germany and France succumbed to Putin’s blackmail and shied away from inviting Ukraine and Georgia to NATO’s Membership Action Plan; or the 2018 Brussels Summit when also then President Trump’s closely averted intention to leave the Alliance led to a “near death experience” of NATO.
Compared to that, the Ankara Summit was free of the extra Trump drama unless one considers the degree to which Trump has and continues to undercut the Alliance a drama in its own right. With comparatively less focus on drama, the summit was geared to demonstrate unity and delivery on existing commitments. At the same time, it missed out on addressing a number of strategic issues.
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While the NATO Summit in Ankara was useful, it was not a strategic turning point. It was, above all, a summit of implementation with focus on topics that appeased Trump. But precisely because the Alliance has now entered the implementation phase, we should ask more uncomfortable questions: Implementation towards what strategic end-state? That brings us to the unresolved strategic gaps.
But first on what Ankara achieved
The Summit showcased progress in particular in four areas – albeit with limitations:
A clear re-affirmation of Article 5 – at least on paper
The Summit communiqué reaffirmed the Allies’ “ironclad commitment” to collective defence under Article 5: an attack on one is an attack on all. At a time of uncertainty about the future shape of the transatlantic relationship this is useful, although doubts about the US commitment to Art. 5 remain.
Defence spending is moving towards the 3.5% core-defence target – with gaps
At the Hague Summit in 2025, Allies committed to spending 5% of GDP annually by 2035. 3.5% of this is to cover core defence requirements and up to 1.5% broader defence- and security-related expenditure. One year later, Ankara could point to significant progress. European Allies and Canada had increased their core defence investment by more than €122 billion.
However, Spain, Slovakia, and the United States itself have made it clear from the outset that they will not adhere to this pledge, while many other NATO nations, including France and Italy, have no credible plans in place how to reach the new benchmark. Meanwhile, some Allies like the Czech Republic, Albania, and Slovenia are not even meeting the former 2 percent of GDP defence spending target—although they and NATO have claimed otherwise.
Steps towards broadening key capabilities – over time
Ankara saw meaningful movement in several of these domains:
- Eleven NATO allies agreed to jointly procure Saab GlobalEye aircraft to replace part of NATO’s aging AWACS fleet for airborne warning and control. While less visible than combat aircraft announcements, airborne warning and control systems are among the alliance’s most critical strategic enablers.
- Seven allies expanded strategic airlift and tanker capacity through multinational Airbus A400M and A330 MRTT initiatives. Strategic transport and aerial refuelling have long been among Europe’s most significant capability shortfalls.
- Intelligence and surveillance received similar attention. Northern European allies also announced plans to procure up to five MQ-4C Triton aircraft, significantly improving NATO’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.
Three of the four major capability initiatives are centred on European-designed/manufactured platforms, while the fourth (i.e. Triton) deliberately combines a US platform with European enabling architecture. In other words, Ankara did not represent a simple move toward either “European autonomy” or continued US dependence. It showcased more of a transatlantic industrial model
Practical and financial support for Ukraine – with some creative accounting
Ankara also produced a useful commitment to Ukraine. Allies pledged €70 billion in military equipment, assistance and training for 2026, with a commitment to sustain at least the same level in 2027. To be candid: At least for 2026 this is no fresh money: €30 billion of the €70 billion comes from a €90 billion EU loan agreed earlier in 2026. And Euro 40 billion stem from the Ukraine pledge from NATO’s 2024 Washington Summit.
While political messaging (or window dressing?) this still sends an important signal to Putin: Ukraine’s partners stay the course.
And this is not simply financial support. The emphasis is increasingly on the capabilities Ukraine urgently needs — particularly air defence, ammunition, drones, intelligence and other military equipment — while NATO and EU mechanisms are being used to make assistance more predictable and sustainable.
So, altogether, Ankara delivered some practical substance. But it did not address, let alone resolve many fundamental strategic questions. The main reason for that is the “Trump factor”. It paralyzes the Alliance in multiple ways.
The remaining strategic gaps
Gap 1: Ukraine remains strategically unresolved
Ankara strengthened practical support for Ukraine. But supporting Ukraine and defining Ukraine’s long-term security future are two different things. The Ankara Summit practiced an ostrich approach when it comes Ukraine and its “irreversible path to NATO membership,” as promised at the NATO Washington Summit, or a strategy on how to enable Ukraine’s victory in the ongoing war with Russia. While there has been considerable progress on supporting Ukraine’s war effort, there is much less progress on defining Ukraine’s place in the future European security order.
Gap 2: We still lack a coherent strategy for containing Russia
The Alliance explicitly describes Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security, in fact since 2022. But recognising the threat is not the same thing as having a comprehensive strategy for containing it.
What does containment actually mean in the European context? It cannot mean simply deploying more troops to the eastern flank. It cannot mean simply supplying Ukraine. And it cannot mean waiting for Russia to decide when the war is over.
A credible Russia strategy has to connect many elements: military deterrence, sanctions, economic pressure, energy security, resilience, counter-hybrid measures, intelligence, cyber defence, protection of critical infrastructure, support for Ukraine, and the strengthening of NATO’s eastern and northern flanks. It also needs to take account of Russia’s growing military and technological cooperation with North Korea, Iran and China.
The problem is not that NATO or the EU lack individual instruments. They have many of them. The problem is that the instruments do not yet constitute one coherent, politically owned Western strategy for long-term Russian containment.
And there is an even deeper question: What is the desired end-state?
- Is the objective simply to deter further Russian aggression?
- To enable Ukraine to restore its sovereignty?
- To constrain Russia’s military capacity and prevent it from rebuilding its war machine?
- To minimize NATO’s internal weaknesses of Allies under Russian influence
- To curtail Russian destabilization and subversion across the globe
- Or all of the above?
We need greater strategic clarity. Because deterrence without a political strategy becomes merely permanent crisis management.
Gap 3: The US-Europe transition, strategic enablers and the NATO-EU roadmap remain insufficiently defined
These are three closely connected issues.
First: The future US military contribution remains uncertain.
Ankara reaffirmed the transatlantic bond – on paper. But we also know that the US wants Europe to take care of its conventional deterrence and defence and reduce its engagement accordingly. However, Ankara did not establish a comprehensive roadmap for managing this changing American military contribution to Europe.
Europe needs to know:
- Which US capabilities will remain?
- Which will be reduced?
- Which European capabilities must replace them?
- By when?
This matters particularly because Europe remains dependent on the United States, especially for a number of strategic enablers.
Second: Europe still has a strategic-enabler deficit.
Europe does not primarily suffer from a lack of soldiers. It suffers from insufficient capabilities to find, command, move, protect, and sustain them. While Ankara provided important investments in relevant areas – ranging from intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, via strategic airlift to long-range precision strike – but individual initiatives or procurements are not yet a comprehensive European strategic-enabler architecture. The danger is that Europe spends billions on additional platforms while remaining dependent on the United States for the capabilities that make those platforms strategically effective. The question is no longer simply: How much does Europe spend? It is: What military effect can Europe actually generate — and sustain?
Third: NATO and the EU still lack a comprehensive roadmap for building Europe as a capable geostrategic actor.
We have many individual pieces of the puzzle: NATO defence plans and capability targets; the EU Defence Readiness Roadmap; EU initiatives like Security Action for Europe (SAFE); the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP); national defence plans; multinational capability projects and industrial initiatives, and many more. All of these are important. But where is the strategic roadmap connecting them?
The NATO-EU relationship has improved considerably. There is increasing agreement about a division of labour: NATO focuses on collective defence, military capabilities, standards and command and control, while the EU brings major instruments in resilience, infrastructure, defence industry and financing. That is progress.
But a division of labour is not yet a strategy. What we need is a joint NATO-EU roadmap answering five questions:
1. What must Europe be able to do with little or no US enabling support?
2. Which capabilities should be developed through NATO, which through the EU, and which through smaller coalitions?
3. How do we ensure that EU investment directly reinforces NATO capability targets rather than creating parallel structures?
4. What is the timetable for closing the critical gaps?
5. What is the political end-state?
In other words: What is our vision for Europe? How would a genuinely capable European Defence Union and a European NATO actually look like in 2030 — and how do we get there?
That is, in my view, one of the most important pieces still missing from the European security architecture.
Gap 4: The nuclear question remains largely unresolved
Another issue we should not avoid is nuclear deterrence. NATO continues to rely on the combination of US, British and French nuclear capabilities within the broader Alliance deterrence architecture. But if Europe is assuming greater responsibility for its own security, the political discussion about Europe’s nuclear dimension cannot be neglected. Even less so when the US commitment to NATO’s Article V remains hazy.
What exactly is the future role of the French and British deterrents? How should nuclear consultation among European Allies evolve? What does extended deterrence mean in a more European NATO? And how do we ensure that greater European conventional responsibility is accompanied by credible strategic deterrence?
Ankara reaffirmed the existing architecture. It did not answer these longer-term questions.
Gap 5: Hybrid warfare is recognised — but the response remains fragmented
The same applies to the grey zone. Russia is testing Europe not only through conventional military force but through the entire tool box of its shadow war. We are witnessing the increasingly virulent and aggressive combination of cyber-attacks, sabotage; drones; airspace violations; disinformation campaigns; attacks on critical infrastructure; and attempts to undermine political cohesion.
NATO has increasingly recognised these threats, but the operational response remains dispersed across national governments, NATO, the EU and individual sectors. While Russia has a strategy, we are reacting case-by-case. The Ankara Summit has not provided much here.
We need clearer thresholds. We need clearer responsibilities. We need faster attribution. Commission President Von der Leyen is right that we need consensus on how to react to incidents below the threshold of an armed attack that clearly threaten our security. She is advocating for a “counter-hybrid playbook”. The question is: How do we get there? For a holistic response, a meaningful playbook would require close cooperation between the EU and NATO.
Gap 6: China and the wider strategic environment
There is another key issue that Ankara did not address: Europe is increasingly confronted with a security environment in which the threat from Russia cannot be considered in isolation. China is supporting Russia economically and technologically. It is oiling Putin’s war machinery against Ukraine. North Korea and Iran are contributing military resources. And strategic competition increasingly extends into multiple dimensions such as space, cyber, critical technologies, supply chains, energy, or maritime routes.
NATO therefore needs to think beyond the traditional distinction between the “European theatre” and everything else. In fact, we need to consider a potential Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific as something directly linked to the (ongoing) war in Europe. Already at the 2024 Washington Summit NATO declared: “The PRC cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation.” But what is the price China should be paying? The Ankara Summit left that question unanswered.
3. What should happen next?
The gaps tell us what is missing. The next step is to translate them into a limited number of political priorities. Here are my proposals:
Priority 1: Develop a comprehensive strategy for Ukraine
How the war against Ukraine eventually ends, is Europe’s single most consequential challenge. If it ends well, we all will win. If it ends badly, we will pay the price for decades to come.
We therefore need to connect military support today with a credible security architecture for tomorrow. That means sustained military assistance, but also a strategy for enabling Ukraine’s victory and integrating Ukraine into the future European security architecture. This implies to define especially
- Ukraine’s relationship with NATO, the EU or coalitions of the willing;
- European contributions to Ukraine’s deterrence and defence during and after the war;
- Long- term security guarantees and the role of European forces in maintaining a future potential settlement.
Priority 2: Develop a coherent strategy for containing Russia
For a coherent containment strategy, we need to connect military deterrence with a full range of instruments and efforts. These range from sanctions and economic instruments, via energy and cyber security, intelligence and counter-hybrid measures, the protection of critical infrastructure as well as broader societal resilience, to sustained support for Ukraine as well as support for the Russian.
And we need to define the strategic objectives: What kind of Russia do we expect to confront five or ten years from now — and what do we want to prevent, deter or constrain? That strategic conversation cannot be postponed indefinitely.
Priority 3: Establish a genuine NATO-EU roadmap towards a capable European geostrategic actor
NATO and EU still work too much in their respective silos. We must bring the partnership to a new level of ambition. Europeans whether in NATO or the EU must realise that they must join forces to build up Europe as a capable geostrategic actor. We need a joint roadmap with: capability targets, financing, responsibilities, sequencing, milestones and political accountability. It should establish how NATO planning and EU investment reinforce each other. And it should answer the fundamental question: What must Europe be able to do strategically by 2030 — with less or no involvement of the United States?
Europe must focus particularly on the capabilities that determine whether military forces can actually operate independently and at scale. Strategic enablers should therefore become a central organising principle of European defence investment.
And this needs to be connected to a managed transatlantic transition. No critical US capability should simply disappear into a gap between American withdrawal and European replacement. Putin and Co would certainly exploit that void!
To be clear: This is not about creating a European alternative to NATO. It is about ensuring that two deeply related processes, the Europeanization of NATO and the “NATOization” of the EU, mutually reinforce each other so that Europe is (finally) performing as a capable geostrategic actor.
Priority 5: Strengthen Europe’s broader strategic resilience
Finally, Europe needs to treat hybrid warfare with threats to our critical infrastructure, cyber, space, energy security and exploitation of our technological dependencies as part of the same strategic problem. The distinction between “military security” and “civilian resilience” is becoming increasingly artificial. Europe needs to be able to absorb shocks, withstand coercion and continue functioning under pressure, in extremis under wartime conditions. Establishing a new joint NATO-EU Resilience planning process, modelled on the basis of NATO’s defence planning process would close an important gap.
Conclusion
On balance, NATO’s Ankara Summit was neither a success nor a failure. It was a useful step, but not yet the strategic answer.
Europe is spending more. Industry is being mobilised. Capabilities are being generated. Practical support for Ukraine remains substantial. And Article 5 has been reaffirmed.
But now comes the harder part. We have to turn money into military power, military power into strategic leverage, and strategic leverage into political strategy.
And we have to do that while managing an uncertain transition in the transatlantic relationship.
The real test of the new European defence effort will therefore not be how many billions we announce. It will be whether, five years from now, Europe is genuinely capable of: defending itself, deterring Russia, supporting Ukraine, protecting its critical infrastructure, and acting as a capable geostrategic actor.
That, in my view, is the real unfinished agenda after Ankara.







