Kategorie: Allgemein

  • Values-Based Realism and Its Enemies: How to Tackle the new Geopolitical ‘Realism’ from Left and Right

    Values-Based Realism and Its Enemies: How to Tackle the new Geopolitical ‘Realism’ from Left and Right

    (Martens Centre Blog, together with Dr. Peter Hefele, uploaded on 24 February 2026)

    This year’s Davos World Economic Forum stood out for many things, not least the Greenland crisis, but it will also be known for two memorable speeches: Those of US President Donald Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. While Trump’s 90 minute rambling, self-congratulatory, passive-aggressive rant may have been the most overcrowded event, Carney’s well-crafted 15-minute speech will enter the history books, not only for its succinctness (as opposed to Trump’s rambling) but for its sketch of a ‘values-based realism’ as a viable alternative to the new transactional pseudo-realism Trump stands for.

    Carney acknowledged the end of the old rules-based international order and proposed a coalition of middle powers that pragmatically cooperates in diversifying its trade while still sticking to essential values as the basis of their international behaviour. But just looking back at the last 5 years, values-based realism has two powerful counter-narratives.

    Great power geopolitics of the Alt-Right

    Geopolitics is back in fashion. For more than a year, we’ve heard from the White House that a new era of global power politics has begun. Trump’s Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller summarised it neatly in early January 2026: ‘We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.’ This transactional, might-makes-right ‘America First’ approach to world affairs is underpinned by official documents such as the National Security Strategy of November 2025.

    In a perfectly clear departure from ‘spreading liberal ideology’ and ‘hectoring … nations into abandoning their traditions and historic forms of government’, the administration dismisses at least eight decades of global democracy support and values-based foreign policy. The partial or total destruction of America’s formidable instruments of democratic solidarity – USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – is entirely in line with this thinking.

    To put it bluntly: In this perspective, what used to be the greatest strength of the West – individual freedom, checks and balances. rules-based multilateralism, and the belief in universal human rights – is now considered its biggest weakness in the global power struggle.

    But there is a new phenomenon arising next to the Trumpian view on great powers eternally jostling for spheres of influence. We observe a rising movement and global alliances on what we would like to call a new realpolitik of Progressives and the Global South.

    After the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many in the West, freshly self-confident with a newfound sense of purpose, were disappointed to see so little support for Ukraine in the ‘Global South’, from Latin America via Africa to much of Asia. That should not have come as a surprise.

    British foreign policy expert Fiona Hill in 2023 spoke of a ‘rebellion’ in the Global South against the collective West. One of the tenets of this mindset is to see the rules-based international order increasingly as a poor disguise for the great power politics of a dominant West – and not as a level      playing field. Another central element is that the Global South very pragmatically forges alliances to defend itself against any Western ‘preaching’, weakening or obliterating ideas like global democracy support. Those are allegedly poorly disguised instruments of Western imperialism.

    What is striking in the context of 2026 geopolitics is how many overlaps there are between the neorealism from the radical right and the progressive Southern philosophies – including their left-progressive acolytes in the West –  of the new global disorder and what to make of it. The messages and consequences are clear: in the end, countries, or rather their often autocratic regimes, have to fight for themselves, or even help each other crush Western-inspired democratic movements. Civil society is not a valid concept and a voice to be heard; democracy support is tainted.

    The challenges of Carneyism

    Mark Carney’s fascinating speech in Davos proposed a new coalition of democratic middle powers, believing in values such as human rights and democracy, but capable of creating partnerships with autocracies.

    The latter come with some unpleasant consequences and bitter pills to swallow. And politicians have to explain this to their voters. Canada’s plans for a free trade agreement with China, for the time being withdrawn, is an example of such dilemmas. The most recent EU-India Free Trade Agreement is another one: it means buying more products made with Russian oil, thus indirectly financing Russia’s war on Ukraine. 

    For Europe’s democracies, there is no alternative to navigate the geopolitical storm without illusions, but still based on principles worth defending, and in cooperation with civil societies and democratic forces across the world. We need to hedge against over-dependency on an unreliable and often hostile US by diversifying, obviously not by replacing one dependency with another. Neither the cynicism of the Alt-Right, nor the relativism and defeatism of many progressives and Global South propagandists, should keep us from promoting our values of a free and open society, contributing to making the world at least a bit safer and freer.

  • Would Péter Magyar Be a Better Hungarian Leader Than Viktor Orbán?

    Would Péter Magyar Be a Better Hungarian Leader Than Viktor Orbán?

    Asking for a friend…

    In all fairness, the short answer is: most likely, yes. Unless you’re Vladimir Putin or Donald Trump, both of whom emphatically agree that Orbán must stay in power. But from the point of view of most other people in Europe, Hungarian and non-Hungarian, the answer should be yes.

    Hungary’s parliamentary election on 12 April will arguably be this year’s most momentous European poll, with consequences far beyond Hungary, and even beyond Europe. After 16 years in power and an elsewhere unparalleled push to turn his country into a de facto autocracy, for the first time since 2010, Viktor Orbán faces the possibility of electoral defeat.

    A lot has been made in recent weeks of all the caveats to a positive answer to the title question. They range from a very unfair advantage for Orbán’s ruling FIDESZ in the electoral system to an uneven playing field when it comes to government control of media, the vote counting etc. Magyar’s TISZA party would have to gain a supermajority of votes in order to get a majority in Parliament. And even if power changes hands, the deep state that Orbán has had four full terms to create, with centrally controlled courts, administration, law enforcement and intelligence services, will at least partly work against any new government.

    Most of all, Péter Magyar would probably not signify a clear, 180 degree turn in everything Orbán stands for, from populism to nationalism, vis-à-vis Brussels, Kyiv or other places in Europe. After all, Magyar was a loyal follower of Orbán until 2024. And for example on Hungarian minority rights in neighbouring countries like Slovakia, he has been challenging the current gouverment ‘from the right’. Magyar wouldn’t be an easy partner for Ukraine and Hungary’s fellow member states, either. His character begs some questions. He and most of his teammates lack governance experience. But the following assumptions about him are justified, in my view:

    1) He would be significantly more cooperative than Orbán on EU security and assisting Ukraine. He would stop making fighting ‘Brussels’ an element of Hungary’s political DNA.

    2) He would end the strategic use of corruption as an element of building and maintaining power, if only to fulfil his campaign promises and prevent an early return to power by FIDESZ.

    3) He would try to re-establish, step by step, the rule of law with strong and independent institutions, if only to make sure the EU funds are flowing again and he can show some immediate economic effect to Hungarians.

    4) While continuing the policy of not sending weapons to Ukraine, he would refuse to be Putin’s mouthpiece in the European Union that Orbán has become.

    5) He would stop the culture wars, freeing up a lot of political energy.

    6) While there may be chaotic conditions for a while, don’t underestimate the burst of enthusiasm and creativity, the return of expats and the general sense of a better future that will take hold of most of the country.

    Now, whether in April Magyar can actually turn a majority of votes into a government, is a different question. The electoral playing field is anything but level. FIDESZ is going full steam ahead with a Musk/Trump/Putin-enabled campaign about alleged foreign interference in favour of Magyar, preparing the ground for biased courts to nullify the election results. The ensuing protests could then even serve as an opportunity to declare a state of emergency.

    But such a scenario would hopefully be a reason for EU partners to get serious about altering Hungary’s status as a member state. Precisely because Trump might want to openly interfere with fundamental EU affairs at this point, this might quickly become another Rubicon moment for Europe, with a strong imperative to prove we can still remain who we are, even in catastrophic circumstances.

    But first and foremost, fingers crossed for a resounding victory of Péter Magyar’s TISZA at the ballot box!

  • Europe, Don’t Be a Scaredy-Cat!

    Europe, Don’t Be a Scaredy-Cat!

    Get onto your feet – now!

    While the tectonic plates below our feet keep shifting, and the global order keeps eroding, Europeans are still punching below their weight. The recent concerted push-back against Trump’s coercive plans for a US-annexation of Greenland illustrate how much Europe can gain from standing up to a bully. Here is my passionate plea for a politics of courage – as the rule and not the exception!

    Europe should not be afraid. Not afraid to assume responsibility for its own security. Not afraid to use its economic power. Not afraid of an open rupture with Washington. And, of course, not afraid of Putinism.

    However, over past years, Europe’s politics was largely driven by fear. Yet fear is a terrible adviser. It paralyzes thinking and triggers the instinct to retreat or hide. Yet withdrawal does not eliminate the source of fear. On the contrary: it allows it to grow.

    Europe’s political leadership, too, has been shaped by fear. Fear of the bully in the White House has led to a mixture of submission and ingratiation — a posture that only reinforces his contempt for Europe. Fear of the violent man in the Kremlin has lead to hesitation, appeasement, and a fixation on avoiding escalation — a strategy that merely emboldens an aggressor pursuing a revisionist, imperial project.


    Democracy and the Politics of Fear

    Admittedly, some characteristics of democratic systems make them particularly susceptible to fear-driven politics. Politicians operate under constant competitive pressure; elections, approval ratings, and legitimacy are fragile. The fear of losing public support — and thus power — often encourages defensive or opportunistic behavior rather than courage. This tendency is reinforced by the logic of blame: political actors are far more likely to be punished for failure than rewarded for success.

    The result is structural risk aversion. Short-term, seemingly safe options are favored over decisions that may appear riskier but promise more sustainable long-term outcomes.

    Fear can also be deliberately instrumentalized. Populist parties, in particular, mobilize anxieties about crime, terrorism, migration, or economic decline in order to generate loyalty and consolidate power. Modern media ecosystems amplify perceived threats and crises, fostering an atmosphere of permanent alarm. Under such conditions, political leaders are pushed to react reflexively rather than act autonomously.

    Yet politics shaped by fear comes at a high price. Structural, long-term solutions are neglected in favor of immediate constraints. Experimentation and reform are avoided; supposedly “tried and tested” approaches are clung to even when they have long ceased to work. Conformity is rewarded, critical debate discouraged, and pluralism narrowed.

    Fear also fuels “us versus them” thinking, undermining cooperation within societies and between states. It fragments the public sphere. Decisions born of fear — preventive wars, mass surveillance, draconian security measures, or appeasement of violent actors — frequently generate the very dangers they were meant to avert.

    Fear is politically contagious. If it is not transformed into purposeful action through leadership, but merely managed, it becomes paralyzing. Decisions are postponed, risks externalized, responsibility diffused. The result is not security, but self-deterrence — a pattern that has been visible repeatedly since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.


    The Costs of Fear-Driven Politics

    History offers abundant evidence of the destructive consequences of fear-based politics.

    The appeasement of Nazi Germany is a stark example. Traumatized by the devastation of World War I, European leaders sanctioned territorial concessions in the hope of avoiding another conflict. Fear of the aggressor, combined with a policy of accommodation, paved the way for the catastrophe of World War II.

    A second example is the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration justified the war with claims about threats from weapons of mass destruction — claims later shown to be manipulated. The invasion destabilized Iraq and the wider region for decades and severely damaged U.S. credibility, including within NATO. Its origin lay in fear of terrorism.

    Today, across Europe, far-right parties exploit fears of immigration and Islam to generate political support. Alarmist rhetoric about the supposed “annihilation” of European civilization — echoed in the new U.S. security strategy — only lends further momentum to these anti-democratic forces.


    From Fear to Responsible Action

    Historically, democracies rarely fail because of excessive courage. They fail because dangers are ignored for too long — or because leaders are unwilling to name them out of fear.

    A politics of courage does not deny fear. It confronts it – in order to act deliberately and decisively in pursuit of a higher objective. As Franklin D. Roosevelt famously suggested, courage is not the absence of fear, but the recognition that something else matters more.

    A politics of courage is value-based. Even under pressure, it remains guided by principles such as justice, dignity, and the rule of law. It rests on the conviction that inaction can be ethically worse than the risks of action. It assumes that political agency matters — that the future is shaped by what we do today. Its horizon extends beyond narrow self-interest and short-term advantage toward the higher common good.

    A politics of courage confronts reality honestly. It identifies dangers without exaggeration or manipulation, names uncertainties, and accepts political or personal costs in order to do what is right rather than what is easy. Above all: risk management is understood simultaneously as opportunity management.

    Instead of symbolic quick fixes, it invests in solutions that address root causes. It embraces a long-term perspective and accepts short-term political or economic costs in order to secure durable outcomes beyond electoral cycles.

    Fear is translated into responsible action by pairing clear communication of threats with credible courses of action for governments, institutions, and citizens alike. Society is treated not as a manipulable mass, but as a community of responsible adults. Acceptance is generated through transparency, fairness, and shared responsibility.

    A politics of courage exercises power with restraint, deploying extraordinary measures only when necessary and always within the bounds of democratic accountability, pluralism, and the rule of law. At the same time, courage is a prerequisite for democratic self-assertion. Without it, democracy is merely administered — not defended.


    Models of Courageous Leadership

    History offers powerful examples of courageous leadership.

    Franklin D. Roosevelt embodied courage as strategic foresight and patient mobilization against prevailing public sentiment. Through his “Four Freedoms” speech and his famous fireside chats, he prepared institutions, the economy, and society for uncomfortable truths, neutralizing fear before it could become paralyzing.

    Winston Churchill exemplified courage as radical honesty in the face of existential threat. In his first speech as prime minister in June 1940, he offered “blood, toil, tears, and sweat,” refusing the false safety of accommodation. By naming danger without euphemism, he transformed fear into collective resilience.

    Since 2022, Volodymyr Zelenskyy has embodied courage as perseverance under existential threat. At personal risk, he has kept Ukraine united, consistently combining honest communication about danger with clear calls to action — transforming national fear into domestic and international resolve.

    What unites these figures is that they were not governed by fear. They transformed fear into political agency. By this standard, Europe’s political leadership fares poorly.


    Trusting Society

    One of the central misunderstandings of modern democracy is the conflation of leadership with mood management. Polling, focus groups, and real-time social-media feedback suggest that politics should merely reflect prevailing opinions. That is not leadership; it is adaptation.

    Courageous leadership begins where public discourse is not only measured but shaped. It provides orientation, frames interpretation, and works through conflict rather than avoiding it. Those who merely react cede the initiative to actors who simplify, polarize, or exploit fear.

    Courageous politicians do not deny fear; they confront reality, also when this is uncomfortable. They name risks and costs, and outline paths forward. Instead of tactical opportunism, they demonstrate conviction, consistency, and responsibility. Courageous leadership trusts society rather than infantilizing it. It believes society can cope with also hard realities.

    But responsibility does not lie with leaders alone. Open societies must value resilience and long-term responsibility over short-term popularity. They must accept that serious leadership will not always be liked — and that appeasement is no substitute for honesty.

    Political education, media, and civil society must preserve spaces where complexity is tolerated and conflict debated constructively. A politics of courage requires citizens who understand that responsibility is never risk-free.


    Europe Between Strength and Self-Doubt

    Objectively, Europe has ample reason to act with confidence. The EU, together with the United Kingdom and Norway, encompasses more than 500 million people — more than the United States and far more than Russia. This population is highly urbanized, well educated, and deeply integrated into global value chains.

    Economically, Europe belongs to the top tier. With a combined GDP of roughly $26 trillion, it trails the United States (with some $ 30 trillion) but significantly exceeds China (ca. $ 19 trillion) and vastly outpaces Russia (ca. $2.5 trillion), whose economic output is comparable to that of Italy.

    European NATO members collectively field around 2.1 million soldiers — more than either the United States or Russia. Europe’s weaknesses lie less in numbers than in capability and coordination — deficits that can be addressed through political will.

    Yet Europe consistently operates below its potential. It emphasizes its limitations, fears escalation, remains trapped in historical guilt debates, favors political comfort, and lacks geostrategic leadership. The real danger is not external defeat, but self-deterrence. Those who fail to articulate and use their own strength invite others to test it.

    Russia’s leverage lies less in material superiority than in its willingness to take risks and exploit uncertainty. Europe’s weakness, by contrast, is largely psychological. Where Europe hesitates, Moscow creates facts — even when the balance of power suggests otherwise.

    Europe therefore faces a strategic choice. It can continue to downplay its strength and practice self-restraint — or it can act with clarity and take responsibility. Courage would not mean confrontation for its own sake, but the willingness to use power as a necessary instrument of democratic self-assertion.

    A European politics of courage would not seek to shape the global order alone — but it would be prepared and willing to defend it.

  • Thinking beyond old silos!

    Thinking beyond old silos!

    Europeans and Canada need to be bolder and braver in charting out options for their future security.

    Feeling like Cassandra can be unsettling. In early 2025 I wrote the below as part of a broader policy paper on the future of NATO. With Trump now threatening to annex Greenland, thereby putting NATO’s future in further jeopardy, my analysis remains evergreen…

    A potential US withdrawal from NATO would not make the NATO Treaty per se obsolete. At least de iure, it would remain in place. Remaining members may argue that the Alliance is the best and already existing structure for the collective security of all its members. It has a tried and tested machinery, an established international secretariat (both civilian and military), and includes apart from Canada also Norway, the UK and Türkiye as significant non-EU security powers.

    Notwithstanding, remaining members cannot pretend that they could do business as usual. For starters, they would be obliged to update NATO’s founding treaty from 1949. Articles 5 and 6 focusing on NATO’s collective defence provisions explicitly refer to include Europe and North America. With the US gone, this would no longer be valid. What is more, NATO’s institutional identity forged over more than 75 years has always centred around the transatlantic link between Europe and US/America. A potential US withdrawal would in essence be the end of NATO as we know it, and would require a fundamental reconceptualization of its strategic outlook and posture.

    The resulting political dynamics could well lead to transforming or transitioning NATO into a new European Defence Alliance or Organisation, or broader, a Western Defence Alliance, as a new body and ideally based on a coalition of the willing. Setting up such a new institution could also be a useful move to reinforce European capability to act.

    However, there could be an even better way forward: If we want to create the institutional basis for Europeans (and Canada) to become a serious geostrategic actor, we need to stop thinking in old institutional NATO and EU silos which, often based on mutual ignorance, lead to an increasing fragmentation, a growing maze of clouded responsibilities, and often unnecessary duplication.

    Therefore, an even more holistic approach with significant strategic advantages would be to undertake this reform jointly from the EU and NATO angle and, in fact, with the overarching goal to create a joint new body, akin to a Western Defence Union. As a basis, both sides would “create a real joint security strategy between the EU and NATO which clearly integrates NATO and EU threat assessments, capability targets, regional and thematic responsibilities” (Volt; 2025). In essence, such a new joint body with its roots in NATO and the EU would be a further development and merger of all EU efforts currently undertaken as part of a future European Defence Union, which currently focuses on support to Ukraine, ramping up European defence industry and production, and investment in defence, with all defence and security efforts undertaken then hitherto in the NATO framework.

    As both the EU and NATO are frequently gridlocked by the unanimity or consensus principle, such a new institution based on a coalition of the willing would avoid the notorious blockages from Russia’s Trojan Horses like Orban and Fico. It would include Canada, and in fact should also include Ukraine as the country which is defending European security on its soil. Ideally, a new institution would also opt for a qualified majority voting formula as the standard decision-making process. This would further enhance the institution’s capacity to decide and deliver at speed of relevance.

    Such a new framework could also include a mutual defence clause which is more demanding on members than NATO’s Article 5 whereby members only commit to “taking forthwith, individually or in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of force, to restore and maintain international peace and security.”

    Political discussions among capitals about reforms of frameworks and structures must be pursued with urgency.

  • Ukraine freezing, Trump raging, Europe reacting

    My latest for TVP World, on Ukraine and Trump/Greenland:

    1) There is, as there has always been, a real danger of Trump ending US support for Ukraine, even if the Europeans are paying for it. Just to blackmail Zelensky into accepting a bad peace deal, or now to coerce Europe on his latest fantasy, annexing Greenland.

    2) This is happening as Russia intensifies its airstrikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. So far, Ukrainians have shown an admirable resilience and ingenuity in repairing and improvising, but now more European deliveries of air defence systems and ammo are urgent.

    3) Macron’s claim that 3/4 of Ukrainian battlefield intelligence is provided by France, not US, is ambitious but intelligence doesn’t replace weapons.

    4) There are ways to tackle the manpower problem of the UA armed forces, by limiting length of service and multiplying pay to get more people to sign up, but also by having younger and more convincing officers and NCOs for training, as most defections happen after basic training – and finally by replacing humans by ground based combat robots, as recently happened very successfully in Donbas.

    5) Trump’s latest tariff threat is clearly crossing a Rubicon for Europeans. The mood in Brussels and other capitals is: „Enough is enough“. There will be a unified answer by the EU, and it won’t be nice. A threat of retaliatory tariffs on US products and services (incl. digital) is definitely on the cards.

    6) Norway and UK are totally on board with this (so much for Brexit). Even many of Europe’s national populists are now attacking Trump, such as Farage and the Denmark Democrats.

    7) Cooperation and coordination of the Europeans with Congress is crucial, and has already begun. There are hopeful signs that Senators and Congresspeople, at long last, man up to prevent Trump from destroying NATO and throwing Ukraine under the bus.

  • Ukraine’s Road to EU Membership

    TVP World, the Polish Public TV English language channel, has a new format: „Wider View From Brussels“. Here’s my take, of 2 days ago, on Ukraine’s road to EU membership, the geopolitical, political and economic implications, comparisons with the 2004 big bang enlargement, and the eminent question of how to overcome the fatal Hungarian vetoes – together with Rosa Balfour from Carnegie Europe, moderated by TVP World’s Marcin Zaborowski.

  • The Cost of Failure

    The Cost of Failure

    A Russian victory in Ukraine would reshape Europe

    In these days of hectic diplomacy around a ‘peace deal’ in Ukraine, it’s easy to lose sight of the long term and the big picture. There is a real possibility of a botched deal that leaves Ukraine weakened, Vladimir Putin triumphant, Europe in disarray and America withdrawn. We ought to give more attention to what it might mean.

    A notable exception to this collective denial is Carlo Masala, the German political science professor whose short book If Russia Wins: A Scenario describes how a catastrophic deal for Ukraine leads Russia to ‘test the West’ with a limited hybrid incursion into Estonia in 2028, taking the Russian-speaking town of Narva much like it took Crimea in 2014.

    The North Atlantic Council decides not to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, leaving the incursion unpunished. As Russian strategists celebrate and NATO’s Secretary General mutters about a “dark day for the alliance”, the question of what exactly could happen next is left unanswered. This op-ed will build on Masala’s scenario, developing a plausible trajectory for 2030.

    NATO after Narva

    The Narva scenario would immediately render NATO meaningless, and it could even cease to exist entirely. The Nordics, Baltic countries and Poland might try to form a more limited alliance but most NATO members would re-nationalise their defence, probably trying individually to exchange security guarantees with Russia and accepting limits on their national sovereignty.

    German chancellors and French presidents would have to call Moscow before doing anything relevant on the world stage. To soften the blow, a purported peace dividend would let them reduce their military spending and strike more or less favourable energy deals with Russia. Nord Stream would be reopened with great fanfare.

    Formally, of course, we would all remain democracies. There would be elections, independent media and open public debates – ‘Russophobes’ could scream until they’re blue in the face. But checks and balances would be undermined, and Russian intelligence services and online trolls would provide discreet assistance to national-populist parties, many of which would already be in power by 2030.

    The EU would hang on by the skin of its teeth, but with a much reduced Single Market and neutered supranational institutions. The inevitable economic stagnation would only serve to reinforce the cynicism on which populists and autocrats thrive.

    With Russian influence on the rise, our daily lives would be marked by corruption and organised crime to an extent we can hardly imagine – echoing what the Kremlin has already achieved at home in amalgamating the public administration, secret police and mafia.

    Last but not least, China would enter the fray in increasing our supply chain dependence and strengthening illiberal forces, in limited competition with Russia, but with the same enemy: liberal democracy.

    How not to get there

    This catastrophe can of course be avoided, but we need to change course. Ensuring our long-term independence means pursuing three interdependent strategies: Helping Ukraine remain free and sovereign, mounting a credible European defence as soon as possible, and getting back to dynamic economic growth.

    Europe must fix its defeatist attitude with relation to Ukraine. The coalition of the willing can, in partnership with like-minded democracies around the world, enable Ukraine to hold out against Russian aggression – still with weapons bought from the US, but with little direct US involvement. European leaders can also help Ukraine develop its own weapons industry, and encourage military reform to ease recruitment difficulties.

    This should naturally be financed by frozen Russian assets, as the European Commission has proposed, and tough sanctions must remain in place.

    In building Europe’s own defence and deterrence, Southern and Western member states will have to follow more closely the example of the Eastern flank. Unpopular cuts in welfare spending may be required, which is why the negative 2030 scenario should get much more attention in political communication. We will need more European leaders delivering ‘blood-sweat-and-tears’ speeches akin to Churchill’s masterful oratory of 1940.

    Nevertheless, much of the pain can be offset by economic growth, which Europe must now redouble its efforts to create. Deregulation and trimming of bureaucracy will create the surplus that makes high military spending more palatable; and injecting this funding into the European economy will set in motion a virtuous circle that will make Europe richer as well as safer.

    The past eighty years have made Europeans accustomed to peace and prosperity, to the extent that we struggle even to imagine a return to conflict. The bad news is that change is upon us, and we may indeed fail to meet the moment. The good news is that we still have the tools to avert catastrophe – if we choose to use them.

    Appeared in: The Sentinel 9 December 2025

    https://substack.com/home/post/p-180624914

  • Die Zukunft – eine neue Welt(un)ordnung

    Die Zukunft – eine neue Welt(un)ordnung

    Mark Twain wird das Bonmot zugeschrieben „Prognosen sind schwierig, vor allem wenn sie die Zukunft betreffen“.

    Wie Mark Twain habe ich natürlich auch keine Kristallkugel, aus der ich die Zukunft lesen kann.

    Grundsätzlich halte ich es mit Perikles: „Es kommt nicht darauf an, die Zukunft vorauszusagen, sondern darauf, auf die Zukunft vorbereitet zu sein.“

    Um auf die Zukunft besser vorbereitet zu sein, lassen sich mit Hilfe von Strategic Foresight (Strategischer Vorausschau) eine Reihe von plausiblen Zukunftsszenarien entwickeln, mit unterschiedlichen Wahrscheinlichkeiten und jeweils unterschiedlichen Folgen.

    Der Grundgedanke ist, im Sinne von Popper, dass die Zukunft offen ist.  Es gibt nicht die EINE Zukunft, sondern verschiedene Zukünfte – je nachdem wie wir handeln.

    Strategic Foresight ist die Disziplin zur Vorbereitung auf mehrere mögliche Zukünfte. Ihr größter Nutzen ist es, Handlungsfähigkeit unter Unsicherheit zu sichern.

    Im Folgenden möchte ich vier mögliche Zukunfts-Szenarien kurz skizzieren:

    Geregelte Mehrpoligkeit: Gesteuerter Wettbewerb und stabiler Multipolarismus

    In diesem optimistischen Szenario bündeln Staaten, internationale Organisationen und Gesellschaften ihre Ressourcen, um globale Probleme wie Klimawandel, Pandemien und Wirtschaftskrisen gemeinsam zu lösen. Die USA, China, EU und weitere Großmächte konkurrieren weiter, schaffen aber Regeln, Kanäle und Krisenmanagement-Mechanismen. Es herrscht also Rivalität, aber ohne offenen Großmachtkrieg. Regionalen Konflikten wird mit koordinierten, aber begrenzten Instrumenten begegnet; der Handel bleibt in hohem Maße vernetzt, wobei selektive „Entkopplung“ bei Schlüsseltechnologien stattfindet. Im Bereich Sicherheit und Verteidigung erreichen die USA und die Europäer eine neue Partnerschaft auf Augenhöhe. Die BRICS würden ihre eigenen Interessen verfolgen, wären aber mehrheitlich nicht explizit GEGEN den Westen.

    Warum plausibel: Die Kosten eines Großmachtkrieges sind extrem hoch; wirtschaftliche Interdependenz und gemeinsame Probleme (Klima, Pandemien, Finanzstabilität) zwingen zu funktionaler Kooperation. Analysen zu realistischen Koexistenz der USA und China und zu multipolaren Entwicklungswegen stützen dieses Szenario.

    Folgen allgemein und für Europa/Deutschland:

    • Bessere globale Kooperation und mehr gemeinsame Problemlösungen z.B. bei der Klimapolitik, mehr gemeinsame Standards;
    • Gerechtere Verteilung von Ressourcen und Chancen, weniger extreme Ungleichheit;
    • Stabilere internationale Ordnung, auch wenn Kompromisse nötig sind.

    Der Druck auf Europa, sich im Bereich Verteidigung auf eigene Beine zu stellen, ist hoch und trägt Früchte. Im Fokus stehen Resilienz und Bündnissicherung. 

    Europa entwickelt sich zum Vorreiter grüner Transformation und profitiert von stabilen Handelsbeziehungen. Deutschland kann seine Industrie auf nachhaltige Innovation umstellen und stärkt so seine Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Gemeinsame europäische Sicherheitsstrukturen übernehmen wichtige Verteidigungsaufgaben.

    Insgesamt ist dies das unwahrscheinlichste Szenario. Es erforderte ein hohes Maß an internationalem Vertrauen und institutioneller Reformbereitschaft, die aktuell angesichts geostrategischer Rivalitäten schwer zu erreichen sind.

    Eine Welt der Tech-Giganten

    Technologische Durchbrüche dominieren die Weltordnung. Digitale Konzerne und Staaten mit führender Industrie setzen Standards für Künstliche Intelligenz (KI), Biotechnologie und Energie. Dies ermöglicht Produktivitäts-steigerungen und eine nachhaltigere Wirtschaft, die weniger von fossilen Brennstoffen abhängig ist. Innovationszentren entstehen in vor allem in China, gefolgt von den USA, während weniger entwickelte Regionen abgehängt werden. China wäre der dominante Akteur, während die USA einen Teil ihrer technologischen Führungsrolle verlieren und Europa Mühe hat, Schritt zu halten. In seiner extremsten Form würde eine den Menschen dominierende Super-KI die Weltherrschaft übernehmen.

    Warum plausibel: Innovation und technologischer Fortschritt spielen eine ständig wachsende zentrale Rolle für Dominanz.  Ihre Bedeutung als Grundlage für Macht und Machtausübung in allen Bereichen (politisch, wirtschaftlich, sozial, kulturell) wächst ständig. Autoritäre Akteure setzen sie weitgehend schrankenlos ein.

    Folgen allgemein und für Europa & Deutschland
    Durch Chinas führende Rolle als Tech-Gigant geraten demokratische Systeme weiter unter Druck.  Die europäische Daten- und Netzregulierung wird zum zentralen geopolitischen Wettbewerbsfaktor. Sozialpolitische Spannungen treten auf, wenn Automatisierung Arbeitsplätze verdrängt. Deutschland profitiert von starken High-Tech-Sektoren, muss aber massive Investitionen in Forschung und Bildung tätigen, um Schritt zu halten.

    Die Wahrscheinlichkeit dieses Szenarios ist eher moderat. Die hohe Investitionsbereitschaft in Digitalisierung und grenzüberschreitende Tech-Partnerschaften spricht für eine solche Entwicklung. Gleichzeitig ist ihre Eskalation zur Systemkrise ein reales, aber weniger wahrscheinliches Extremszenario.

    Dies ist der düsterste Zukunftsentwurf: eine Welt, die im Chaos, in internen Konflikten und in einem grassierenden Autoritarismus versinkt. Multilaterale Organisationen wie die EU oder NATO erodieren oder zerfallen. Staaten handeln zunehmend unilateral. Die größer werdende Zahl von BRICS Ländern beschleunigt mit ihrem Fokus auf nationale Eigeninteressen diesen Prozess. Nationale Egoismen schwächen auch Europa nachhaltig. Russland trägt erfolgreich zur weiteren Spaltung bei und hat eine Reihe von Vasallenstaaten geschaffen. Die Weltwirtschaft steckt in der Krise. Handelskriege und Blockpolitik sind zu Normalität geworden. Der Lebensstandard in den westlichen Ländern sinkt, während schwache Nationen zusammenbrechen. Klimakrise und Migration entgleisen.

    Eine zerbrochene Welt

    Warum plausibel: Schon heute sehen wir eine Erosion der klassischen Rüstungskontrolle, Blockaden im UN-System, und eine steigende Zahl bewaffneter Konflikte weltweit. Eine Multipolarität ohne koordinierende Mechanismen neigt zur Fragmentierung. Der Munich Security Report und die Risikoanalysen des World Economic Forum beschreiben diese Dynamiken.

    Folgen allgemein und für Europa & Deutschland

    Europäische Staaten kämpfen gegen Flüchtlingsströme und um die Sicherung kritischer Infrastruktur und Gewährleistung öffentlicher Güter. Es kommt zu Schocks bei der Energieversorgung und bei Lieferketten. Die Verteidigungsausgaben steigen weiter. Deutschland erlebt einen Rückgang seiner globalen Einflussmöglichkeiten und erhöhten Druck auf Sozialsysteme. Nationale Alleingänge ersetzen gemeinsame Politik.

    Die Wahrscheinlichkeit auch dieses Szenarios ist eher moderat. Eine Kaskade innenpolitischer Krisen (ökonomisch, ökologisch, gesellschaftlich) könnte multilaterale Strukturen weiter zerstören, wenngleich ein völliger Zusammenbruch weniger wahrscheinlich ist. Ein vollständiger „Anarchie-Zustand“ wäre extrem schädlich, aber besteht als deutliches Risiko, wenn Kooperation weiter erodiert.

    Eine konfrontative Welt gekennzeichnet von Blockbildung 

    Die Großmächte verfolgen primär nationale Interessen und formieren rivalisierende Blöcke. Ein demokratischer geprägter Block (ggf. ohne USA) konkurriert mit einem autoritären, von China und Russland geführten Block, der seinen Einfluss insbesondere durch Netzwerke mit den BRICS verstärkt, die sich als Teil des anti-westlichen Blocks sehen. Die rivalisierenden Blöcke ringen um Rohstoffe, technologische Vorherrschaft und geopolitischen Einfluss. Handels-, Technologie- und Sicherheitskonflikte eskalieren, Finanz- und Rohstoffkrisen verschärfen globale Spannungen. Die Klimakrise verschärft die Migrationsströme nach Europa.

    Warum plausibel: Wachsende Spannungen zwischen den USA und China einerseits, die verstärkte „Partnerschaft ohne Grenzen“ zwischen China und Russland (auch als „axis of upheaval“ in Kooperation mit Iran und Nordkorea) andererseits sowie die Schritte zur Erweiterung der BRICs einhergehend mit ihrer weiteren Institutionalisierung liefern die praktische Basis.

    Folgen allgemein und für Europa/Deutschland:

    • Mehr regionale Konflikte bzw. Rivalitäten.
    • Schwächere globale Koordination bei Problemen, die grenzüberschreitend sind (Klimawandel, Pandemien etc.).
    • Neue Allianzen und Gegenallianzen.

    Europa wird zur „angegriffenen Festung“: Ein starker Ausbau der eigenen Verteidigungsfähigkeit wird nötig, während der Druck auf die Einheit innerhalb der EU wächst. Handelsbarrieren und Wirtschaftssanktionen belasten die deutsche Exportindustrie. Energiesicherheit wird zum zentralen innenpolitischen Thema.

    Insgesamt ist dies das wahrscheinlichste Szenario. Steigende Blockbildungstendenzen (USA vs. China, BRICS-Koalitionen) und andauernde Regionalkonflikte begünstigen ein solches Szenario.

    Wichtigste Handlungsempfehlungen aus europäischer Perspektive

    And now, so what? Ausgehend von dem Szenario mit der größten Wahrscheinlichkeit, hier einige zentrale Handlungsempfehlungen:

    1. Strategische Handlungsfähigkeit sichern

    • Technologie & Innovation: Europa muss in Schlüsseltechnologien (KI, Halbleiter, Biotechnologie, grüne Energie, Cyberabwehr) eigene Kapazitäten aufbauen.
    • Rohstoffe: Die Diversifizierung von Lieferketten (z. B. seltene Erden, Lithium, Halbleiterkomponenten) muss ausgebaut werden, um Abhängigkeiten von China, den USA oder Russland zu reduzieren.
    • Sicherheit und Verteidigung: Der Ausbau einer eigenständigeren Verteidigungskapazität (durch EU-Initiativen, eine europäischere NATO oder ggf. sogar eine neue Institution a la Europäische Verteidigungsallianz) muss Europas Abhängigkeit von den USA nachhaltig reduzieren.

    2. Handel und Allianzen diversifizieren

    • Partnerschaften: Durch den Ausbau von Handels- und Investitionsabkommen mit Regionen wie Indien, ASEAN, Lateinamerika, Afrika kann Europa mehr Handlungsfreiheit erzielen. Ein Schwerpunkt sollte auf Länder mit demokratischen Systemen gelegt werden.
    • Diplomatie: Europa sollte seine „balancierende Rolle“ zwischen USA und China stärken, und auch damit mehr Eigenständigkeit gewinnen.
    • Nachbarschaftspolitik:  Die Stabilisierung und Integration angrenzender Regionen (Westlicher Balkan, Nordafrika, Osteuropa) sollte intensiviert werden, um den eigenen Einflussraum zu sichern.

    3. Resilienz gegenüber Blockkonkurrenz erhöhen

    • Energieversorgung: Ein weiterer Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien, Wasserstoffwirtschaft, Speichertechnologien, ist notwendig, um nicht erpressbar zu sein.
    • Digitale Souveränität: Europäer sollten europäische Clouds, Standards und Plattformen fördern, damit Europa nicht zwischen den Big-Tech-Giganten aus den USA und China zerrieben wird.
    • Finanzsystem: Es gilt, den Euro als internationale Reservewährung (z. B. durch digitale Euro-Initiativen) weiter zu stärken, um weniger abhängig vom Dollar zu sein.

    4. Europas Soft Power und normative Macht bewahren

    • Regulierungsexport: Europa kann Standards setzen (z. B. beim Datenschutz oder der Regulierung von KI, im Bereich der Nachhaltigkeit), die weltweit Wirkung entfalten.
    • Klimapolitik: EU sollte Vorreiter für grüne Transformation bleiben und Klimadiplomatie als Soft-Power-Instrument nutzen.
    • Multilateralismus: Auch wenn die Welt multipolar ist, kann Europa internationale Foren nutzen, um Brücken zu bauen.

    5. Innenpolitische Stärke & Zusammenhalt

    • Soziale Stabilität: Ungleichheit und populistische Spaltungen in Europa müssen reduziert werden, sonst wird die außenpolitische Handlungsfähigkeit untergraben.
    • Demokratieschutz: Investitionen in Resilienz gegenüber Desinformation, hybriden Bedrohungen und Einflussoperationen (insbesondere aus Russland, China, teils auch den USA) müssen intensiviert werden.
    • Erweiterung und Integration: Stärkere EU-Integration in der Außen-, Sicherheits- und Digitalpolitik sollte darauf abzielen, durch nationale Partikularinteressen geschwächt zu werden. 

    Insgesamt sollte Europa im Szenario einer multipolaren Welt nicht passiv reagieren, sondern sich als ein dritter Machtpol zwischen USA und China behaupten. Dafür braucht es

    • Als Grundeinstellung: Mut, Zuversicht und ein Besinnen auf unsere Stärke;
    • Einen starken inneren Zusammenhalt – nur gemeinsam haben wir eine Chance!

    Dabei sollten wir uns von Mahatma Gandhi inspirieren lassen: „Die Zukunft basiert auf dem, was wir heute tun.“

  • Making NATO HQ „Daddy’s home“

    Making NATO HQ „Daddy’s home“

    Those believing that NATO’s recent 2025 Summit of characterized by European submission and strategic hollowness would have been enough demonstration of Trump appeasement, stand to be corrected. NATO Secretary General Marc Rutte also seeks to appease Donald Trump via sweeping reforms of NATO Headquarters.

    How? In an avidly opportunistic anticipation of “Daddy’s demands”, NATO Headquarters (HQ) is subject to a presumed “efficiency exercise”, including staff cuts and merging functions. However, in essence it is largely a reform to ensure that NATO HQ is “Daddy’s home”. Taking inspiration from the ill-conceived US “DOGE” exercise, it is largely a sleek ingratiation aligned to US MAGA politics. Under the disguise of “efficiency”, NATO HQ functions which could become the target of Donald Trump’s ire for their presumed “wokeness” or “irrelevance” are either downgraded, tucked away or dissolved.

    To illustrate: The team of the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, so far part of the Office of the Secretary General, will be moved to the Political Affairs Division, to ensure lower visibility. For similar reasons, the Climate and Energy Security Section will move from the Emerging Security Challenges Division to be merged within the Defence Policy and Planning Division.

    The Division arguably worst hit so far by the “efficiency” exercise is the Public Diplomacy Division. Similar to the Executive Management Division, it will lose its standing as a division with a senior political appointee, i.e. an Assistant Secretary General in the NATO jargon, leading it. This, in itself, is not a drama, as many previous incumbents have rarely excelled in terms of leadership and management.

    Incidentally, in the case of the Public Diplomacy Division, NATO nations could in fact stop its downgrading: The Division was created in 2003 by consensus via a decision of the North Atlantic Council. It would therefore also require a consensus decision of the same Council to dismantle it.

    What is even more concerning is that the team managing a large-scale public diplomacy programme to foster informed discussions on NATO and wider defence matters in our societies will be dissolved. In particular, NATO’s co-sponsorship grants programme which over decades supported think tanks, universities and other civil society initiatives in all NATO nations and partner countries will come to a grinding halt.

    Perhaps the nifty idea behind all this it to all make NATO communications as such more Trump-like, with a main focus on the use of social media channels (eventually aided by US artificial intelligence tools to be purchased by NATO) in addition to standard platforms such as media conferences where critical questions frequently remain unanswered. There will be little if any space left for people-to-people communications where the real discussions take place.

    While, of course, on a lower scale than the US dissolution of USAID, it is equally shortsighted and counterproductive. With disinformation campaigns from Russia or China on the rise and no end in sight, with populism in many nations eroding also an informed debate on security and defence matters, it would seem key to intensify just such a debate – especially now that the NATO plan to move to 5% GDP for defence investment must be explained to often reluctant citizens. NATO HQ goes the opposite way. Should Putin notice, he will like it!

  • To protect Europe, promote democracy

    Europe’s swing from soft to hard power projection is necessary but risks going too far. Promoting democratic values is part of our strategic interest, not a nice-to-have.

    Russian aggression, American self-interest and a return to great-power conflict are the defining features of 2025. With liberal democracy under assault from several directions, the EU is finally grappling with how to make its democracies more robust and resilient, at home and globally.   

    The consensus around European foreign policy has moved towards a more ‘realistic’ approach to power: more hard than soft, pursuing interests over values, with fewer conditions governing international agreements. Deals with autocrats are on the table if they give us something we need. 

    And yet internally, we still recognise the need to protect democratic values. The European Commission last year unveiled the EU Democracy Shield, a worthwhile initiative to bring the various efforts to protect our liberties under a common framework. 

    The problem is that these emerging external and internal approaches are diametrically opposed. If this contradiction runs its course, it will weaken both the domestic resilience and the external power of the European Union — and, therefore, of freedom on a global scale. To avoid that, we must develop a new balance between soft and hard power. 

    Values are long-term interests  

    In the brave new world of 2025, the old distinction between essential interests and nice-to-have values doesn’t hold water. The world is more peaceful, stable and prosperous the more democracies and fewer autocracies there are. While a deal with the devil might help us in the immediate term, it will bring harm further down the road. 

    America’s arming of the Taliban in the 1980s helped weaken the Soviet Union in the short term, but created huge problems two decades later. Closer to home, the EU’s China policy gave the immediate benefit of lucrative export markets and cheap imports, but we are now paying dearly through painful supply chain dependencies on those very markets, which are often distorted by Chinese political interests. 

    To promote the universal values of freedom and democracy, in other words, is to promote European interests in the long term. The dilemma is not so much whether to promote interests or values, but whether we pursue values in the short or long term. 

    With this understanding, we can see that a deal with an autocrat might help us to, say, curb illegal migration through a certain country — but empowering civil society in that country would create a more stable and prosperous neighbour, something of much greater long-term value. 

    Democracies in decline worldwide

    The increasing self-confidence of autocrats and the sense of democratic decline is not new. The number of free countries in the world has been falling for almost two decades, according to Freedom House. It has been clear for some time now that the optimism of the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Soviet communism, was premature and bordered on hubris. 

    Nonetheless, the first months of Donald Trump’s second presidential term have already indicated an acceleration of democratic backsliding, in the form of more aggressive autocracies and a further undermining of the rule of law both in Europe and in the United States.

    Most dramatically, the US has practically ceased its support for democracy and democrats across the globe, reversing a seven-decade-old policy that underpinned America’s role as a global advocate of freedom and human rights. This reversal arguably marks the low point of freedom globally since the end of the Cold War.  

    China, Russia and other autocracies now feel enabled to fill this gap. They are free to spread their narratives and their influence, creating dependencies through financial, medical and technical assistance without giving any support to civil society and the rule of law. 

    The EU may not be able entirely to fill the gap left by the US, but we owe it to ourselves to step up and at least aspire to take on the mantle of leader of the free world.   

    Time to adopt smart power

    The EU has neglected hard power for decades and is now reaping the consequences. To make things worse, it also developed a rather self-congratulatory attitude about its own soft power.  

    But as we reverse course, we risk pouring the baby out with the bathwater. There is still a role for soft power alongside Europe’s military renaissance, supporting democracies around the world as an outer line of defence for our own freedom. Our new approach to power projection should not be entirely hard or soft, but balanced. Call it ‘smart power.’ 

    In supporting democracy, the EU needs to think beyond its neighbourhood. We have spent a lot of energy and money on supporting democracy and the rule of law in the countries adjacent to the EU, or across the Mediterranean. Now, institutions such as the European Endowment for Democracy should broaden their geographical scope.  

    Civil society is key, not only on the receiving end but also in the EU itself. The EU should offer financial support to organisations in member states that help foster civil society worldwide.   

    Local specificities and sensitivities need to be taken into account. Autocrats will always accuse of us of destroying family values and traditions, but we shouldn’t make it easy for them. Insisting on gender and LGBTQ policies that the vast majority of people in a target country disagree with is counterproductive. 

    The EU should treat global solidarity with democrats as a central interest in defending our own democracy. By mobilising civil society in the EU itself, we can reach out globally and fill at least part of the gap left by a US which has — hopefully temporarily — ditched its efforts to support freedom on a global scale. 

    By combining elements of hard and soft power, we can stop the democratic backsliding and support freedom-loving people across the globe.  

    https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/oped-to-protect-europe-promote-democracy