Autor: Roland Freudenstein

  • The Global Solidarity of Democrats – in the Age of Autocracy and Empire

    My latest policy brief for the Wilfried Martens Centre, on the Global Solidarity of Democrats. Let’s end the doom and gloom about the future of liberal democracy, and make a new push. Here are 10 central points:
    1️⃣In the current era of autocracy and empire, democracy is on the back foot. Autocratic regimes have become more resilient and cooperate with one another in directly undermining democratic societies.
    2️⃣While the ‘Global South’ is rather indifferent to the democracy paradigm, the US under Trump has not only abandoned its role as a leading democracy supporter but is in some cases attacking open society.
    3️⃣Democrats should strike back. The crisis must be turned into an opportunity. The defenders of liberal democracy should forcefully counter the new geopolitical pseudo-realism as well as anti-Western narratives.
    4️⃣Supporting other democrats is not bonhomie, but in our own strategic interest.
    5️⃣The weaknesses of autocracies need to be better pointed out.
    6️⃣Democratic resilience at home and supporting democrats globally go together.
    7️⃣The particular local conditions and interests in the target countries need to be better respected.
    8️⃣Political diasporas should play a bigger role.
    9️⃣The new push should be led by the EU and its member states and initiated by civil society, especially political parties. We should both use more resources and explore new methods of fundraising and institutional models.
    🔟Viktor Orbán’s defeat in Hungary shows that the tables can indeed be turned on autocracy as well as empire.

    The Global Solidarity of Democrats: Turning the Tables in the Age of Autocracy and Empire

  • Diplomacy and War Zelensky-Trump-Putin phone diplomacy, NATO and Poland-Ukraine: My interview yesterday on TVP World

    Zelensky-Trump and Putin-Trump calls:

    • Zelensky can build on recent military successes against Russia (drones, deep strikes). Trump may not like Zelensky, but he respects winners.
    • Zelensky can show that he is still interested in peace negotiations, as opposed to Putin who hasn’t budged since 2022

    NATO summit in Ankara:

    • damage limitation is the Europeans’ goal but Trump has been turning up the hate against NATO recently.
    • On defence spending, Greenland, Iran, in 2025/6 Europeans have done the reasonable things and resisted the crazy ideas.
    • The problem is that every Trump tweet bashing the allies gives Putin new hope of splitting the West and thereby eventually winning against Ukraine.

    Ukrainian drone strikes:

    • They are extremely effective in turning up the heat on Putin. He is now in his worst situation since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, thanks to Ukrainian military successes, but also Western sanctions and the subsequent souring of the mood of many Russians.
    • Whether that will force him to compromise on peace with Ukraine, remains to be seen. But it’s still Ukraine’s best bet.

    Military situation in Donbas:

    • Claims and counter-claims about who controls Kostyantynivka: What we know for sure is that the city centre will still be embattled for some time while Ukraine inflicts terrible losses on Russia (like in Pokrovsk).
    • Kostyantynivka is no tipping point, even for the Donbas itself. Slovyansk and Kramatorsk are firmly in Ukrainian hands, and strongly fortified.

    US intel warnings about Russian attack against Poland:

    • Putin may indeed be weighing options of a hybrid attack on a NATO member. It sounds counter-intuitive because Russia has problems already in Ukraine but it would most certainly not be a full-scale ground attack but something hybrid (missiles, drones, sabotage, maybe limited incursion under false flag).
    • The goal would not be to conquer territory, but to distract attention (and arms deliveries) from Ukraine and, above all, split the Europeans: there would be countries in favour of an armed response and others who would want to de-escalate.
    • Donald Tusk is right to amplify those US government warnings: Better safe than sorry!

    The Polish-Ukrainian spat over history:

    • This is by now a full-blown crisis between important allies, and the only profiteer is Putin!
    • Mistakes were made on both sides, but the most important lesson is: Poles and Ukrainians will hardly agree on a common vision of a painful history. They should jointly prioritise to cooperate on topics that are of strategic importance: that Ukraine wins the war and that it soon joins the EU.
    • In that sense, history should be put in its place.
  • Europe’s Drone Moment: Turning Civilian Strength into Strategic Defence Advantage

    Europe’s Drone Moment: Turning Civilian Strength into Strategic Defence Advantage

    By Christine Raab, Germany-based drone and defence expert, founder of COPURA GmbH

    Russia’s war against Ukraine, the constant probing of Europe’s airspace and borders, and the vulnerability of our critical infrastructure have made one thing crystal clear: drones are now a central feature of modern security. From the Black Sea to the Baltic and the Gulf region, cheap unmanned systems have challenged traditional military technology and exposed how easily our open societies can be disrupte. For a Europe that has long under‑invested in hard power, drones are both a warning light and an opportunity.

    The warning is obvious: Drones have driven a profound empowerment of small groups and even individuals, similar to what smartphones did some 15 years ago. They shake up our concepts of security and are accessible to state and non‑state actors alike. They have been used to spy and hit facilities that were previously considered relatively safe, while border services and police forces report increasing use of drones for smuggling, illegal crossings and surveillance of security forces themselves. The security infringements are serious and manyfold. Europe needs to act and act fast.

    Yet Europe is not starting from zero: In the last decade, the EU has developed the most sophisticated civilian drone framework in the world. Its airspace rules, certification concepts, operational categories and uncompromising approach to safety are shaping how drones are designed, built and flown – in Europe and beyond. A capable ecosystem of SMEs, start‑ups and industrial players has emerged around these rules. This civilian base is a hidden strategic asset that political decision‑makers should now bring into their security toolbox.

    “Civilian” and “defence” increasingly blend together and if we build bridges with our security thinking, a dual‑use strategy would use taxpayer money once to serve two purposes: crowding in private investment and jobs at home, while at the same time strengthening deterrence and resilience against real threats. It would provide security on our borders and across EU territory, and at the same time serve as a major innovation agenda for the European economy.

    Bridge 1 – capability. Many technologies and procedures tested and solidified in civil airspace – detect‑and‑avoid systems, traffic management, secure communications or operator training – are directly relevant to border surveillance, critical‑infrastructure protection and battlefield logistics. By aligning requirements and standards where possible, defence and interior ministries can shorten procurement cycles, avoid bespoke “gold‑plated” solutions and benefit from economies of scale created by the civilian market. Training reserve soldiers on drones in their regular exercises is another cost‑efficient way to increase overall resilience. This is fiscal efficiency in practice.

    Bridge 2 –  governance. A cross‑border airspace incursion, a hostile drone over a nuclear plant, or an attack on an LNG terminal at sea raises operational and legal questions for local police, air‑navigation service providers, national air forces, EU agencies and NATO – all at once. Today, responsibilities and rules of engagement remain fragmented, with grey zones between “civil” and “military” chains of command. Good governance also needs coherent, integrated data for proper situational awareness, another element Europe still lacks. We need clearer roles, better information‑sharing and joint exercises between EU, NATO and member states, using existing civil‑drone expertise as part of the solution.

    Bridge 3 – industry. We cannot afford to miss the innovation wave of drones and counter‑drones. The good news is that a vibrant civilian sector already exists inside the Single Market. With the right incentives, these firms can scale into dual‑use champions, offering European alternatives to imported systems and embedding our own standards on safety, cybersecurity and data protection. EU defence tools, from joint procurement to the European Defence Fund, should be used to pull these players into larger programmes, not to reinvent the wheel in closed military silos.

    More drones will likely raise concerns among citizens. Questions about surveillance, data use, and deployment at borders or over cities are not “technical”. If mishandled, they risk fuelling resistance to exactly the capabilities Europe needs. Our democratic systems have a high‑stakes opportunity here to show that liberty and security are not a zero‑sum game. A rules‑based approach – with clear legal mandates, proportionality safeguards and effective parliamentary oversight – can ensure that high‑tech security remains anchored in European values, supported by open public discussion to build societal acceptance.

    So here is a set of political actions necessary to get the unmanned capabilities a democratic and resilient Europe needs:

    • Prioritise a small number of concrete drone and counter‑drone capabilities that directly protect citizens and critical infrastructure.
    • Use existing civilian rules, agencies and test ranges as accelerators for defence and security projects, not as obstacles.
    • Develop and maintain high‑volume drone production capacities in Europe, accepting that maintaining them may cost taxpayers money.
    • Fund pragmatic pilot projects with industry, cities and border regions to prove concepts quickly and visibly, helping to shorten procurement cycles.
    • Create the legal and technical conditions for an integrated situational‑awareness picture for decision‑preparation, because when the moment comes, decisions must be quick and aligned.
    • Embed privacy‑by‑design and transparency requirements early, so that public trust grows with capability, rather than distrust.

    Europe’s drone moment is already here and a lot of initiatives in these priority areas have started. The bigger challenge will be to maintain focus despite political distractions and to develop capabilities as coherently as possible across Europe. In security, any wall is only as strong as its weakest brick. If Europe manages to implement such a security‑ and innovation‑focused agenda in developing its unmanned capabilities, it can credibly improve its geopolitical security position within a foreseeable time.

  • Trump, NATO and a Possible Russian Attack

    (my interview for TVP World on 26 April, 2026)

    • White House Correspondents Dinner attack:
      • Europeans’ gut reaction is: This is America’s toxic gun culture and political polarisation.
      • But initially, there was even a conciliatory tone between Republicans and Democrats: both sides were represented at the dinner, and Trump called this an attack on the Constitution (about which he otherwise cares less).
      • But this kind of unity is not going to last. Trump’s ship is sinking, politically, and divisiveness will quickly return.
    • Trump’s and Tusk’s remarks on NATO allies:
      • Trump calling Europeans bad allies is like Voldemort claiming Harry Potter violated the Geneva Convention at the Battle of Hogwarts.
      • Critics of PM Tusk’s questioning US loyalty in NATO should finally admit that it’s Trump who has been systematically undermining Article 5 for over a year now.
      • Trump’s claim that NATO allies are unhelpful over Iran systematically overlooks the fact that NATO is a defensive alliance, not one for a war of choice without even consulting allies.
      • The one time allies were there to help the US was after it had been attacked on 9/11. And Europeans casualties there were overproportional in relation to their size.
    • US-Polish relations:
      • There still is a special relationship beyond NATO. Poland’s record on defence spending and readiness to fight is exemplary. Trump has nothing to complain about here.
      • Recent US behaviour reminds a lot of Poles of Soviet bullying. And President Nawrocki’s attempt to create a special axis to Washington, bypassing the government, is not helpful.
    • Is a Russian attack on NATO imminent?
      • PM Tusk said something that many European political leaders and military commanders have said, just maybe a little less dramatically than he.
      • An attack may indeed be closer than many in Europe think. Russia still has some reserve forces and air assets, and it already is waging a hybrid war against Western democracies ranging from cyber attacks to sabotage etc.
    • Is NATO ready?
      • Probably not tomorrow. Also depends on the kind of attack. Now, the US are indispensable for a defence.
      • In the long run, Europeans have to be able to deter Russia on their own; in the short run, they have to take what they can get from the US. This may make them actually more dependent, which is why Europeans need to navigate between short and long term.
    • EU summit in Cyprus:
      • The 90 bn loan for Ukraine passed! That’s a welcome boost for Ukraine.
      • On financing the EU’s huge expenditures for defence, energy security and soon maybe even to counter a new global recession, there is the habitual difference between the frugal North and the profligate South. But a compromise will be found!
  • Values-Based Realism and Its Enemies: How to Tackle the new Geopolitical ‘Realism’ from Left and Right

    Values-Based Realism and Its Enemies: How to Tackle the new Geopolitical ‘Realism’ from Left and Right

    (Martens Centre Blog, together with Dr. Peter Hefele, uploaded on 24 February 2026)

    This year’s Davos World Economic Forum stood out for many things, not least the Greenland crisis, but it will also be known for two memorable speeches: Those of US President Donald Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. While Trump’s 90 minute rambling, self-congratulatory, passive-aggressive rant may have been the most overcrowded event, Carney’s well-crafted 15-minute speech will enter the history books, not only for its succinctness (as opposed to Trump’s rambling) but for its sketch of a ‘values-based realism’ as a viable alternative to the new transactional pseudo-realism Trump stands for.

    Carney acknowledged the end of the old rules-based international order and proposed a coalition of middle powers that pragmatically cooperates in diversifying its trade while still sticking to essential values as the basis of their international behaviour. But just looking back at the last 5 years, values-based realism has two powerful counter-narratives.

    Great power geopolitics of the Alt-Right

    Geopolitics is back in fashion. For more than a year, we’ve heard from the White House that a new era of global power politics has begun. Trump’s Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller summarised it neatly in early January 2026: ‘We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power.’ This transactional, might-makes-right ‘America First’ approach to world affairs is underpinned by official documents such as the National Security Strategy of November 2025.

    In a perfectly clear departure from ‘spreading liberal ideology’ and ‘hectoring … nations into abandoning their traditions and historic forms of government’, the administration dismisses at least eight decades of global democracy support and values-based foreign policy. The partial or total destruction of America’s formidable instruments of democratic solidarity – USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty – is entirely in line with this thinking.

    To put it bluntly: In this perspective, what used to be the greatest strength of the West – individual freedom, checks and balances. rules-based multilateralism, and the belief in universal human rights – is now considered its biggest weakness in the global power struggle.

    But there is a new phenomenon arising next to the Trumpian view on great powers eternally jostling for spheres of influence. We observe a rising movement and global alliances on what we would like to call a new realpolitik of Progressives and the Global South.

    After the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many in the West, freshly self-confident with a newfound sense of purpose, were disappointed to see so little support for Ukraine in the ‘Global South’, from Latin America via Africa to much of Asia. That should not have come as a surprise.

    British foreign policy expert Fiona Hill in 2023 spoke of a ‘rebellion’ in the Global South against the collective West. One of the tenets of this mindset is to see the rules-based international order increasingly as a poor disguise for the great power politics of a dominant West – and not as a level      playing field. Another central element is that the Global South very pragmatically forges alliances to defend itself against any Western ‘preaching’, weakening or obliterating ideas like global democracy support. Those are allegedly poorly disguised instruments of Western imperialism.

    What is striking in the context of 2026 geopolitics is how many overlaps there are between the neorealism from the radical right and the progressive Southern philosophies – including their left-progressive acolytes in the West –  of the new global disorder and what to make of it. The messages and consequences are clear: in the end, countries, or rather their often autocratic regimes, have to fight for themselves, or even help each other crush Western-inspired democratic movements. Civil society is not a valid concept and a voice to be heard; democracy support is tainted.

    The challenges of Carneyism

    Mark Carney’s fascinating speech in Davos proposed a new coalition of democratic middle powers, believing in values such as human rights and democracy, but capable of creating partnerships with autocracies.

    The latter come with some unpleasant consequences and bitter pills to swallow. And politicians have to explain this to their voters. Canada’s plans for a free trade agreement with China, for the time being withdrawn, is an example of such dilemmas. The most recent EU-India Free Trade Agreement is another one: it means buying more products made with Russian oil, thus indirectly financing Russia’s war on Ukraine. 

    For Europe’s democracies, there is no alternative to navigate the geopolitical storm without illusions, but still based on principles worth defending, and in cooperation with civil societies and democratic forces across the world. We need to hedge against over-dependency on an unreliable and often hostile US by diversifying, obviously not by replacing one dependency with another. Neither the cynicism of the Alt-Right, nor the relativism and defeatism of many progressives and Global South propagandists, should keep us from promoting our values of a free and open society, contributing to making the world at least a bit safer and freer.

  • Would Péter Magyar Be a Better Hungarian Leader Than Viktor Orbán?

    Would Péter Magyar Be a Better Hungarian Leader Than Viktor Orbán?

    Asking for a friend…

    In all fairness, the short answer is: most likely, yes. Unless you’re Vladimir Putin or Donald Trump, both of whom emphatically agree that Orbán must stay in power. But from the point of view of most other people in Europe, Hungarian and non-Hungarian, the answer should be yes.

    Hungary’s parliamentary election on 12 April will arguably be this year’s most momentous European poll, with consequences far beyond Hungary, and even beyond Europe. After 16 years in power and an elsewhere unparalleled push to turn his country into a de facto autocracy, for the first time since 2010, Viktor Orbán faces the possibility of electoral defeat.

    A lot has been made in recent weeks of all the caveats to a positive answer to the title question. They range from a very unfair advantage for Orbán’s ruling FIDESZ in the electoral system to an uneven playing field when it comes to government control of media, the vote counting etc. Magyar’s TISZA party would have to gain a supermajority of votes in order to get a majority in Parliament. And even if power changes hands, the deep state that Orbán has had four full terms to create, with centrally controlled courts, administration, law enforcement and intelligence services, will at least partly work against any new government.

    Most of all, Péter Magyar would probably not signify a clear, 180 degree turn in everything Orbán stands for, from populism to nationalism, vis-à-vis Brussels, Kyiv or other places in Europe. After all, Magyar was a loyal follower of Orbán until 2024. And for example on Hungarian minority rights in neighbouring countries like Slovakia, he has been challenging the current gouverment ‘from the right’. Magyar wouldn’t be an easy partner for Ukraine and Hungary’s fellow member states, either. His character begs some questions. He and most of his teammates lack governance experience. But the following assumptions about him are justified, in my view:

    1) He would be significantly more cooperative than Orbán on EU security and assisting Ukraine. He would stop making fighting ‘Brussels’ an element of Hungary’s political DNA.

    2) He would end the strategic use of corruption as an element of building and maintaining power, if only to fulfil his campaign promises and prevent an early return to power by FIDESZ.

    3) He would try to re-establish, step by step, the rule of law with strong and independent institutions, if only to make sure the EU funds are flowing again and he can show some immediate economic effect to Hungarians.

    4) While continuing the policy of not sending weapons to Ukraine, he would refuse to be Putin’s mouthpiece in the European Union that Orbán has become.

    5) He would stop the culture wars, freeing up a lot of political energy.

    6) While there may be chaotic conditions for a while, don’t underestimate the burst of enthusiasm and creativity, the return of expats and the general sense of a better future that will take hold of most of the country.

    Now, whether in April Magyar can actually turn a majority of votes into a government, is a different question. The electoral playing field is anything but level. FIDESZ is going full steam ahead with a Musk/Trump/Putin-enabled campaign about alleged foreign interference in favour of Magyar, preparing the ground for biased courts to nullify the election results. The ensuing protests could then even serve as an opportunity to declare a state of emergency.

    But such a scenario would hopefully be a reason for EU partners to get serious about altering Hungary’s status as a member state. Precisely because Trump might want to openly interfere with fundamental EU affairs at this point, this might quickly become another Rubicon moment for Europe, with a strong imperative to prove we can still remain who we are, even in catastrophic circumstances.

    But first and foremost, fingers crossed for a resounding victory of Péter Magyar’s TISZA at the ballot box!

  • Ukraine freezing, Trump raging, Europe reacting

    My latest for TVP World, on Ukraine and Trump/Greenland:

    1) There is, as there has always been, a real danger of Trump ending US support for Ukraine, even if the Europeans are paying for it. Just to blackmail Zelensky into accepting a bad peace deal, or now to coerce Europe on his latest fantasy, annexing Greenland.

    2) This is happening as Russia intensifies its airstrikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure. So far, Ukrainians have shown an admirable resilience and ingenuity in repairing and improvising, but now more European deliveries of air defence systems and ammo are urgent.

    3) Macron’s claim that 3/4 of Ukrainian battlefield intelligence is provided by France, not US, is ambitious but intelligence doesn’t replace weapons.

    4) There are ways to tackle the manpower problem of the UA armed forces, by limiting length of service and multiplying pay to get more people to sign up, but also by having younger and more convincing officers and NCOs for training, as most defections happen after basic training – and finally by replacing humans by ground based combat robots, as recently happened very successfully in Donbas.

    5) Trump’s latest tariff threat is clearly crossing a Rubicon for Europeans. The mood in Brussels and other capitals is: „Enough is enough“. There will be a unified answer by the EU, and it won’t be nice. A threat of retaliatory tariffs on US products and services (incl. digital) is definitely on the cards.

    6) Norway and UK are totally on board with this (so much for Brexit). Even many of Europe’s national populists are now attacking Trump, such as Farage and the Denmark Democrats.

    7) Cooperation and coordination of the Europeans with Congress is crucial, and has already begun. There are hopeful signs that Senators and Congresspeople, at long last, man up to prevent Trump from destroying NATO and throwing Ukraine under the bus.

  • Ukraine’s Road to EU Membership

    TVP World, the Polish Public TV English language channel, has a new format: „Wider View From Brussels“. Here’s my take, of 2 days ago, on Ukraine’s road to EU membership, the geopolitical, political and economic implications, comparisons with the 2004 big bang enlargement, and the eminent question of how to overcome the fatal Hungarian vetoes – together with Rosa Balfour from Carnegie Europe, moderated by TVP World’s Marcin Zaborowski.

  • The Cost of Failure

    The Cost of Failure

    A Russian victory in Ukraine would reshape Europe

    In these days of hectic diplomacy around a ‘peace deal’ in Ukraine, it’s easy to lose sight of the long term and the big picture. There is a real possibility of a botched deal that leaves Ukraine weakened, Vladimir Putin triumphant, Europe in disarray and America withdrawn. We ought to give more attention to what it might mean.

    A notable exception to this collective denial is Carlo Masala, the German political science professor whose short book If Russia Wins: A Scenario describes how a catastrophic deal for Ukraine leads Russia to ‘test the West’ with a limited hybrid incursion into Estonia in 2028, taking the Russian-speaking town of Narva much like it took Crimea in 2014.

    The North Atlantic Council decides not to invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, leaving the incursion unpunished. As Russian strategists celebrate and NATO’s Secretary General mutters about a “dark day for the alliance”, the question of what exactly could happen next is left unanswered. This op-ed will build on Masala’s scenario, developing a plausible trajectory for 2030.

    NATO after Narva

    The Narva scenario would immediately render NATO meaningless, and it could even cease to exist entirely. The Nordics, Baltic countries and Poland might try to form a more limited alliance but most NATO members would re-nationalise their defence, probably trying individually to exchange security guarantees with Russia and accepting limits on their national sovereignty.

    German chancellors and French presidents would have to call Moscow before doing anything relevant on the world stage. To soften the blow, a purported peace dividend would let them reduce their military spending and strike more or less favourable energy deals with Russia. Nord Stream would be reopened with great fanfare.

    Formally, of course, we would all remain democracies. There would be elections, independent media and open public debates – ‘Russophobes’ could scream until they’re blue in the face. But checks and balances would be undermined, and Russian intelligence services and online trolls would provide discreet assistance to national-populist parties, many of which would already be in power by 2030.

    The EU would hang on by the skin of its teeth, but with a much reduced Single Market and neutered supranational institutions. The inevitable economic stagnation would only serve to reinforce the cynicism on which populists and autocrats thrive.

    With Russian influence on the rise, our daily lives would be marked by corruption and organised crime to an extent we can hardly imagine – echoing what the Kremlin has already achieved at home in amalgamating the public administration, secret police and mafia.

    Last but not least, China would enter the fray in increasing our supply chain dependence and strengthening illiberal forces, in limited competition with Russia, but with the same enemy: liberal democracy.

    How not to get there

    This catastrophe can of course be avoided, but we need to change course. Ensuring our long-term independence means pursuing three interdependent strategies: Helping Ukraine remain free and sovereign, mounting a credible European defence as soon as possible, and getting back to dynamic economic growth.

    Europe must fix its defeatist attitude with relation to Ukraine. The coalition of the willing can, in partnership with like-minded democracies around the world, enable Ukraine to hold out against Russian aggression – still with weapons bought from the US, but with little direct US involvement. European leaders can also help Ukraine develop its own weapons industry, and encourage military reform to ease recruitment difficulties.

    This should naturally be financed by frozen Russian assets, as the European Commission has proposed, and tough sanctions must remain in place.

    In building Europe’s own defence and deterrence, Southern and Western member states will have to follow more closely the example of the Eastern flank. Unpopular cuts in welfare spending may be required, which is why the negative 2030 scenario should get much more attention in political communication. We will need more European leaders delivering ‘blood-sweat-and-tears’ speeches akin to Churchill’s masterful oratory of 1940.

    Nevertheless, much of the pain can be offset by economic growth, which Europe must now redouble its efforts to create. Deregulation and trimming of bureaucracy will create the surplus that makes high military spending more palatable; and injecting this funding into the European economy will set in motion a virtuous circle that will make Europe richer as well as safer.

    The past eighty years have made Europeans accustomed to peace and prosperity, to the extent that we struggle even to imagine a return to conflict. The bad news is that change is upon us, and we may indeed fail to meet the moment. The good news is that we still have the tools to avert catastrophe – if we choose to use them.

    Appeared in: The Sentinel 9 December 2025

    https://substack.com/home/post/p-180624914

  • Germany’s new Ukraine doctrine: more money, harder questions

    My latest interview for TVP World, 14 Nov 2025


    – Germany under Chancellor Friedrich Merz is putting its money where its mouth is when it comes to helping Ukraine defending itself: On top of the planned 8,5 bn Euros, in 2026 Germany has pledged 3 bn additionally.
    – The EU will use the frozen Russian assets as backup for a 140 bn Euro loan to Kyiv, but:
    – Belgium is right to insist on iron-clad guarantees from its EU partners for possible lawsuits.
    – Merz combines ramping up aid fur Ukraine with some frank language on solving the Ukraine Armed Forces‘ manpower problem and fighting corruption more effectively.
    – Putin wants to hit Ukrainian energy infrastructure more massively than ever before in order to cause waves of refugees. That’s why Ukraine urgently needs more help on air defence.